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ABSTRACT
THE SLAVE SOUTH IN THE FAR WEST:
CALIFORNIA, THE PACIFIC, AND PROSLAVERY VISIONS OF EMPIRE
Kevin Waite
Steven Hahn
This dissertation rests on a relatively simple premise: America’s road to disunion
ran west, and unless we account for the transcontinental and trans-Pacific ambitions of
slaveholders, our understanding of the nation’s bloodiest conflict will remain incomplete.
Whereas a number of important works have explored southern imperialism within the
Atlantic Basin, surprisingly little has been written on the far western dimension of
proslavery expansion. My work traces two interrelated initiatives – the southern
campaign for a transcontinental railroad and the extension of a proslavery political order
across the Far Southwest – in order to situate the struggle over slavery in a continental
framework. Beginning in the 1840s and continuing to the eve of the Civil War, southern
expansionists pushed tirelessly for a railway that would run from slave country all the
way to California. What one railroad booster called “the great slavery road” promised to
draw the Far West and the slaveholding South into a political and commercial embrace,
while simultaneously providing the plantation economy with direct access to the Pacific
trade. The failure of American expansionists to construct a transcontinental railroad
during the antebellum era has discouraged close scholarly scrutiny of this political
movement. Yet through their efforts, southern railroaders triggered some of the fiercest
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sectional struggles of the era, and carried the contest over slavery far beyond the Atlantic
world. The second part of this dissertation reconstructs local political contests in Utah,
New Mexico, Arizona and California to highlight the long reach of proslavery interests.
Never a majority in the region, southern-born leaders wielded an outsized influence
within western legislatures, courtrooms, and newspaper offices to effectively transform
the Southwest into a political appendage of the slave South. With the fracturing of the
Union in 1861, the project of southern expansion moved to the battlefields of a
continental civil war, with several initially successful Confederate invasions of New
Mexico. Even as the rebellion collapsed across the South, Confederate leaders continued
to look west, authorizing yet another invasion of the region as late as the spring of 1865.
The proslavery dream of a western empire almost outlived slavery itself.

xiii

CONTENTS

Abbreviations

xii

Introduction: West of Slavery

1

1. The Southern Dream of a Pacific Empire, 1607-1850

20

2. The Great Slavery Road, 1850-1859

72

3. The Southernization of Antebellum California, 1850-1859

125

4. Slavery’s Sunbelt, 1850-1861

179

5. The Confederate Dream of a Continental Empire, 1861-1865

235

6. The Afterlife of the Old South in the Far West, 1865-1873

284

Epilogue: The Rebellion’s Western Resting Place

332

Works Cited

339

xiv

Abbreviations
Henry E. Huntington Library (HEHL)
Bancroft Library (BANC)
Virginia Historical Society (VHS)
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1880–1901) (OR)
Congressional Globe (Cong. Globe)
Crist, Lynda Lasswell, et. al. eds., The Papers of Jefferson Davis, 14 vols. (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1971-2015) (PJD)
De Bow’s Review (DBR)

1

Introduction

WEST OF SLAVERY
Over two-thousand miles from the rebellion’s heartland in South Carolina, a
group of white settlers in Mesilla, New Mexico hosted a secession convention of their
own. This was March 1861, at which point only six other slave states had followed South
Carolina out of the Union. Despite the abundant risks, and the rather limited support that
the rebellion had mustered thus far, the New Mexican delegates unanimously agreed:
they too would break from the Union and form the Confederate territory of Arizona.1 In
the one-sided debate leading up to this resolution, the fire-eating General W. Claude
Jones celebrated the common bonds that united South and West. “Our destiny is linked
with the South,” he argued. “Her memory of the past, her principles, her interests, her
present glory, her hopes of the future, are ours.” The decision was a stark one for Jones
and his fellow delegates in Mesilla. “Northward, insult, wrong and oppression are
frowning upon us,” he thunderedlth. “Southward a brilliant and glorious pathway of
hope, leads to the star of empire.”2 South Carolina’s hotspur, William Lowdes Yancy,
could have hardly said it better himself.

1

Up until this point, Arizona did not exist as a separate territory – despite the best efforts of many of its
residents. And unlike the state of Arizona, which sits directly to the west of New Mexico, the Confederate
territory of Arizona occupied the southern portion of New Mexico. For histories of the region and the
territorial purchase that brought it within U.S. borders, see; Paul Neff Garber, The Gadsden Treaty
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1923); William S Kiser, Turmoil on the Rio Grande: History of
the Mesilla Valley, 1846-1865 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2011); and Howard R. Lamar, The Far
Southwest, 1846-1912: A Territorial History (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1966, revised
edition, 2000), 361-376.
2
Speech of General W. Claude Jones at the secessionist convention at Mesilla, March 16, 1861, in Mesilla
Times, March 30, 1861. The issue also includes a report on a gathering of leading local citizens at Tucson
on March 25, who likewise passed secessionist resolutions. My thanks to Sarah Allison, special collections
librarian at New Mexico State University, for making available to me this scarce issue. For a biographical
sketch of Jones and his longstanding campaign to separate the southern half of New Mexico as the territory

2

Why would settlers in a region with only a handful of slaves and thousands of
miles from the plantations of the Deep South hitch their fortunes to a slaveholder’s
fledgling rebellion? The answer to that question requires a long view both of antebellum
western history and of the geopolitics of slavery. Arizona was not an anomaly in the
West. Rather its secessionist convention was an extreme manifestation of a proslavery
ethos that had spread across the entire region prior to the Civil War.3 A fully-fledged
slave system took root in neither California, Arizona, nor New Mexico, yet they all
harbored influential partisans like W. Claude Jones, who gave western politics a strong
southern flavor. In turn, when expansionists in the South looked to the Trans-Mississippi
West, they saw a field of imperial opportunity, a region that may or may not develop an
economic dependency on chattel slavery, but would at least defend the political ideology
upon which it rested. Their ambition was to create a sphere of influence across the entire
southern corridor of the continent – from the plantation districts of the Deep South,
across Texas and New Mexico, and into California – and thereby bolster proslavery
power at the national level. When Jones spoke of the “vast interests” of the South, he had
in mind these westward-facing slaveholders. This dissertation explores their projects,
from grand visions of empire, to the local initiatives which made that empire real.
The analysis begins in the realm of imagination, with slaveholders’ bold designs
for a Pacific railroad. No western project generated greater interest in the South than this

of Arizona, see L. Boyd Finch, “William Claude Jones: The Charming Rogue Who Named Arizona,”
Journal of Arizona History 31 (Winter 1990), 405–424.
3
There is no firm scholarly consensus on what constitutes the “West,” not least because America’s western
boundary shifted over time. This dissertation is concerned with the territories of the antebellum Desert
West – Utah and New Mexico (including Arizona) – as well as the state of California. When the term “Far
Southwest” is deployed in this study, it is meant to signify this region.

3

campaign for transcontinental communication. At its helm were some of the great
slaveholding luminaries of the antebellum period – including John C. Calhoun, Jefferson
Davis, J.D.B. De Bow, James Gadsden, William McKendree Gwin, and Matthew
Fontaine Maury. Their aim was to construct a railroad that would run through slave
country all the way to the shores of California. What one railway booster called “the
great slavery road” promised to draw the Far West and the plantation South into a
political and commercial embrace, thus giving slaveholders a transcontinental landscape
upon which to project their imperial fantasies.4 But more than just the American West
was at stake. This iron thoroughfare would also provide the plantation economy with a
direct outlet to the Pacific trade, potentially rerouting Asia’s commerce through the slave
South, and vice versa. As a typical piece of railroad boosterism predicted, this highway
would connect “the cotton planting and sugar growing States of the South” with “the
West coast of this continent, with the Sandwich Islands, with the East Indies, with China,
with Japan, with six hundred millions of people.”5 Slave-grown staples would thus
circulate through a truly global market of commerce, a southern empire of trade that
would link the emporia of Liverpool in one direction to the ports of Canton in the other.
The grandiosity of these ambitions was matched only by the fervor with which
southerners pursued the project. From 1845 to the outbreak of the Civil War, proslavery
partisans schemed, lobbied, and petitioned for a Pacific railroad, bringing sectional

4

In a speech near Marshall, Texas, Thomas Jefferson Green, a Texas slaveholder-cum-California politician,
trumpeted the southern transcontinental railroad: “This road is emphatically the Southern – yea, what the
abolitionist truly calls the ‘great slavery road.’” The speech is excerpted in the Texas State Gazette, July
29, 1854.
5
Circular to the Citizens of the United States by the Memphis Convention Corresponding Committee;
together with “Steam Navigation to China,” Matthew Fontaine Maury to T. Butler King, January 10, 1848
(Memphis, no publisher: 1849), Library Company of Philadelphia, 3, 5.

4

tensions to a near breaking-point on several occasions. Northern politicians and
businessmen did not sit by idly as southerners campaigned for a railway through slave
country, however. Instead, they mounted an equally vigorous effort on behalf of
alternative routes across free soil.6 The result was the longest-lived controversy of the
period, one that predated, outlasted and triggered many others, including the Gadsden
Purchase and the Kansas-Nebraska Act. As both sides recognized, the project would
transform both national geopolitics and global trade. Whichever section won the railroad
would command not only the political allegiances of the West, but also the commerce of
the oceans beyond.
This railroad campaign ultimately amounted to what we might consider a
monumental non-event.7 For all the political capital expended on its behalf and all the
factional conflicts it generated, a Pacific railway was never constructed during the
antebellum period. Although sectional partisans lobbied up until the eve of the Civil
War, with each passing year compromise over a transcontinental route became
increasingly elusive. Yet the so-called “great slavery road” was no mere pipe dream.
The clarity of hindsight should not obscure the contingency of this historical moment.
Slaveholders exercised a disproportionate influence at both the executive and

6

It should be noted here that there was no uniformity of opinion amongst the railroaders in either the North
or the South. While an influential body of southerners, for instance, advocated for a line running from
Memphis to San Diego, they were challenged by others in the slave states who preferred alternative termini
for the would-be road, such as New Orleans. There were similar regional disputes amongst northern
railroad promoters. For more on these internal divisions see Chapter 2; also David Michael Dunning, “The
Southern Perception of the Trans-Mississippi West, 1845-1853” (PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, 1995); and for what William Freehling calls the “many Souths” see, Freehling, The
Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (Oxford University Press, 1990) and The Road to
Disunion: Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861 (Oxford University Press, 2008).
7
This formulation is a repurposing of Robert E. May’s characterization of the slaveholding bid for Cuba,
what he calls “one of the major non-events of the antebellum period;” May, The Southern Dream of a
Caribbean Empire (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 1973, 2002), 186.

5

congressional levels, and they used that influence to advance their bold project for
transcontinental communication. On several occasions, they nearly secured legislation to
commence construction to the Pacific, and in the process they articulated some of the
most sweeping imperial visions of the era. This study, then, takes seriously these foiled
ambitions and failed dreams of empire, as the blueprints for an America that very nearly
could have been.
It also assesses their ancillary projects, which in and of themselves transformed
the nation’s geopolitical alignments. Southern expansionists scored one of their great
victories in 1853, when, at the insistence of Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, the U.S.
government dispatched the proslavery ultra, James Gadsden to Mexico. His mission was
to negotiate a purchase of Mexican territory over which a far southern transcontinental
railroad could cross. The resulting treaty, finalized in 1854, gained for the U.S. – and for
slaveholders in particular – some 30,000 square miles of prime railroad real estate in the
Mesilla Valley, in exchange for $10 million.8 Shortly thereafter, the federal government
began an extensive series of surveys under the direction of Davis to determine the most
favorable route for a Pacific railroad. In his official report, Davis dismissed the northern
options as unsuitable and formally endorsed a far southern route along the Gila River and
through the newly acquired Mesilla Valley.9 Then, in 1857 a proslavery postmaster

8

For Gadsden’s dealings with Mexico, see William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United
States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860, 12 vols. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace 1932-1939) 9:134-69, 600-96. For Gadsden’s official instructions, which highlighted “the sole
object… in desiring a change in the treaty line on this frontier – an eligible route for a rail-road,” see
William L. Marcy to Gadsden, July 15, 1853, in David Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International
Acts of the United States of America, 8 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19311948), 6: 342-347.
9
Jefferson Davis, Report of the Secretary of War on the Several Pacific Railroad Expeditions (Washington:
A O.P. Nicholson, 1855).

6

general used Davis’s report to override northern congressional opposition and authorize
the construction of the nation’s first overland mail road across this far southern route.10
Along this highway, southern migrants carried westward their goods, their families, and
most significantly their political loyalties.
Slaveholders never built their transcontinental railway, but in developing these
ancillary projects, they helped achieve one of the road’s primary aims: to extend the
southern political orbit across the Far West. The next section of this study picks up here,
thus shifting the analytical frame from South to West, and from grand imperial visions to
the local political struggles which gave shape to that empire. It was the free state of
California, paradoxically, that became the lynchpin in the project for a continental South.
With little regard for the state’s free-soil constitution, southern-born politicians quickly
seized the reins of power in California, and over the next decade, steered its political
course along a distinctly proslavery path. They did so through a well-oiled political
machine that marginalized the antislavery opposition and packed the state’s federal posts
with proslavery loyalists. Through the statehouse and the courtrooms, they opened legal
loopholes for California’s small, but not insignificant slaveholding population, and
imperiled the liberties of African Americans in the West. They also consistently
controlled the state’s congressional delegation – two Senate and two House seats – thus
lending the South a valuable western ally in the national debate over slavery. And on an
almost annual basis, they attempted to split the state in half to make way, many

10

For the official justification for what the Chicago Tribune called “one of the greatest swindles ever
perpetrated upon the country by the slave holders,” see Report of the Postmaster General, Congressional
Globe, 35th Congress, 1st session, appendix, 27-28. The Tribune is quoted in David Lavender, The American
Heritage History of the Great West (New York: American Heritage Publishing Company, 1965).

7

presumed, for a slaveholding territory in southern California. Never a majority within the
state, southern-born leaders wielded an outsize influence to give to California a political
complexion that more closely resembled Virginia than Vermont.
Likewise, in New Mexico, Arizona, and to a certain extent Utah, proslavery
politicians punched well above their numerical weight. In symbolic legislative acts, both
Utah and New Mexico passed slave codes in 1852 and 1859, respectively. Although
territory housed more than a few dozen black slaves, the two codes nevertheless sent a
powerful message to the rest of the nation: the political vision – if not the economic order
– of the slave South would hold sway in the Far Southwest. As Alexander M. Jackson,
author of the latter slave code, exulted in a letter to Jefferson Davis, “This legislation
perfected the title of the South to New Mexico.”11 Meanwhile in the southern portion of
that territory, what residents referred to as Arizona, a territorial movement emerged that
drew strength from slaveholders at the national level. Populated primarily by Texas
migrants and composed largely of Gadsden Purchase lands, the would-be territory of
Arizona promised to southerners yet another ally in the slave extension controversy.
Arizona never won its independent territorial status during the antebellum years, but
when the secession movement rippled west, its residents were among the first to declare
allegiance to the nascent Confederacy.
The project of southern expansion, carried out for well over a decade in
Washington and across the West, now moved to the battlefields of a continental civil war.

11

Alexander Jackson to Jefferson Davis, February 17, 1861 in John P. Wilson, ed., When the Texans Came:
Missing Records from the Civil War in the Southwest, 1861-1862 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 2001), 18.

8

And thus, what had been a purely political project could be pursued henceforward
through the apparatus of a militarized state, as dreams of western empire merged into
Confederate grand strategy. It was precisely because of their earlier geopolitical victories
across the Far Southwest that slaveholders were willing to wager so much during their
rebellion. Indeed, the first Confederate invasion of the war targeted New Mexico, where
some of the staunchest western rebels were clustered. Although rebel forces eventually
failed in their primary objective – to blaze a pathway to the Pacific – they succeeded for a
time in driving federal troops from much of the Southwest and in securing the
Confederate territory of Arizona. To be sure, the war was ultimately won and lost in the
major military theaters of the East. But the willingness of the Confederate high
command to divert scarce men and materiel to New Mexico’s deserts speaks to the
enduring hold of the Far West on the southern imperial imagination. As the rebellion
collapsed across the South, Confederate leaders continued to look west, authorizing yet
another invasion of the region even as late as the spring of 1865. The proslavery dream
of a Pacific empire almost outlived slavery itself.
***
What can a dream that ultimately failed teach us about the nature of slavery, of
the South, and of American empire? This study does not conform to the standard
narrative of slaveholding imperialism. From Robert May to Walter Johnson, and a
number of historians in between, scholars have pointed to the Caribbean as the theater of
slavery’s restless empire. The “All Mexico” movement to absorb an entire nation,
William Walker’s invasions of Nicaragua, John A. Quitman’s numerous efforts to
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conquer Cuba – these have come to epitomize the southern lust for expansion.

12

While

not always focused explicitly on empire per se, recent scholarship has nuanced this
portrait of the internationalist South, highlighting the less overtly violent side to the
overseas dealings of slaveholders. Michael O’Brien’s authoritative analysis on the
intellectual world of the Old South, Brian Schoen’s study of the transatlantic career of
southern cotton, and Matthew Karp’s work on the “foreign policy of slavery,” among
others, have challenged the persistent caricature of the atavistic slaveholder.13 Instead
their work foregrounds a slaveholding class that stood, in many ways, among the
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Robert E. May, The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of
Florida, 1973, 2002). Despite his bold claims, Walter Johnson does not substantially alter the geography of
slaveholding imperialism in River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom
(Cambridge: Harvard, 2013). For more on American filibustering throughout the Spanish speaking world,
see Tom Chaffin, Fatal Glory: Narciso Lopez and the First Clandestine U.S. War against Cuba
(Charlottesville, 1996); Robert May, John A. Quitman: Old South Crusader (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1995); May, Manifest Destiny’s Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); May, Slavery, Race, and Conquest in the Tropics:
Lincoln, Douglas, and the Future of Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). For
more on the simultaneous growth of southern slavery and American empire, see John Craig Hammond,
“Slavery, Sovereignty, and Empires: North American Borderlands and the American Civil War, 16601860,” Journal of the Civil War Era 4 (June 2014), pp. 264-298.
13
Eugene D. Genovese famously explained the “pre-modern” and “feudal” tendencies of slaveholders in
The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South (New York,
1965). For more recent historians of the American South, Genovese has become something of a straw man.
His scholarship is a good deal more nuanced and sophisticated than subsequent historians have recognized,
however, and his arguments about the anti-capitalist nature of slavery still hold some water (as I argue in
Chapter 2). James Oakes is perhaps most guilty of caricaturing Genovese’s earlier work; see Oakes, The
Ruling Race: A History of American Slaveholders (New York: Norton, 1982).
For path-breaking works on the international reach of the Old South and its modernizing impulses,
see Michael O’Brien, Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life and the American South, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Brian Schoen, The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal
Politics, and the Global Origins of the Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009);
Matthew J. Karp, “‘This Vast Southern Empire:’ The South and the Foreign Policy of Slavery, 1833-1861”
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2011). See also, Manisha Sinha, The Counterrevolution of
Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina (Chapel Hill, 2000); Matthew Pratt Guterl,
American Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of Emancipation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University, 2008); Laura Jarnagin, A Confluence of Transatlantic Networks: Elites, Capitalism, and
Confederate Migration to Brazil (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama, 2008); Gerald Horne, The Deepest
South: The United States, Brazil, and the African Slave Trade (New York: New York University Press,
2007). For a treatment of the commercial savvy and forward thinking tendencies of slaveholders within a
domestic context, see Aaron W. Marrs, Railroads in the Old South: Pursing Progress in a Slave Society
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
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vanguard of American modernizers. Commercially-minded, transnationally-connected,
and forward-thinking, antebellum southerners dictated a political vision for the nation
that was firmly in step with global developments. As the price of plantation staples
soared across Atlantic markets and as unfree agricultural labor flourished throughout
Europe’s empires, American southerners could claim, with some confidence, that history
was on their side.14 The modernizing slaveholder was no contradiction in terms.
Pioneering though they are, these works implicitly confine slaveholders’ horizons
to the Atlantic Basin, when, in fact, southern visions of empire were truly global in
scope.15 This study follows the slaveholding gaze westward to argue that, while planters
operated primarily in an Atlantic world, they dreamed of a Pacific one. Indeed, they took
active, often bold steps in an attempt to extend their reach all the way to the ports of
China. As many at the time argued, trade with Asia was to be the cornerstone upon
which a southern commercial empire would rest. “The Eastern World!” bellowed Judah
Benjamin at a New Orleans convention in 1852. “Its commerce has been the bone of
many a bloody contest. Its commerce makes empires of the countries to which it flows,
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Matthew Karp makes this point with particular clarity in “The World the Slaveholders Craved:
Proslavery Internationalism in the 1850s,” in Andrew Shankman, ed., The World of the Revolutionary
American Republic: Land, Labor, and the Conflict for a Continent (New York: Routledge, 2014).
Numerous observers in the antebellum South touted the global ascendency of unfree labor and the triumph
of slave-grown products. For one of the most robust arguments of this kind, see George Fitzhugh,
Cannibals All! Or, Slaves Without Masters (Richmond, A. Morris, 1857); and James Henry Hammond’s
famous “King Cotton” speech in Cong. Globe, 35th congress, 1st session (March 4, 1858), 959-962.
15
The absence of the Pacific in Civil War-era historiography emerged as a theme in a panel with Brian
Schoen and others at the Society for Civil War Historians in Chattanooga, TN this June. Their roundtable
discussion, “The Transnational Perspective of the Civil War: Revolution, Nationalism, Separatism,”
celebrated recent scholarship on Latin America and Europe, which has greatly enlarged the geographic
scope of the American political crisis over slavery, while noting that the transnational turn in Civil War
studies has yet to incorporate the Pacific world. Of all the aforementioned works, Karp’s is the only one to
consider the Pacific dimension to proslavery foreign policy, primarily through an examination of southern
efforts to shape the role of the Pacific squadron.
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and when they are deprived of it they are empty bags, useless, valueless.”

In this

pursuit of transcontinental communication and trans-Pacific trade, southerners proved
perfectly willing to hazard a precarious sectional balance. For many slaveholders, this
was an empire worth fighting for. And for historians by extension, this is a political
project worthy of closer scrutiny.
Taking seriously this geopolitical vision requires a new, more capacious way of
thinking about proslavery imperialism. Such an empire depended not only on efforts to
capture more territory for slavery, as historians have shown, but also on a less dramatic
brand of political and commercial expansion. A slaveholder’s empire, its champions
recognized, could even cross free soil. To be sure, slaveholders rarely overlooked an
opportunity to enlarge the terrain open to plantation agriculture. But they also sought
political allies to enhance their national influence and commercial outlets to broaden their
economic prospects. These latter objectives – driven more by coercion than conquest –
reflected a distinctly imperial logic nonetheless. In the decade before the Civil War, the
proslavery push westward relied on territorial purchase from Mexico, the pacification of
the Southwest’s powerful Indian tribes, and diplomatic pressure to open ports throughout
the Pacific world.17 In many ways, the most successful slaveholding imperialists did not
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Benjamin’s speech was printed in New Orleans Picayune (no date), and reprinted in the Arkansas Whig,
22 January, 1852.
17
This study interprets the project of southern commercial and political expansion as a fundamentally
imperial venture. For works on American empire-building along the Mexican border, see Samuel Truett,
Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2008); Rachel St. John, Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2011). Efforts to displace and pacify Native peoples in these southwestern
borderlands required substantial military, economic, and diplomatic coercion. For studies on the enduring
power of Indians in this region, see Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); and Peka Hamalainen, The Comanche Empire
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). Similarly, the American commercial presence in the Pacific
world was predicated on coercion. This early history is traced in David Igler, The Great Ocean: Pacific
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face southeast toward the Caribbean; they looked west toward the Pacific. Whereas
southern filibusters failed in their attempts to seize Cuba and held Nicaragua for just a
few short and bloody years, slaveholders could claim more lasting victories in the West.
There, territorial purchases and infrastructural projects buttressed a transcontinental
sphere of proslavery influence and bolstered southern power at the national level. For too
long, a historiographic focus on episodes in the Atlantic Basin has distracted scholarly
attention from these more enduring projects along the Pacific.18 Is it not telling that the
Confederacy quickly abandoned its bid for Cuba, but launched several invasions to open
a pathway to California’s ports?
A Pacific orientation enlarges our perspective not only on slaveholding
imperialism, but on the history of American empire more generally. We now know, of
course, that America’s empire did not sprout overnight with the U.S. victory over Spain
in 1898, as an earlier generation of historians argued.19 Walter LaFeber and William
Appleman Williams, among others, have backdated this “new” overseas empire to the

Worlds from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). For the violent
history of American involvement in what were then known as the Sandwich Islands, see Gary Okihiro,
Island Worlds: A History of Hawaii and the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
Perhaps America’s most baldly imperialistic effort in Asian markets was the forced opening of Japan’s
ports in 1853; see George Feifer, Breaking Open Japan: Commodore Perry, Lord Abe, and American
Imperialism in 1853 (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2006).
18
A western focus should not, however, lead us to dismiss these Atlantic interventions as errands into the
wilderness or as geopolitically inconsequential. The so-called southern dream of a Caribbean empire
provided a perennial sticking point for sectional politics and no doubt hastened the nation’s spiral toward
disunion. Furthermore, plenty of western expansionists also nurtured Caribbean dreams of empire; see for
instance, James Gadsden to Jefferson Davis, July 19, 1854, in Lynda Lasswell Crist, ed. The Papers of
Jefferson Davis, Vol. 5, 1853-1855 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 5:78-79.
19
A chapter in Samuel Flagg Bemis’s standard account of American foreign policy is titled “The Great
Aberration of 1898;” Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt, 1950),
463. For a survey of scholarship on American imperialism, see Edward P. Crapol, “Coming to Terms with
Empire: The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth Century American Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History
16 (1992), pp. 573-597.
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Gilded Age and even to the Civil War. American enterprise, Williams in particular
argues, was the tail that wagged the dog, directing the state’s gaze across the Atlantic and
Pacific in search of new commercial outlets, years before the conquest of Cuba and the
Philippines.20 Yet the rich body of work on this subject often still divides the history of
American empire into two distinct periods – one continental and antebellum, the other
extraterritorial and postbellum.21 This distinction is misleading. As the western
expansionists of the antebellum era understood all too well, continental conquest and
trans-Pacific empire fit hand-in-glove. Indeed, they were part of the same project.
California, therefore, was not to be the cul-de-sac of empire, but rather the beachhead for
further conquests. This is precisely what slaveholders had in mind when they looked
westward.
As the study moves from slaveholding visions of empire in the Pacific to local
political struggles in the Far West, it contends with yet another body of scholarship: the
political history of the sectional crisis and the Civil War era. The recent Civil War
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The seminal works to prompt this historiographic turn are Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An
Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1963, 1998); William
Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of
Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York: Random House, 1969). In his most enduring
work, Williams makes similar arguments, while extending his chronology forward in time; Williams, The
Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1959, 2009); see also his brief and
provocative, Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America’s Past
Predicament Along with a Few Thoughts About an Alternative (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
21
Most surveys of American empire have adopted this misleading periodization, including, one of the
better brief histories on the subject; Walter Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion
(New York: Vintage, 2008). Several scholars have noted this temporal divide in the historiography of
American empire. See for instance, Matthew J. Karp, “Slavery and American Sea Power: The Navalist
Impulse in the Antebellum South,” Journal of Southern History 77 (May 2011), 289; and Paul A. Kramer,
The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States & the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2006), 10-11. For a rare and (often overlooked) challenge to this periodization, see
Norman A. Graebner, Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion (Claremont, CA:
Regina Books, 1983, reprint edition, first published 1955). The Graebner thesis received a reboot in Bruce
Cumings’s sprawling account of the American push to the Pacific; Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea:
Pacific Ascendancy and American Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
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sesquicentennial prompted a proliferation of highly original works, some of which
pushed westward the geographic boundaries that have long circumscribed the scholarly
scope of the conflict. From Glorieta Pass to the San Juan Islands, we now know a great
deal about military engagements and secessionist scares across the American West.22 Yet
we understand far less about the deep-rooted imperial aims which set them in motion.23
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It is somewhat surprising that historians have been so slow to extend the terrain of Civil War studies into
the American West. After all, the effort unites two of the most popular and deeply researched fields in
American historiography: the struggle over slavery and the nation’s continental conquests. Two new edited
collections have dramatically increased the scholarly coverage of the subject; see Adam Arenson and
Andrew R. Graybill, eds. Civil War Wests: Testing the Limits of the United States (University of California,
2015); Virginia Scharff, ed., Empire and Liberty: The Civil War and the West (University of California
Press, 2015); and the accompanying exhibit, “Empire and Liberty,” at the Autry Museum of the American
West. For a geographically expansive reinterpretation of the Civil War era, see Steven Hahn, “Slave
Emancipation, Indian Peoples and the Projects of a New American Nation-State,” The Journal of the Civil
War Era 3 (Sept. 2013). For recent works from the perspective of St. Louis, Colorado, and California,
respectively, see Adam Arensen, The Great Heart of the Republic: St. Louis and the Cultural Civil War
(2011); Susan Schulten, “The Civil War and the Origins of the Colorado Territory,” Western Historical
Quarterly 44 (spring 2013), pp. 21-46; and Glenna Matthews, The Golden State in the Civil War: Thomas
Starr King, the Republican Party, and the Birth of Modern California (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012). These works join several older monographs, primarily concerned with military operations in
far western theaters. See, for instance Martin Hardwick Hall, Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1960); Roy C. Colton, The Civil War in the Western Territories: Arizona,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984); Alvin M. Josephy, Jr.,
The Civil War in the American West (New York: Vintage, 1991); Donald S. Frazier, Blood and Treasure:
Confederate Empire in the Southwest (College State: Texas A&M University Press, 1995); L. Boyd Finch,
Confederate Pathway to the Pacific: Major Sherod Hunter and Arizona Territory, C.S.A. (Tucson: Arizona
Historical Society, 1996); and Andrew E. Masich, , The Civil War in Arizona: The Story of the California
Volunteers, 1861-1865 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006). William F. Deverell has argued
that this focus on the relatively minor military engagements in the region have distracted from the deeper
meaning of the Civil War in the West. “Western historians look for the Civil War in the West in the wrong
places,” Deverell wrote, “A skirmish here or there, a real battle in northern New Mexico, and that is
supposedly the whole story;” Deverell, “Redemptive California? Re-thinking the Post-Civil War”,
Rethinking History 11:1 (March 2007), 64.
In an attempt to assess some of this recent historiography and suggest further avenues for research,
several scholars (myself included) assembled a roundtable panel at the recent Society for Civil War
Historians Conference, titled, “Go West, Young Historians! Expanding the Boundaries of Civil War
Studies.” Several forthcoming works will, no doubt, further enrich our understanding of the Civil War-era
West, including Megan Kate Nelson’s hefty Path of the Dead Man: How the West was Won – and Lost –
during the American Civil War; Deverell’s To Bind Up the Nation’s Wounds: The American West in the
Aftermath of the Civil War; and a special issue on the Civil War in the West from the Journal of the Civil
War Era, guest-edited by Ari Kelman and with articles from Peka Hamalainen, Stacey Smith, Megan Kate
Nelson, and myself.
23
There have been a few exceptions, however. Megan Kate Nelson provides brief, but useful background
on proslavery expansion in the Southwest in “Death in the Distance: Confederate Manifest Destiny and the
Campaign for New Mexico, 1861-1862,” Civil War Wests: Testing the Limits of the United States, Arenson
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Although historians frequently cite the westward expansion of slavery as the driving issue
that led to the Civil War, only rarely do they look beyond Bleeding Kansas. The sectional
crisis in the Far West remains lodged in a scholarly blind spot – a curious oversight given
that historians have spilled more ink on the Civil War-era than any other period in
American history. The leading narratives of the sectional crisis suggest that California’s
free soil constitution of 1849 effectively banished proslavery intrigue to the east of the
Sierra Nevada or even the Rocky Mountains. Similarly, other parts of the Far Southwest
– including New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah – rarely figure in the political accounts of
this period.24
Although the Far West remains conspicuously absent from the dominant narrative
of the sectional crisis, some regionally focused studies have illustrated how slavery
spread beyond the confines of the plantation South. Stacey Smith, for instance, has

and Graybill, eds.; as does Frazier in Blood and Treasure, Chapter 1. Oddly, however, Frazier focuses on
an earlier period while glossing over proslavery imperialism during the formative final decade before the
conflict. Such an oversight is reflective of the broader trend, in which the Compromise of 1850 marks the
breaking point in proslavery western expansion.
24
In important and prize-winning works on the Civil War-era, the Far West makes only a fleeting
appearance, quickly receding from view upon the resolution of Henry Clay’s Omnibus Bill. See, for
instance, James M. McPherson’s Pulitzer Prize-winning Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Ballantine,
1989); William Freehling’s magisterial two-volumes on the coming of the Civil War, The Road to
Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (Oxford University Press, 1990) and The Road to Disunion:
Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861 (Oxford University Press, 2008); and David M. Potter’s Pulitzer
Prize-winning The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861, completed and edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher (New
York: Harper & Row, 1976). It should be noted, however, that Potter briefly covers the Pacific railroad
debates as a prologue to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The absence of the Far West after 1850 is perhaps more
surprising – given his title – in Michael A. Morrison, Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of
Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1997); see
also Robert E. Bonner, Mastering America: Southern Slaveholders and the Crisis of American Nationhood
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). A number of historians have even gone so far as to argue
that southerners’ expansionist aims on the Far West lay dormant throughout the 1850s; see William Earl
Weeks, Building the Continental Empire: American Expansion from Revolution to the Civil War (Chicago:
Ivan R. Dee, 1996); Jesse T. Carpenter, The South as a Conscious Minority, 1789-1861: A Study in
Political Thought (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1930, 1990). Similarly, landmark surveys
of western American history have given short shrift to the Civil War; see, for example, Richard White,
“It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991).
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argued persuasively that California’s ostensibly free soil gave rise to a number of unfree
labor practices, from black chattel slavery, to Indian bound servitude, to Chinese sex
trafficking.25 With a focus on Utah and New Mexico’s slave codes, several local
historians have also tracked the development of proslavery policies in individual western
territories during the 1850s.26 Often lacking a national framework, however, these studies
generally lose sight of the broader issues that made the West’s antebellum politics so
fractious in the first place. Absent from most of these accounts are southern slaveholders
themselves, who, through their actions at the federal level, turned the Far West into a
sectional battleground. In contrast, this study moves beyond the local and the regional to
examine a political struggle that was, in fact, continental. Facing west from slave country
and east from gold country, we can recognize the political culture of California, New
Mexico, and Arizona for what it truly was: the direct product of a southern imperial
project.27 This was, in the words of one anxious Unionist on the eve of the Civil War, “a
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Although largely overlooked by the major surveys of the period, California historians have, for decades,
studied the influence of proslavery ideology and unfree labor within the state. The most sophisticated and
important account is Stacey Smith, Freedom’s Frontier: California and the Struggle over Unfree Labor,
Emancipation and Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). My work is
particularly indebted to Smith’s insights, her advice, and her generous sharing of sources. See also Rudolph
M. Lapp, Blacks in Gold Rush California (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). The work that most
successfully incorporates California’s political battles with national developments is Leonard Richard’s
analytically-thin but content-rich, The California Gold Rush and the Coming of the Civil War (New York:
Vintage, 2007).
26
The work on proslavery politics in the Southwestern territories – some of it very good – is confined
mostly to regional journals. See, for example, Mark J. Stegmaier, “A Law That Would Make Caligula
Blush? New Mexico Territory’s Unique Slave Code, 1859-1861,” New Mexico Historical Review 87: 2
(spring 2012), pp. 209-242; Newell G. Bringhurst, “The Mormons and Slavery – A Closer Look,” Pacific
Historical Review 50 (August 1981). The fullest account of these political struggles in New Mexico
remains Loomis Morton Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 1846-1861 (Philadelphia:
Porcupine Press, 1976, reprint of 1944 edition). And for a rare work that incorporates the political history
of the entire region, see Howard Lamar, The Far Southwest, 1846-1912: A Territorial History
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1966, revised edition, 2000). As a survey with a broad
geographic and temporal scope, however, Lamar’s history deals only briefly with the slavery question.
27
This formulation is, of course, a riff on Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native
History of Early America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003). Like Richter’s work, this
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grand scheme of intercommunication and territorial expansion more vast and complicated
than was ever dreamed of by Napoleon Bonaparte in his palmiest days of pride and
power.”28
In contemporary scholarship, the trans-Mississippi remains, in many ways, a land
apart.29 And yet, during the antebellum period, the line separating the slave South from
the Far West was faint enough to be, at times, indistinguishable. This study analyzes
those regional interconnections to fix our attention on a proslavery agenda that bridged
the southern corridor of the continent. West of slavery, the American political landscape
did not give way to free soil. Instead, the plantation South faded into what we might
consider the Desert South, a western borderland where African bondage existed only in
isolated pockets, and yet the political ideology of slavery maintained a predominant

study illustrates how a geographic reorientation of traditional narratives can yield new and surprising
histories. Unlike his book, however, this dissertation primarily follows the agents of empire, rather than
those who resisted its incursions.
28
William Need to Simon Cameron, September 27, 1861, Official Records of the War of the Rebellion
(OR), Series I, Vol. L, Part I, 635-641.
29
Arthur Quinn made this point explicitly with regard to California, arguing that the state is traditionally
seen “as the great exception within American history, only incidentally involved in the history of the
broader nation;” Arthur Quinn, The Rivals: William Gwin, David Broderick, and the Birth of California
(New York: Crown, 1994), v. Patricia Nelson Limberick has argued that “Most American historians,
including all the writers of college-level American history textbooks, have postponed their reckoning with
the Western half of the nation;” All Over the Map: Rethinking American Regions (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996), 96. See also, observations by Elliot West in The Contested Plains:
Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (University Press of Kansas, 1998)), 11. In more recent
years, historians have done much to bring the West into the national narrative, though there still remains
much work to be done. The historians most successful at bridging South-West divide have focused, for
obvious reasons, on the Texas borderlands and often in the context of American imperial history. See
Andrew J. Torget, Seeds of Empire: Cotton, Slavery, and the Transformation of the Texas Borderlands,
1800-1850 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Sarah Rodriguez, “‘Children of the
Great Mexican Family’: Anglo-American Immigration to Texas and the Making of the American Empire,
1820-1861,” (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2015); Randolph B. Campbell, An Empire for
Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1821-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1991). Although her focus is on a later period, the geographically wide-ranging work of Hope McGrath has
perhaps been most successful in tracing the linkages between the nineteenth-century South and West; see
McGrath, “An Army of Working-Men: Military Labor and the Construction of American Empire, 18651915” (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2016).
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position. To look for the Old South in these unexpected places – far beyond the fifteen
states that have historically defined the region – we gain a new perspective on American
empire and the Civil War era. Through infrastructural development and political
scheming rather than outright conquest, slaveholders sought to extend their domain to the
very shores of the Pacific, and in the process, ignited some of the fiercest political
contests of the period. Yet in their campaign to bind south and west, they ultimately
fractured the nation, and their dream of Pacific empire crumbled along with their
rebellion.
***
Across six chapters, this dissertation explores both southern projects for Pacific
empire and the political struggles that those projects sparked throughout the Far West.
Chapter 1 follows the slaveholding gaze across the Pacific in the years prior to 1850 to
illustrate how southerners pursued a far vaster empire of commerce than historians have
yet recognized. While individual Yankee traders plied Pacific waters, it was slaveholding
politicians, by and large, who brought the American state within striking distance of
Asia’s markets and, in the process, added a global dimension to the deepening sectional
crisis. In the decade that followed, as Chapter 2 illustrates, slaveholders intensified the
race for transcontinental and trans-Pacific influence through a tireless railroad campaign.
Rather than state-right purists or agrarian isolations, the slaveholders who pushed for a
transcontinental railroad were shrewd expansionists and worldly businessmen who
exploited all the resources within reach – technology, capital, and federal power – to
extend the South’s geostrategic reach. They ultimately failed in their railroad ambitions,
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but through their corollary projects, slaveholders largely dictated federal policy within the
Far West.
The Compromise of 1850 may have rendered California free soil, but it did not
blunt the western aspirations of slaveholders, contrary to what the standard narrative
would have us believe. Rather, as Chapter 3 argues, California’s admission to the Union
as a free state paradoxically inaugurated a decade of proslavery control over that region.
But California was just a piece – albeit a crucial one – to the puzzle of proslavery
political dominion in the Far West. In Chapter 4, the analysis moves to the neighboring
territories of Utah and New Mexico (including Arizona) to examine how the politics of
slavery infiltrated a region generally ignored by historians of the antebellum era. As part
of the first study to connect proslavery politics across the entire Southwest, these chapters
pose a question that, only at first blush, appears self-evident: where did the slave South
end and the Far West begin? Generally studied in isolation, these two regions possess
histories more deeply intertwined than the current scholarship allows. As Chapters 3 and
4 argue, the South and West often made natural bedfellows, and together the leaders of
these regions sought a new geopolitical alignment that would link the American slave
system to both the Atlantic and Pacific worlds.
Without this perspective on the political economy of the antebellum West, we
cannot understand Confederate grand strategy during the war that followed. Chapter 5
argues that rebel war aims constituted the military continuation of this decades-old
imperial project. It also explores pro-Confederate agitation within the Far West, which
transformed the region into what we might consider a vast border zone by 1861. The
conclusion of the conflict witnessed the collapse of both the plantation system and the
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proslavery dream of Pacific empire, but, surprisingly, not the end of the South’s political
influence within the Far West. Chapter 6 examines the afterlife of pro-southern politics
in California. It argues that the racial reordering of the Reconstruction era drew some of
its stiffest opposition from well beyond the former Confederacy. California’s Democratic
Party led a revolt against Reconstruction by linking the white supremacist anxieties of the
state’s electorate to the ongoing political struggles of the South’s former rebels. Like the
dissertation as a whole, this final chapter applies a national framework to a political
history that has often been described in narrowly regional terms. In short, this study
brings to light what contemporaries recognized but historians have largely failed to see:
the struggle over slavery and its legacies played out on a truly continental stage.
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Chapter 1

THE SOUTHERN DREAM OF A PACIFIC EMPIRE, 1607-1850
When the first Jamestown colonists landed on the coast of Virginia in 1607, they
were already dreaming of distant shores. Although for years the colony struggled to feed
itself as it clung to a narrow spit of land on the Atlantic seaboard, the Pacific exerted a
powerful pull on the Virginian imagination. Starving or not, the colonists would not
ignore two main objectives as outlined by the Virginia Company: to find valuable
materials for export, ideally gold, and to discover a route to the South Sea. The latter, of
course, had been the fantasy of Columbus as he sailed west from the Spanish port of
Palos in 1492. Now, with a beachhead on the North American mainland, the Jamestown
colonists hoped to finally open a gateway to the lucrative China trade. While their few
early explorations yielded little – except for an appreciation of the continent’s vastness –
subsequent generations would not be deterred.1 In 1668, as the colony achieved firmer
footing, Governor Berkeley began preparations for a two-hundred-man expedition “to
find out the East India sea,” as he wrote to Lord Arlington. Unfortunately for Berkeley,
heavy rains and a lack of royal patronage would scuttle this and a subsequent expedition.2
But though the disappointments mounted, the dream never died. If anything, the search
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for a Pacific outlet only became more urgent over the coming century and a half. And
Virginians – more specifically, slaveholding Virginians – continued to lead the way.
Scholars have characterized the early Eastern Pacific Ocean as something of a
Yankee lake. To be sure, it was primarily New England traders who plied the waters off
the coast of California in the early nineteenth century, transforming the tallow and hide
trade into a lucrative American enterprise. Yet historians have been all too quick to write
slaveholders out of this story.3 David Igler’s original and important account of the early
Pacific world, for instance, uses South Carolina senator George McDuffie as a stand-in
for slaveholding apathy towards Asian trade.4 But if some southerners cleaved to strict
constructionism and agrarian parochialism to dismiss the search for Pacific commerce,
they were largely out of step with the leading thinkers of their region. For the first half of
the nineteenth century, southern statesmen articulated and pursued a geopolitical agenda
that set the United States on the path toward continental and Pacific empire. America
built that empire in three great lunges – the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas,
and the seizure of New Mexico and California – and each of these was orchestrated by a
slaveholding president.
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By tracing this southern push toward the Pacific, we enlarge the perspective on
both slaveholding imperialism and American empire, more generally. Scholars have
explored the ways in which antebellum southerners looked well beyond the confines of
their plantations. Indeed, slaveholders involved themselves intimately, these historians
show, in the diplomatic, commercial, and military affairs of the Atlantic world.5 But the
southern imperial imagination could never be confined to a single ocean basin. While
slaveholders lived in an Atlantic world, they dreamed of a Pacific one, and they took
active steps to extend their influence well beyond the hemisphere. From the explorers of
the colonial era, to the policymakers of the early republic, to the thinkers and politicians
of the antebellum period, southerners assumed a leading role in the American march to
the Pacific. By the 1840s, in particular, somewhat abstract hopes for trans-Pacific
influence took more concrete form with the campaign for a transcontinental railroad
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through slave country. And in the process, southern expansionists transformed the
Pacific coast into a sectional battleground.
As with the scholarship on southern expansionism, the historiography of
American antebellum empire is in need of a broader optic. To be sure, historians no
longer write of empire-building as a strictly European practice, as an older generation
once did. The conquest of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, once dismissed as an
exception, now typifies an imperial nation-state that was at least decades in the making.6
And yet, contemporary scholars still employ an often misleading distinction between
“formal” and “informal” empires – the former describing the imperial quest for territorial
aggrandizement, while the latter applies generally to commercial penetration and
diplomatic coercion.7 These categories serve to divide the history of American empire
into temporal halves. The first phase features continental conquest during the antebellum
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period, followed by a campaign of commercial extension during the post-Civil War era.

8

As slaveholding expansionists recognized, however, these two modes of empire – formal
and informal, territorial and commercial – were mutually constitutive. By conquering the
continent, the United States not only enlarged its territorial holdings; it also gained more
direct access to a Pacific world of commerce. In fact, for slaveholding presidents like
James K. Polk, the driving motivation behind territorial conquest was the access that it
provided to maritime outlets. Antebellum imperialists never intended to stop short at the
shores of California.9

Slaveholders and the Continental Approach to a Pacific Empire
Long before regional identities hardened into sectional rivalries, southern-born
leaders articulated a vision of continental destiny and trans-Pacific influence. Thomas
Jefferson deserves pride of place as the president who turned national attention toward
the other end of the continent – or in the words of Henry Nash Smith, “the intellectual
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father of the American advance to the Pacific.”

Yet a decade before he used his

executive power to dispatch Lewis and Clark on their journey to the mouth of the
Columbia, Jefferson promoted the intended transcontinental exploration of the French
botanist Andre Michaux. Writing on behalf of the American Philosophical Society and
fellow patrons of the project, the Virginian instructed Michaux on “the chief objects” of
the exploration: “to find the shortest & most convenient route of communication between
the US. & the Pacific ocean, within the temperate latitudes.”11 Diplomatic complications,
however, ultimately scuttled the operation and Michaux never reached the Pacific coast –
although he did win fame for his subsequent works on North American flora.
The transcontinental pioneers were, of course, Captain Merriweather Lewis and
his lieutenant, William Clark, who set out ten years after Michaux’s aborted expedition.
Jefferson’s instructions to Lewis, though more detailed, repeated much of what had been
previously directed to the French adventurer. Lewis was to explore the waters of the
Missouri in order to discover “the most direct & practicable water communication across
this continent.” As Jefferson envisioned it, this expedition was to provide a deeper
understanding of the continent’s geography, and especially its waterways, in order to
facilitate speedier access to the Pacific slope. While Jefferson had stressed the scientific
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value of Michaux’s mission, his interests this time were more explicitly commercial.
Lewis was to scout for furs along the Pacific coast, and most importantly, whether or not
trade could be conducted along this transcontinental route “more beneficially than by the
circumnavigation now practiced.” Upon “your arrival on that coast,” Jefferson
continued, “endeavor to learn if there be any port within your reach.”12 Indeed,
communication with a Pacific port was a central objective of this mission, as it would
provide a source of contact with other maritime powers in the region, as well as an outlet
to the Asian trade beyond. It was the lure of such outlets that would guide American (and
Texan) policymakers through the coming decades.
By the 1830s, developments in neighboring Mexico prompted U.S. leaders to
think more expansively about their nation’s future growth. President Andrew Jackson
not only attempted to annex Texas to the United States after the 1836 rebellion there, but
also to acquire a piece of the Pacific coast.13 He instructed his minister to Mexico,
Anthony Butler, to enter negotiations in order to purchase the region surrounding the
harbor of San Francisco. In Jackson’s mind, this was “a most desirable place of resort of
our numerous vessels engaged in the whaling business in the Pacific, far preferable to any

12

Thomas Jefferson to Merriweather Lewis, June 20, 1803, in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Original
Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, 1804-1806, 8 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company,
1904-1905), 7:247-252. See also Thomas Jefferson to Meriwether Lewis, July 4, 1803, Manuscript/Mixed
Material. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib012551. (Accessed May
10, 2016). For more on Jefferson’s hopes for a “great, free and independent empire” on the Pacific coast,
see Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood (Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 2000), 118.
13
In fact, Jackson had been lusting after Mexican territory since his earliest days in office. See, for instance,
Andrew Jackson, “Notes for Instructions to Joel Roberts Poinsett,” August 13, 1829, The Papers of Andrew
Jackson Digital Edition, Daniel Feller, editor. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015—
http:rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/JKSN-01-07-02-0267 [accessed August 3, 2016].

28

to which they now have access.”

14

Whaling may have been a primarily New England

business venture, but slaveholding presidents like Jackson’s recognized its importance to
the national economy. At this point, expansion was a national endeavor, and projects for
the Pacific were not yet colored by the controversy over slavery. While Jackson’s
successor, Martin Van Buren of New York did not pursue this diplomatic campaign for
California, by the early 1840s John Tyler, yet another slaveholding executive and a
Virginian, renewed the effort. His ministers proposed a bold bargain to Great Britain,
another nation with imperial designs on the Pacific. Tyler and his ministers offered to
cede American territorial claims in Oregon north of the Columbia river in exchange for
British aid in securing California from Mexico. The bargain failed, but not for lack of
effort or creativity.15
Conceived in conquest, the Republic of Texas continued an aggressive policy of
territorial expansion until its annexation to the U.S. a decade later in 1846. Like Andrew
Jackson and John Tyler, the proslavery politicians of Texas set their sights on the ports of
the Pacific. “As a separated Power, the splendid harbours [sic] on the South Sea or
Pacific Ocean, will be indispensable for us,” wrote the republic’s minister to the U.S.,
Memucan Hunt, in April 1838. “The possession of the harbor of St. Francisco,” he
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continued, was alone worth the effort and expense required to seize the southwestern half
of the continent.16 As Texans like General Thomas Jefferson Green boasted, their nation
occupied a central position for the channeling of this Pacific commerce – a natural
thoroughfare between the American slave states and the ports of California. Soon, Green
predicted, a series of railroads and canals would unite these two halves of the continent,
via the Lone Star republic.17 The same year that Texas won its independence, the New
Orleans Bee envisioned an even grander transcontinental network. Within a decade, the
Bee predicted, a railroad from New Orleans to California would be constructed, making
the Gulf South one of the great commercial centers of the world.18 Here was the
slaveholding vision of Pacific empire taking shape: the Deep South, Texas, the Pacific
West, and Asia naturally invited commercial integration, and once achieved, would grant
America’s slave economies a substantial share of global trade.
Yet as Memucan Hunt and others recognized, Pacific ambitions could potentially
set Texas on a collision course with the United States, whose leaders simultaneously
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maneuvered to claim ports like San Francisco.

When the Congress of Texas passed a

resolution extending the republic’s jurisdiction to the California coastline, Daniel
Webster remarked that “Texas was too grasping and might excite the jealousy of other
nations.”20 Texan expansionists would not, however, bow to the foreign policy objectives
of the U.S. or to the legitimate territorial claims of Mexico. On the contrary, Texan
policymakers operated under the assumption that they could redraw the North American
map with no input from their much larger neighbor to the south. The republic’s leaders
winked at (or even endorsed) several invasions of Mexican territory, including the failed
1841 effort to seize New Mexico and the valuable Santa Fe trade. Such defeats did little
to dim the imperial horizons of Texans, however. In his farewell message of December
1844, President Sam Houston sounded a familiar note. “If we remain an independent
nation, our territory will be extensive – unlimited,” he proclaimed. “The Pacific alone
will bound the mighty march of our race and our empire.”21
More American in outlook than some of his Texan colleagues, Thomas Jefferson
Green nonetheless shared their far western preoccupations. Both a politician and a
soldier of fortune, Green chased various opportunities in a long public career that took
him across the southern half of the continent and back again. A brigadier general in the
Texas revolutionary army and later a major general in the California militia, Green also
served on the legislatures of North Carolina, Florida, California, and the Republic of
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Texas. In 1842, he was appointed second in command of the so-called Mier expedition, a
failed Texan raid into Mexican territory south of the Nueces River, that ended in the
capture of the entire unit of over two hundred invaders – though Green and a number of
others eventually escaped. Rebuffed in one imperial venture, he soon set his sights on a
far grander theater for expansion. In his memoir of this ill-fated expedition, published in
1845, he called for the seizure of Mexican California and the establishment of American
control across this terrain, “the most desirable portion of this continent.” The land
between the 28th and 42nd parallels possessed “a soil and climate of unsurpassed capability
for grazing and agriculture,” as well as mineral wealth “equal, if not superior, to any in
the world”. But perhaps more enticing were the natural harbors that dotted this long
coastline – Guaymas, San Diego, San Gabriel, Monterey, and San Francisco, among
others. With an eye to America’s continued commercial expansion, Green argued, like
Hunt and others, that “the port of San Francisco, or some other port in the south, is
absolutely necessary.”22
Texans like Green were hardly the only, or even the most prominent slaveholders
to fantasize about the possibilities of California’s harbors. The untapped potential of the
Pacific coastline was a favorite topic of conversation for John C. Calhoun while in
Washington in the early 1840s. His musings left a strong impression on a young
slaveholding congressman from Mississippi, William McKendree Gwin. As Gwin
recalled in his memoirs, Calhoun predicted that a future city on the bay of San Francisco
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– which at that point constituted little more than a cluster of ramshackle buildings – “was
destined to be the New York of the Pacific Coast.” In fact, it would be “more supreme,”
Calhoun claimed, as San Francisco “would have no such rivals as Boston, Philadelphia,
and Baltimore.” It was only a matter of time before American claimed that territory, he
insisted, at which point the United States would control “the direct route of the great
commerce of Asia.”23 Gwin and Green were clearly wooed by such promises of Pacific
ascendency, as both politicians set out for California in 1849. And once there, as we
shall see, they promoted a distinctly proslavery vision of empire in the Far West.
Calhoun, of course, remained in Washington and South Carolina, where he used
his considerable influence to advocate a strong American position on the Pacific. In an
1843 debate over whether the United States should assert its exclusive right to Oregon
and break its joint ownership with Britain, Calhoun again stressed the importance of
Pacific harbors. He cited the British victory in the Opium War as evidence that soon
Japan’s ports would soon be opened to the West, as had China’s per the recently
concluded terms of surrender. America and Europe could then bid for the commerce of
“the whole of that large portion of Asia, containing nearly half of the population and
wealth of the globe,” he continued. “No small portion” of this vast Asian commerce “is
destined to pass through the ports of the Oregon Territory to the valley of the Mississippi,
instead of taking the circuitous and long voyage round Cape Horn.”24 Pacific enterprise,
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as Calhoun recognized, was an inherently imperial venture. Indeed, the commercial
empire, to which so many southerners and northerners alike appealed, was no misnomer.
Expanded trade with China had been made possible through overwhelming military force
– as it would be with Japan, as well – and America needed to maintain a position of
geostrategic strength to claim its share of this wealth.25
Calhoun’s views on Pacific outlets aligned with the general maritime agenda of
some of the South’s most influential political thinkers. As Matthew Karp has argued, the
buildup of the antebellum American navy was overseen primarily by slaveholders and
their allies. In the final two decades before the Civil War, nine of the twelve secretaries
of the navy hailed from slave states, while southern-born senators controlled the
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Committee on Naval affairs for sixteen of those years.

The Georgia planter Thomas

Butler King held that committee chair for several years, during which time he became a
particularly prominent proponent of naval expansion in the Pacific world. From 1842 to
1860, a Virginian, Matthew Fontaine Maury, served as the superintendent of the Depot of
Charts and Instruments in Washington. He would win international recognition as one of
the nation’s most gifted cartographers, oceanographers, and champions of
transcontinental communication and trans-Pacific commerce.27 Meanwhile, another
Virginian, the slaveholding Thomas ap Catesby Jones, commanded the Pacific Squadron.
With their emphasis on internal improvements for the South, global commerce, and
American sea power, leaders like Maury and King typified the proslavery campaign for
Pacific empire. As the United States continued moving West, they would remain at the
heart of this great project.
Through the first half of the nineteenth century, slaveholders proved some of the
most forceful promoters of an American empire on the Pacific. To be sure, several
northern policymakers, including Daniel Webster and John Quincy Adams, matched
them in their expansionist zeal. And again, the merchants and sailors who conducted the
face-to-face transactions throughout the Pacific world were overwhelmingly Yankee in
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origin. Yet scholars have overplayed the northern character of early America’s
commercial development. After all, the ports of the Pacific would have remained nothing
but an American fantasy if not for the territorial advances made by slaveholding
presidents – Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase, Tyler’s annexation of Texas, and later
Polk’s conquest of northwest Mexico. Such additions, however, also enflamed the
simmering controversy over slavery, and ensured that by the mid-1840s, the Pacific slope
would assume the character of a sectional battleground.

Railroading to Empire
Few projects fueled sectional discord quite like the struggle to determine where
America’s first transcontinental railroad should run. Although expansionists like Thomas
Jefferson Green and the editors of the New Orleans Bee had called attention to
transcontinental communication since the 1830s, it was not until 1845 that the railroad
became a major national issue. Not coincidentally, that year also marked the beginning
of a rapid acceleration in the Pacific trade due to the recently concluded Treaty of
Wanghsia between China and the U.S.28 From that point forward, Pacific empire became
nearly synonymous with railroad development. And American expansionists would
increasingly divide over the question of slavery.
The New York merchant Asa Whitney, recently returned from a two-year stint in
China, was the first to bring the railroad to national prominence. On January 28, 1845,
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Whitney put forward a memorial to the House of Representatives, requesting the
construction of a rail line from the Great Lakes into Oregon.29 A tireless promoter of this
route, Whitney accrued significant support, but also powerful opposition, especially from
proslavery railroaders, who saw the linking of the Great Lakes and the Pacific Coast as a
death knell for southern commerce. Although every “patriotic and thinking citizen”
desires the accomplishment of a Pacific railroad, an anonymous contributor to the
Charleston Courier wrote in January 1847, Whitney’s proposed route was entirely
impractical. Its shortcomings were clear and numerous, the writer added: not only would
it be subject to inclement weather and far too northerly to benefit most of the nation,
Whitney’s railroad was also intended to be a private enterprise.30 De Bow’s Review
added to the criticism coming from southern presses, and soon the Baltimore American
was the only paper in the region to stand by Whitney’s plan.31
When Whitney first proposed the construction of a transcontinental railroad in
1845 he did not anticipate the sectional strife that such a plan would provoke. But
conflict and debate went hand-in-hand with any project that promised such wealth to a
given region. Whitney’s memorial had barely reached the Capitol when a powerful
coalition of southern railroad promoters emerged, refusing to stand idle as Whitney
attempted to snatch Pacific commerce for northern cities. Such feelings of sectional
rivalry spurred James Gadsden to write to John C. Calhoun in October, 1845, urging the
elder statesman’s attendance at the upcoming Memphis Convention. He saw the

Cong. Globe, 28th Congress, 2nd Session, (January 28, 1845), 218-219.
Charleston Courier, January 12, 1847.
31
Cotterill, “Early Agitation for a Pacific Railroad,” 396-398. For more criticism of Whitney’s plan, see,
for instance, De Bow’s Review, July 1849, 22-23.
29
30

37

Convention as an opportunity to ally the western states with “the Great Commercial and
Agricultural interests” of the South, rather than “the Tax gathering and Monopolizing
interests of the North.”32 Gadsden insisted on viewing the West as a natural outgrowth of
the South. By linking the regions with “iron avenues,” he argued, they would achieve
“Southern equality in… trade.”33 In pursuing this dream of trans-regional
communication and southern commercial regeneration, Gadsden would become one of
the leading antebellum railroad advocates on either side of the Mason-Dixon line.
A common trope in the endorsement of any railroad scheme was a pledge of
nationalism and a rhetorical renunciation of sectional impulses. Railroaders, North and
South, claimed to work for the common good, rather than for regional aggrandizement.
Rarely, however, should we take such claims at face value. After all, railroad promoters
generally held strong local ties and regional agendas, and their transcontinental appeals
could only target, and therefore enrich, very specific parts of the country. Anyway, even
those with truly national intentions would have been foiled by the state of antebellum
American railroads. The railroad system simply did not cohere. Railroads at the time ran
on over twenty different gauges, and while the 4 feet 8 ½ inch gauge accounted for
roughly half the total mileage, most of the South ran on a five-foot gauge. Anytime a
gauge changed, freight had to be transported at considerable cost to the next train,
sometimes miles away.34 Thus any cities on the main trunk of a transcontinental railroad
would likely receive the lion’s share of the commerce, while cities linked by connecting
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branches would have to content themselves with the scraps. Despite all the claims to the
contrary, transcontinental railroad debates were sectional matters.
Such hollow claims of sectional disinterestedness were frequently marshaled by
the delegates of the Memphis Convention of 1845, who gathered in November to
promote communication between the Mississippi Valley and the Southeast. In a frenzy
of press coverage and general public enthusiasm, 580 delegates from sixteen states,
including Calhoun as president, converged on Memphis.35 The vast majority, however,
hailed from slave states. Indeed, this was a convention of southerners, by southerners,
and for southerners. And nothing interested them as much as railroad construction.36 At
stake was “commercial empire,” according to Gadsden, and while the construction of
railway lines from Southeastern cities into Memphis was the first order of business, the
Charlestonian could not refrain from advocating a route all the way to the shores of
California.37 Others shared his Pacific aspirations. Another delegate, for instance,
eagerly looked forward to the day when a line would connect Charleston to California,
and the “vast trade” of “Golden Carthy [sic] and the Orient Ind” would pour into
American harbors.38 Calhoun, too, conservatively predicted that the U.S. would have a
Pacific railroad within the next generation.39
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The Memphis Convention gave southerners the opportunity to come together and
articulate, as a powerful commercial and political bloc, an alternate vision to Whitney’s
transcontinental proposal. Of course, there was no perfect southern consensus. New
Orleans interests, for instance, viewed the gathering at Memphis as a threat to its
stranglehold on the western trade, and they continued to favor river transportation over
the promises of a transcontinental railroad.40 Yet the very presence of almost 600
influential and like-minded leaders in the same place testifies to a growing coalition
committed to the creation of a commercial empire oriented on a south-west axis,
buttressed by railroads reaching all the way into California. As historian Robert Cotterill
noted, southern railroad promoters were more systematic and far-seeing than their
Northern counterparts, keeping the prize of western commerce steadily within their
sights.41 That California was a Mexican possession at this point seemed almost irrelevant
to men like Gadsden. The horizons of southern commercial expansionists stretched well
beyond the borders of the nation.
That year also marked the emergence of a powerful new voice in slaveholding
expansionism and transcontinental communication. James Dunwoody Brownson (J.D.B.)
De Bow published the first issue of his Commercial Review of the South and West in New
Orleans in January 1846.42 Although the periodical struggled financially at first, it would
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soon become what De Bow’s biographer calls “the most recognizable journal in the
antebellum South.”43 In monthly installments, De Bow and his corps of contributors
articulated the platform of a modernizing South. Here was a periodical that promoted
railroad development, urban growth, and industrialization as a bulwark, rather than an
impediment, for slave agriculture. The Far West occupied a central place in De Bow’s
plans for regional development, and as the sectional crisis intensified, so too did his
interest in the commercial expansion of the South.44 Over the coming years he would
establish himself as one of the most active chroniclers of southern railroad development
and most vocal boosters of westward expansion.45
The Pacific – and to a significant degree, the issue of a transcontinental railroad –
was at the heart of America’s greatest imperial undertaking. The U.S.-Mexican War
added 1.2 million square miles of territory to the United States and secured, at long last,
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the harbors of California for American commerce. James K. Polk’s administration
achieved through military force what previous slaveholding presidents, like Andrew
Jackson and John Tyler, had attempted through diplomatic coercion. From the very
outset of the conflict, it was the deep-water harbors of California that most enticed the
slaveholding president. In fact, even before war had broken out, Polk’s secretary of the
navy, George Bancroft, instructed the commander of the Pacific Squadron, John D. Sloat,
to direct his attention to California’s ports. “If you ascertain with certainty that Mexico
has declared war against the United States,” he wrote, “you will at once possess yourself
of the port of San Francisco.” That harbor, Bancroft later elaborated, was to be
considered “the most important public object.”46 What made this harbor especially
attractive, according to the former minister to Mexico, Waddy Thompson, was both its
size and its proximity to timber. “To say nothing of other harbors in California, that of
San Francisco is capacious enough for the navies of the world,” Thompson, a South
Carolinian, wrote in his 1846 memoir. “Its shores are covered with enough timber… to
build those navies.” If the U.S. hoped to enlarge its commerce with the Pacific – which
Thompson valued at over $50 million annually – it required “a place of refuge for our

46

George Bancroft to John D. Sloat, June 24, 1845; Bancroft to Sloat, May 15, 1846. On the importance of
California more generally to the Polk war effort see William L. Marcy to Colonel Stephen W. Kearny, June
3, 1846. These letters are all included in [Captain of Volunteers], Alta California: Embracing Notices of the
Climate, Soil, and Agricultural Products of Northern Mexico and the Pacific Seaboard; also a History of
the Military and Naval Operations of the U.S. Government against Northern Mexico, in the Years 1846 and
1847, and the Opinion of the Hon. James Buchanan on the Wilmot Proviso (Philadelphia: H. Packer & Co.,
1847), 14-16. For more commentary on Polk’s fixation on maritime commerce, as opposed to territorial
expansions, see Graebner, Empire on the Pacific, ix.

42

ships.”
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By 1848 Thompson’s fantasies had become reality. The U.S. now had its

empire on the Pacific.
To be sure, there were other inducements to the conquest of the Mexican
northwest, especially in the eyes of slaveholders. If Thompson’s descriptions were to be
believed, California possessed an agricultural climate not unlike the plantation South.
Although he did not comment on the possibility for slave labor in California, Thompson
did note tellingly that southern staples like “sugar, rice, and cotton find there their own
congenial climate.”48 In his highly critical account of the war, an anonymous army
officer made more explicit the parallels between the slave South and the Far West. “In
California, Sonora, and New Mexico, as good wheat, corn, and tobacco can be raised as
are produced in Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, or Tennessee,” he wrote, “and as good
cotton as Alabama or Mississippi can produce, may also be grown in California.”49 This
would have certainly been welcome news to certain slaveholding expansionists. But
again, the central objective of the proslavery administration was not an increase in
territory – as fertile as some of that soil may have been. Instead, Polk and his ministers
had their eyes set on a grander prize: a Pacific world of commerce.
That much became clear during the treaty negotiations with Mexico in 1848,
when the railroad question again came to the fore. Although the U.S. did not go to war
against Mexico for the express purpose of securing a suitable Pacific railroad route,

47

Thompson was particularly interested in the commercial potential of New Orleans, what he predicted
would become “the greatest city in the world.” An American port on the Pacific, together with a
transcontinental system of railroads and canals, “would throw into [New Orleans’s] lap the vast commerce
of China and India;” Waddy Thompson, Recollections of Mexico (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1846),
233. His $50 million figure seems to be a gross overestimate. See below.
48
Thompson, Recollections of Mexico, 233.
49
[Captain of Volunteers], Alta California, 59.

43

Polk’s government made transcontinental communication an important part of the peace
process. Unfortunately for southern railroad promoters, even with California secured, the
favored route to San Diego still did not pass entirely within U.S. territory. Proslavery
railroaders, therefore, lusted after even more territory, or at least a right-of-way through
Mexico. With the Mexican military on the ropes, J.D.B. De Bow now saw no excuse to
begin negotiations without the southern railroad in mind. Securing rights of passage
through Mexican territory should be a “sine qua non in our treaty with that republic,” he
insisted.50 Meanwhile, Jefferson Davis hoped for more Mexican territory in order to
“secure the railroad route to San Diego.”51 So too did Secretary of State James
Buchanan. In a letter to Nicholas Trist, then negotiating in Mexico, Buchanan urged the
diplomat to secure the Gila valley along the 32nd parallel, which had been deemed prime
real estate for railroad construction.52 Ultimately the U.S. would not win quite as much
land as Buchanan or Davis had hoped, but Trist’s negotiations did secure a right-of-way
for railroad development through northern Mexico.53 And as Jefferson Davis would learn
several years later as secretary of war, this was not the last time southern railroad
champions would turn their attentions to Mexico.54
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With vast new holdings in the Far Southwest, the American map appeared more
inviting than ever for southern railroaders. Their movement attained a newfound
coherence and visibility shortly after the war, largely due to a series of widely reprinted
letters by Matthew Fontaine Maury, superintendent of the U.S. Naval Observatory and
ardent champion of a southern transcontinental route.55 In a letter to Calhoun, dated
March 29, 1848, Maury gave full latitude to his globetrotting imagination and prophesied
a glorious future for the U.S. as the world’s undisputed commercial powerhouse – once
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts were linked by rail. “[C]ommercially speaking, our
country is in the centre of the people of the earth, and occupies a position for trade and
traffic with them which no nation that ever existed has held,” he exulted. Mustering an
impressive array of astronomical measurements to calculate the best route, Maury
rebutted Whitney’s plan and concluded that the train should run from Monterrey to
Memphis, and branch from there to all parts of the eastern seaboard. If this could be
accomplished, he imagined, “you might then drink tea made in Charleston within the
same month in which the leaf was gathered in China.” Left unstated by Maury – yet very
much implicit in this notion of rapid exchange – was an enticing prospect to any planter:
one might then buy cotton products in China within the same month in which the staple
was picked from the South Carolina lowcountry. With such ease of access to Asian
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markets, America would supplant Britain as the leading force in global trade.

56

Several

months later, in another letter, Maury continued to hammer the importance of
communication with the West. “The chief seat of the wealth and power and greatness of
these United States” would not reside on the eastern seaboard for long, Maury claimed.57
Westward went the course of American prosperity.
Beneath Maury’s national triumphalism ran a strong chord of sectional
aggrandizement. At the commercial crossroads of the world, the United States was
destined to draw a commanding share of European and Asian trade, and, so long as the
spine of this traffic ran through slave country, the South would be the primary
beneficiary. Untold riches lay before southern markets, if only the government could be
convinced that Memphis was indeed the most desirable eastern terminus for a
transcontinental railroad. As Maury made clear, transcontinental expansionism already
contained the promise of a transpacific commercial empire. California, therefore, was
not to be the end point of American dominion, but rather a pivotal stepping-stone in a
truly global network of trade. This was economic expansionism at its finest. And the
South had a new champion in Maury.
The railroad, as Maury, De Bow and others argued, was the surest antidote to the
South’s commercial ailments. The North’s fast-growing edge in industrial development
was luring business and immigrants, thus leading free states to outpace the South not only
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in economic capacity but also in population, and thereby upsetting the always precarious
balance of congressional representation. Meanwhile slaveholders saw their commerce
carried away on Northern ships, as they themselves were becoming more dependent on
Europe and the North for manufactures.58 To stem this tide, De Bow called for the
development of a “commercial Empire” centered in the slave South. “As a Southron, we
confess a deep and abiding interest in these schemes to connect the two oceans,” he wrote
in 1849. “Our own cities must revive under their influence, and commerce visit again
and rule in her wonted marts.”59 Direct trade with the Pacific world – conducted along a
southern transcontinental railroad and with southern-owned ships operating out of
California’s ports – would no doubt facilitate such a revival. Cotton would play a key
role. Expansionists like De Bow firmly believed that Asian markets clamored for
southern agricultural products, especially cotton, and that with trade routes across the
Pacific, America would claim a dominant share of global trade.60 The world, and the
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South in particular, would grow rich through slave-grown staples. Cotton was King in
the Atlantic world; the railroad, these expansionists predicted, would bring its dominion
to the Pacific as well.
To bolster these great expectations, southern expansionists could look to the
quickening pace of trade throughout the Pacific. An upswing in American commerce
with China was particularly encouraging. Between 1845 and 1860 American exports to
China had quadrupled, with the total value of imports and exports growing from $9.5
million to $22.5 over that same period. Most promising of all for slaveholders was the
increased Chinese demand for American cotton goods – which, along with California
gold, ranked as America’s most important export to Asia. Commercially-minded
southerners like Maury expected this trade to be self-perpetuating, once Chinese
consumers developed a dependence on American exports. “By constant and familiar
intercourse with our people, they will soon learn to want and taught to buy,” he argued.61
Not to be discounted was the small but growing trade between China and the Pacific
coast after 1849, carried out by ships that had initially transported cargo to California’s
gold fields.62
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Of course, America’s Pacific shipping was still dominated by northern firms, and
even so, it represented only a fraction of the nation’s total global trade. Furthermore,
Britain commanded the largest share of the China market, thanks in large part to its
control of opium sourced from India. The outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion in 1851, led
by the Christian millenarian Hong Xiuquan, convinced some traders and policymakers
that the toppling of the Qing dynasty would bring about more favorable relations with the
U.S. But as the war dragged on – ultimately claiming an estimated 20 to 70 million lives
– it became increasingly clear that the U.S. could not expect a sea change in trade
relations.63 The joint British and French operation against the Qing dynasty from 1857 to
1860, known as the Second Opium War, only further destabilized an already volatile
region. In short, this was a particularly tumultuous era in China, over which American
slaveholders, in particular, had little control. But no amount of bloodshed seemed to dim
their outlook on the potential for Asian trade, which was to be ferried, they predicted,
along a far southern transcontinental railroad. For these slaveholding expansionists, the
Pacific was the future.
A study of these proslavery railroad projects adds a new geographic dimension to
the growing scholarship on what one group of historians have described as the “Old
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South’s modern worlds.”

Antebellum planters eagerly sought commercial networks

and diplomatic influence on a global scale – not least in the Pacific Basin. Although
obstacles were high, the South had the means to surmount them through a combination of
technology, capital, and federal power. These southerners clung to neither strict
constructionism nor rural seclusion. Rather, they lobbied for a massive mobilization of
state power and looked westward to a new field of commercial and political opportunity.
There they saw the consumers of Asia, the gold of California, and a network of potential
political allies.

The Natural Limit(lessness) of Slavery
The recent conquest of the Mexican Northwest fired the global imaginations of
expansionists like Maury, but it also touched off vigorous disputes about the future of
American slavery. From the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso in 1846 to the
Compromise of 1850, the question of slavery in what was now the American Southwest
divided Congress into warring factions. Some of the most influential politicians of the
day insisted that slavery was naturally confined to the southeastern portion of the United
States, that it could not extend into the newly acquired territories by simple laws of
climate. “What more do you want?” Henry Clay asked in early 1850. “You have got
what is worth more than a thousand Wilmot provisos. You have nature on your side –
facts upon your side – and thus truth staring you in the face, that there is no slavery in
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those territories.”

Daniel Webster famously reiterated this point in no mixed terms.

“Now, as to California and New Mexico, I hold slavery to be excluded from those
territories by a law even superior to that which admits and sanctions it in Texas,” he
argued in the Senate. “I mean the law of nature – of physical geography – the law of the
formation of the earth.”66 Even those who hailed from further south than Webster’s
Massachusetts and Clay’s Kentucky cast doubt on the profitability of slave agriculture in
the Southwest. Waddy Thompson, who had once written glowingly about California’s
agricultural potential, now argued that the region offered more in liabilities than in
profits. The land was ill-suited to the cultivation of cotton and sugar on a grand scale, he
wrote to John C. Calhoun, while transportation across the remote desert regions would
pose perpetual problems.67
Others, however, were justifiably skeptical of this natural limits thesis, what the
New York Daily Times later dubbed a “clap-trap” argument, drummed up merely to
defeat the Wilmot Proviso.68 Indeed, David Wilmot himself noted that African slavery
had found its way into New Mexico as early as 1847.69 Few were more critical of the
natural limits argument than Horace Mann, a Whig congressman and educational
reformer. In a series of publically circulated letters, Mann scolded Webster for his
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shortsighted acquiescence to the westward expansion of slavery. The institution would
not obey the dictates of a “thermometer,” Mann warned. “Slavery depends, not upon
Climate, but upon Conscience,” he wrote in 1850. “Wherever the wicked passions of the
human heart can go, there slavery can go.” Even if slave agriculture proved unprofitable,
however, the growing households of the Southwest would soon call for 100,000 domestic
slaves, he predicted. Furthermore, who was to say that substantial quantities of gold
would not be found in New Mexico, as it had been in California a year earlier? “This is
the very kind of labor on which slaves, in all time, have been so extensively employed,”
Mann rightfully noted.70 Mann’s message was clear: unless checked by some external
power, slavery would roll inexorably westward.
In an exceedingly rare occurrence, Jefferson Davis of Mississippi agreed with the
antislavery New Englander, Horace Mann. There was no reason, Davis argued again and
again, to assume that slavery would not be profitable and adaptable in the Mexican
cession. After all, most abolitionists clearly did not subscribe to the natural limits thesis
themselves, he asserted. Otherwise, why go to such lengths to restrict slavery in the new
territories? Rather than natural limits, Davis suggested, there were natural incentives for
the expansion of slavery. Although much of the region remained unknown, reports from
hunters indicated that the lower Colorado River boasted “widespread and fruitful
valleys,” according to Davis. Furthermore, there was always the prospect of further gold
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discoveries, especially in the valleys around the Gila River. Like Mann, Davis predicted
that slaves would soon be used profitably in mining operations in New Mexico. To
buttress these claims, Davis solicited reports on the mineral opportunities in the Gila
Valley from the ongoing U.S.-Mexico joint boundary commission. The news he received
from the commissioner, John R. Bartlett, was certainly heartening. Bartlett had it on
good authority that the area around the Gila possessed a “richness… as a mineral region
unsurpassed in New Mexico, both in Gold Silver & Copper.”72 Davis and his fellow
advocates for the western expansion of slavery were being vindicated. It certainly looked
as if human bondage would pay in the Southwest.
As politicians in Washington debated the adaptability of slave labor to the Far
West, emigrants to the region put these theories to a very real test. In January 1848, gold
was discovered at Sutter’s Mill near Sacramento, California, setting off a mad scramble
for the Pacific coast by December of that year. Among the tens of thousands of
emigrants from China, Chile, Mexico, Hawaii, Australia, America, Europe and
elsewhere, came a much smaller – but by no means insignificant – population of black
slaves from the American South. Historians estimate that southern slaveholders forcibly
transported between 500 to 600 bondspeople to California during the gold rush, though
more recent evidence has suggested that as many as 1,500 black slaves may have reached
the state by the early 1850s.73 In making the journey with their slave property, the
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southern argonauts of the late 1840s were overturning decades of historical precedent, as
slavery had been abolished in California for 23 years under Mexican law before the U.S.
seized the territory in 1846.74 But even the passage of California’s free soil constitution
in late 1849 did not seem to present a serious impediment to slaveholders bound for El
Dorado. If there were natural, historical, or even legal barriers to slave expansion, the
southern emigrants who brought their bondspeople into California did not pay heed.
As David Wilmot had noted, African slavery was not entirely alien to the Far
West during the pre-gold rush period. During the U.S.-Mexico War, a handful of
southern officers, like John S. Griffin of Virginia, brought along personal slaves on their
military campaigns.75 Yet the vast majority of black slaves, as with the vast majority of
emigrants in general, came to California during the gold rush period of the late 1840s.
Most traveled with their masters along the overland trails, the most popular southern
route being the Gila River trail along the 32nd parallel. Next to the more central PlatteHumbolt route, the Gila trail was the second most heavily trafficked overall, carrying
some 12,000 migrants in 1849 alone. Most gold seekers, of course, traveled without
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bondsmen. But if contemporary newspaper accounts and the memoirs of former
argonauts are any indication, encounters with slaves along the overland trails were not
uncommon occurrences.76 Bondspeople and their masters could also be found aboard
steamers bound for the Pacific coast. More expensive but speedier options, the routes
around either Cape Horn or across the Isthmus of Panama carried perhaps as many
African Americans as did the overland trails – although a number of these would have
been freedpeople.77
Whether traveling by sea or by land, transporting valuable slave property across
such vast distances and into a frontier mining community was a risky undertaking. As an
able-bodied slave could fetch up to $1000 at auction, slaveholders had to be relatively
confident of high returns to hazard such a journey. Perhaps no slaveholder was as
optimistic about the prospects for bonded labor in California as the former minister to
Brazil and future Virginia governor, Henry A. Wise. The Far West would be a lucrative
dumping ground for the surplus slave population of the Upper South, he argued.
According to Wise’s calculations, if the Missouri Compromise Line was to be extended
to the Pacific and slavery legally protected in gold country, Virginia alone would stand to
gain over $1 billion through the sale of bondspeople to California.78 Wise’s figure may
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have been absurd, but the experience of masters in mining regions indicated that tidy
sums could indeed be expected from slave labor among the diggings. Decades before the
discovery of gold in California, white masters had used slave labor to great effect in the
placer mines of North Carolina. When in the goldfields of California, North Carolinian
masters often replicated these older mining strategies, organizing slaves into large gangs
under the direction of overseers.
Most slaveholding gold seekers, however, traveled with fewer slaves – generally
one or two – and worked alongside their chattel on more modest claims.79 Even these
smaller operations could be highly lucrative. One South Carolinian, for instance, was
offered $300 per month for the hire of his slave Scipio, though he refused, believing that
Scipio would be more valuable by his side.80 The gamble may have paid off if Scipio
proved anywhere near as lucky or skilled as the two slaves of a Mississippi emigrant,
who reportedly earned their master $5000 by the product of their diggings over two
months. According to reports received by a Mississippi paper, slaves could fetch as
much as to $3,000 to $4,000 on the San Francisco market.81 As in the South, California
slaves could also be used as collateral, or even as stakes in a game of cards. According to
one California observer, a slave by the name of Harry “changed owners about every
Saturday night,” as the prize in a weekly game of freeze-out poker. “The fortunate
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winner would have Harry’s services at picking, shoveling or running a rocker for the
week.”82
The correspondence of George McKinley Murrell illustrates the manifold
advantages that slaveholders could derive from their bonded labor in the diggings of
California. Setting out from his family’s plantation in Bowling Green, Kentucky in the
spring of 1849, Murrell traveled with Reuben, one of his father’s 27 slaves.83 By
September, the two had reached Sacramento and commenced a modest mining venture.84
Although Reuben had some success in the diggings that fall, Murrell soon began renting
his slave’s labor to the boarding house at which they lodged. In fact, it seems unlikely
that Murrell would have been able to cover his expenses without the profits he accrued
from Reuben’s work, which “more than pays my board although that is $4.00 per day.”85
Months later, it was still the profits from Reuben’s labor that secured a roof over his
master’s head. Working as a cook for $10 a day, Reuben generated a steady source of
income in a country that could be notoriously inhospitable to unlucky miners like
Murrell. “I have Rheubin hired out at $10.00 a day and foolish I was that I did not have
him hired out all the time,” Murrell wrote. “I might have been a great deal better off.
$10.00 a day is big wages & but few hands can get it now.”86 The versatile Reuben even
learned to bake, which enabled Murrell to profit from bread sales, “as the miners don’t

82

Horace Bell, On the Old West Coast: Being further Reminiscences of a Ranger, edited by Lanier Bartlett
(New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1930), 21.
83
Murrell spelled the name of his slave as both Rheubin and Reuben. I have opted for the latter spelling, as
adopted by the Huntington Library catalogue description.
84
George McKinley Murrell to Samuel Murrell, September 17, 1849, George McKinley Murrell
Correspondence, HEHL.
85
Murrell to Elisebeth Murrell, October 15-17, 1849, Murrell Correspondence, HEHL
86
Murrell to John Grider, August 24, 1850, Murrell Correspondence, HEHL

57

love to cook.”

87

Murrell was quick to learn that in gold country, where male miners

predominated, domestic skills like cooking and baking came at a premium. As another
southern emigrant complained to his brother, “A servant is not to be had at any price,”
and thus his wife was “constrained to do her own house work and cooking.”88 Under
such conditions, the gamble of bringing a valuable slave into gold country certainly paid
off for miners like Murrell.
But if the profits from slave labor in gold country were steady, the risks could be
substantial. Murrell, like other white masters in California, was on his guard against a
perceived abolitionist influence in the diggings. According to Murrell, he and Reuben
resided “in the midst of the most fanatical of the abolition party,” although he professed
an abiding faith in Reuben. “I do not think that their contaminating & poisoning
principles has in the leas weakened his fidelity & devotedness to me,” he added.89
Similarly, a Louisiana slaveholder, Jesse Holcomb Chaney, witnessed the workings of
antislavery forces in California with great unease. “The abolitionist will go and sit by him
[his slave] when while at work and beg him to leave me,” he noted. While Chaney
reported no problems with his slave, he noted that in general, California slaveholders
“have much trouble about our slaves.”90 Hinton Rowan Helper, while certainly no friend
of the southern slaveholding class, also made note of the “meddling abolitionists” who
attempted to “entice away” black slaves in California’s gold fields. Yet, similarly, he
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estimated that few slaves actually made good on abolitionists’ offers, due to “their
attachment to their masters.”91
A sense of fidelity may have deterred many slaves for seeking their freedom in
California, but it was a different sort of fidelity than the one Murrell and Helper had in
mind. In gold country, slaves were thousands of miles from their homes, their friends,
and their families. Escape on the frontier of California may have meant freedom, but it
would also likely mean lifelong separation from loved ones in the South. With Murrell as
his transcriber, Reuben corresponded with this friends on the plantation in Bowling
Green, expressing a genuine desire to return to them. “There is no country like home,”
Reuben dictated to Murrell, “if I can just only live to get back.”92 Such a reunion,
however, was not to be. Two years after his departure from Kentucky, Reuben was swept
up in a current while helping a traveler cross a river in the gold diggings.93 Reuben lost
his life and Murrell lost his steadiest source of income. There was more than one way to
lose a slave in gold country.
Even if their bondspeople did not run away, southern argonauts had to adjust to a
new master-slave dialectic in the gold diggings. As historian Stacey Smith illustrates,
slaves themselves recognized the new opportunities available to them in an open frontier,
and they exploited their masters’ anxieties to renegotiate the conditions of their
enslavement. In a number of instances, slaves reached agreements with their masters to
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work in California for a set period of time – usually several years – in exchange for their
freedom.94 California slaves often secured for themselves what was known as a Sunday
claim, the right to keep the earnings from their mining on what would have otherwise
been a day of rest. With these earnings, bondspeople were able to purchase their own
freedom, as well as the freedom of their family members back in the South.95 In his study
of antebellum California’s African American community, Rudolph Lapp estimates that
hundreds of slaves secured their family members’ as well as their own freedom through
these means, collectively spending as much as $750,000 in the process.96 Slaves were
eager to claim a share of California’s wealth, with or without the blessings of their
masters. A Tennessee slaveholder, who had settled in a small gulch with his three slaves,
faced open rebellion when he attempted to claim the gold dust that his chattel had
recently washed out. As he approached the gold, his bondsmen warned him to take his
hands of their earnings. He was welcome to work with them on shares, they continued,
but they would dig no more as slaves.97 White masters now had to negotiate, rather than
merely command.
To safeguard their property against such rebellion, slaveholders often journeyed
and settled with kin and close friends, those they could trust to oversee their chattel.
They were especially mindful of the fact that California’s placers were “so hidden and
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retired,” that slaves “could not in many instances be recaptured,” as one southern gold
seeker put it. Thus masters did all in their power to maintain surveillance and to cloister
their human property from interference.98 These slaveholding miners often organized
informal posses to discipline and police bondspeople, thereby bringing to California an
analogue to the slave patrols of the plantation South. Generally settling in the Southern
Mines – which lay close to the end of the southern overland trail – slaveholders
concentrated in Mariposa, Tuolumne and Calaveras counties.99 In essence, these
slaveholding argonauts carved out miniature Souths across the western landscape.
Prominent among them was the settlement of Colonel Thomas Thorn of Texas.
Having organized a caravan of 200 wagons from Texas to California, Thorn settled with
a small southern community and thirty slaves in the gold fields of Mariposa. He
attempted to instill discipline through severe beatings, although like other slaveholders in
California, his command was far from absolute. His slaves proved susceptible to the
influence of antislavery forces in the area and the lure of freedom along the sparsely
policed frontier. Several successfully escaped, while at least one other purchased his
freedom.100
Like Thorn, Thomas Jefferson Green sought to recreate a slaveholding
community within California, and like Thorn, Green soon discovered the limits of his
mastery. Since his days in the Republic of Texas, Green had been an advocate of
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slaveholding expansion to the Pacific. Now in charge of his own mining company, he
aimed to make good on his vision for the American West. Along with a dozen or so
fellow Texans and their fifteen slaves, Green settled the mining colony of Rose’s Bar in
the summer of 1849. Because his company made claims not only in their own names, but
also in the names of their bondsmen – a common practice among slaveholding miners –
Green’s company soon attracted the attention of the non-slaveholders of the region. A
committee of white miners approached Green, but was quickly rebuffed by the Texans.
In response, a second committee formed and passed a resolution “that no slaves or
negroes should own claims or even work in the mines,” according to the memoir of one
of the committee members, Edwin Sherman.101 This committee then approached Green
for a second time, and again received threats of violent resistance. But Sherman and the
free miners held their ground. “If you want to keep your slaves, you will have to go back
to Texas or Arkansas,” Sherman threatened, “or by tomorrow morning you will not have
one slave left, for the miners will run them out and you will never get them back.” The
warning was apparently real enough for Green and his company, who moved off their
claim, with their slaves, the next day.102
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As Stacey Smith notes, historians have mistakenly marked this confrontation as
“California’s standard free-soil creation story.”103 A victory for the white miners of
Rose’s Bar, Green’s flight has been seen as the last gasp of a brief slaveholding
experiment in gold rush California. Yet, this was a turf war; not an abolitionist
movement. Like many white miners in California, Sherman’s group only opposed slave
labor insofar as it encroached on their own claims. Because “slaves were not citizens,”
Sherman and his allies argued, “their owners could not take up pre-emption claims for
them.”104 Morally ambivalent on the issue of slavery and unconcerned with the plight of
bondspeople in general, supporters of a free soil California sought simply to secure the
region for free white labor. They would score some victories, notably at Rose’s Bar and
in the state’s founding document, but such success did not amount to a complete
repudiation of California’s proslavery politics. Just as gold rush California proved a
lucrative field for many slaveholders, it would continue to attract southerners and their
proslavery political culture in the coming years. As Green himself would demonstrate,
southern dreams of Pacific expansion had hardly been extinguished.

Pacific Lost?
As emigrants continued to pour into California, the political struggle over the
Pacific railroad intensified. A flurry of memorials poured into Congress in 1849, a
number of which suggested St. Louis as the desirable eastern terminus, as opposed to
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Whitney’s Great Lakes and Maury’s Memphis proposals. The debate immediately
spilled beyond the halls of Congress, however, as newspapers and commercial
conventions across the country joined the fray. As in 1845, Memphis was again a
hothouse for railroaders. While St. Louis attracted the largest gathering of the sort that
year with roughly 1000 delegates in attendance, the 400 representatives at Memphis put
together, by all accounts, a less fractious and more successful convention (that is, after a
cholera outbreak in the city pushed the event from July to November.) Again, the
organizers of the convention looked toward Asia and its “six hundred millions of people,”
and advanced the far southern route as shorter and more temperate than its northern
competitors. “We shall do what Christopher Columbus was attempting when he
discovered a new world,” the corresponding committee boasted – “find a direct passage
to the East Indies by going west.” Especially heartening to the committee was growing
network of railroads in the South, thus ensuring that a route from Memphis would have
speedy access to the slave states of the Southeast as well as the new markets of the Far
West.105 In attendance were men from fifteen different states – including Asa Whitney
himself, who received a respectful hearing – though, again, southerners dominated the
rolls and the agenda. Most delegates strongly favored the construction of a route from
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Memphis to San Diego, not least among them the Convention’s president, Matthew
Fontaine Maury.106
Thanks to the work of those at Memphis and elsewhere, by 1849 southern railroad
aspirations were on the rise. True, transcontinental promoters still had to contend with a
maelstrom of competing claims. But the Gila route, along the 32nd parallel and into San
Diego, was fast becoming a regional favorite. Published that year, a report and
accompanying series of maps drew authoritatively on the explorations of Fremont,
William Emory, and others to mount the evidence in favor of a far southern route.107 Asa
Whitney, who had never ceased campaigning for his northern route, recognized that the
tides were fast turning against him, and thus struck a defensive posture in his 1849
pamphlet, A Project for a Railroad to the Pacific. He devoted a substantial portion of the
work to an attack on the Gila route, which he viewed as his major rival. The land along
the 32nd parallel is barren, he argued, and lacked the resources necessary to support
railroad construction. Whitney also claimed that the route would exclude too many
important American cities from its trade.108 Other opponents of the southern route would
reiterate such objections in the years to come, a gauge of just how popular the 32nd
parallel had become.
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Coupled with favorable reports on the use of slave labor in gold country, such
progress on the railroad campaign pointed to a bright future for proslavery claims on the
Far West. Yet just as southern hopes were soaring to new heights, a crushing blow came
from California. With its billowing population and pressing land claims, California’s
elites quickly assembled a constitutional convention in September 1849 in order to hurry
the territory’s transition to statehood. As it had at the national level, the question of
slavery occupied a central place in the proceedings of the convention at Monterrey. To
the surprise of some and relief of many, the assembled delegates unanimously resolved to
bar the institution from California’s borders.109 “What surprised us perhaps more than
anything else was the unanimity with which the clause prohibiting slavery was passed,”
one former delegate recalled. “We had expected very considerable opposition from the
Southern element.”110 Southern-born delegates were indeed powerfully represented at the
convention, but they quickly fell in line with the prevailing opinion against slavery.111
Those with their fingers on the pulse in California recognized that the passage of the
antislavery clause was a foregone conclusion well before the convention assembled. The
territory’s press had largely come out against the institution, while participants at local
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meetings held across the state expressed opposition to both slavery and black
immigration. As early as June 1849, a California emigrant predicted that “a Convention
will be held… and slavery will be excluded by a unanimous vote.”112 With the passage of
the antislavery clause, the California constitution would read: “Neither slavery, nor
involuntary servitude, unless for the punishment of crimes, shall ever be tolerated in this
State.”113
As with the confrontation at Rose’s Bar, the prohibition on slavery in California
was, by no means, a moral crusade against human bondage. If anything it was a crusade
against African Americans. A number of delegates sought not only to bar slavery from
California, but also black laborers more generally. Although their efforts ultimately
failed – primarily because the convention recognized that such restrictions would
endanger California’s chances at congressionally-recognized statehood – they engendered
a lively debate within the convention. Morton McCarver, a Kentucky Democrat, worried
that unless California also banned African American immigration, slaveholders would
easily circumvent the state’s antislavery constitution. Masters would bring slaves by the
hundreds into California as indentured laborers, he argued at length, only to set them free
after they had worked a set term in the gold mines. The fact that this practice was already
employed by a number of slaveholders in the diggings gave some credence to
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McCarver’s arguments.

Others, like Lansford Hastings – who would later achieve

notoriety for his role in the Donner Party’s ill-fated journey – concurred. “If [blacks] are
introduced at all, I think they had better be introduced as slaves,” he argued, “for a free
negro is the freest human being in God’s world.”115 The president of the convention,
Robert Semple of Kentucky, predicted that a well-known Louisiana planter would, alone,
transport 1,000 contracted slaves into California in this manner.116 Although such
estimates stretched credulity, delegates were right to suspect the slipperiness of
slaveholders, who would devise various stratagems in order to dodge the restrictions on
their peculiar institution. Indeed, time would show that a constitutional ban on slavery
would not extinguish unfree labor within the state.
The southern delegates’ role in the convention should not be read as an abdication
of their proslavery agenda for the West, but merely as a recalibration of their overall
strategy. A decisive influence on the antislavery measure came from what may seem, at
first blush, an unlikely source, William McKendree Gwin. Born in Tennessee, educated
in Kentucky, and groomed in Mississippi, Gwin still owned a large plantation in Natchez,
which he worked with some 200 slaves. Ideologically committed to slavery and southern
expansion, Gwin nevertheless led his peers in urging the adoption of an antislavery clause
for the constitution. He did so by shrewd political calculation. As John Augustus Sutter,
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a fellow delegate, recognized, “When the question of slavery came up men from the
south kept very quiet, as they wanted offices.”117 Gwin, a former U.S. Representative
from Mississippi, had come to California in search of a grander prize. He coveted a
senate seat and recognized that waging unwinnable battles was no way to endear himself
to the future legislators who would elect him. In short, Gwin had read the writing on the
wall, recognized that a proslavery constitution was a lost cause, and thus opted to save his
political capital for more promising contests.118
One such contest was over the demarcation of California’s borders. Along with
Henry Halleck of New York, Gwin pressed for the creation of a vast state, with an eastern
boundary that would extend to the Rocky Mountains. The intention, Gwin argued, was to
draw the state’s borders in a way that would invite the partitioning of California into
multiple states. “I should like to see six States fronting on the Pacific in California,”
Gwin urged the delegation. “I want the additional power in the Congress of the United
States of twelve Senators instead of four.” Gwin imagined the formation, in due time, of
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20 states west of the Rockies.
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Although Gwin himself never admitted to any particular

proslavery bias – and, in fact, dismissed the notion that slavery would take hold in the
southern half of California – he no doubt hoped that at least several of these states would
welcome the South’s peculiar institution.120 His fellow delegate Elisha Crosby
recognized as much when he wrote, some years later, “The only argument for dividing
the State into north and south was found in the slavery question the north to [be] free and
the south slave.”121
Gwin was certainly not the only southerner to contemplate state division in the
Far West. As he lobbied at the Monterrey convention, Mississippi’s two senators Henry
Foote and Jefferson Davis were waging a campaign in Congress to extend the Missouri
Compromise line to the Pacific coast, which would necessitate the splitting of California.
Foote proposed that Congress draw a line at the 35 deg. 30’ parallel (roughly at
Bakersfield) and break off the southern section of California as the separate territory of
Colorado.122 Indeed, we might mark the proposals of Gwin, Foote, and Davis as the
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beginning of a decade-long California state division movement – a movement that drew
strength from proslavery expansionists who hoped to carve out a piece of the Pacific
coast as a counterweight to California’s free soil constitution.123
The convention’s delegates finished their deliberations by October 1849, crafting
a final document that outlawed slavery but not black immigration, and that drew the
state’s eastern boundary at the Sierra Nevada rather than the Rockies. Submitted for a
popular vote in November, the constitution passed easily, 12,061 in favor and 811
against. Sixty-six of those negative votes came from Mariposa county, where gold
seeking southerners wanted a constitution without restrictions on slavery.124 But they
represented an extreme minority in a territory that had largely shunned the sectional
issues that would delay statehood.
Those within the South, however, were not so willing to concede defeat.
Slaveholders in Jackson, Mississippi cooked up a scheme to effectively overrule the free
soil constitution through the power of immigration. They planned to raise a force of
5,000 white settlers and 10,000 slaves to colonize the mining and agricultural regions of
California. According to one northern observer, by March 1850 there were already “a
few stray specimens” of this would-be colony in California by the spring of 1850.
Ultimately, of course, this mass migration never materialized. As even the most petulant
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slaveholding expansionists would have recognized, such an undertaking would hazard
millions of dollars in slave property with no clear sign of payoff.125
The fiercest struggle over California’s fate took place in Congress. In the debates
over what would become the Compromise of 1850, southerners put up a particularly stiff
fight to secure at least a portion of California for slaveholding settlement. A relatively
junior senator during these debates, Jefferson Davis distinguished himself by opposing
the antislavery agenda for the West, what he called the “robber’s law.”126 With a small
group of fellow southern statesmen, Davis pledged to “avail ourselves of every means…
to prevent the admission of California as a State unless her southern boundary be reduced
to 36 deg. 30 min.”127 The new territories of New Mexico and California belonged
largely to the South by right of conquest, he insisted on several occasions, as the slave
states sacrificed a disproportionate amount of blood and treasure to wrest that land from
Mexico.128 Upon the passage of the statehood bill, Davis even considered physically
taking the document from the speaker of the Senate and “tearing it to pieces.”129 James
Henry Hammond invoked a familiar trope when he predicted that the South would be
made a “Hayti” after it had lost California to free labor.130 The loss was particularly
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galling, as southerners believed a free California would erode their power within the
Senate and thus threaten proslavery interests not just in the West, but at a national level.

Conclusion
Scholars – perhaps taken in by the alarmist tone of their subjects – have given
great weight to the Compromise, representing it as a breaking point in the history of
slaveholders’ western ambitions.131 But southern expansionists were too nimble, too
resilient, and too ambitious to seriously consider raising the white flag at such an early
juncture. Despite their hysterical rhetoric, slaveholders quickly rallied from this setback.
Indeed, such rhetoric belies an undercurrent of optimism that ran through southern
thinking about the Far West, both before and after the Compromise votes. Perhaps no
one was more sanguine than the very man who so quickly conceded on the slavery issue
within California. After a contested vote within the statehouse in late 1849, William
Gwin won election to the U.S. Senate with a six-year term, along with the western
military celebrity John C. Fremont, on a half-year term. Gwin managed to convince a
sufficient number of legislators that the election of a southern senator was a necessary
counterbalance to Fremont and essential to California’s chances at statehood. “I was
induced to vote for him as U.S. Senator because he was known as an extreme Southern
man,” Crosby recalled. “If another northern man had been selected it would have been so
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palpable a cut or insult to the South that the State never would have had a chance of
admission.”132
Whether or not California could have achieved statehood without Gwin’s election
is debatable. But he himself wasted no time in speculating once his position was secured.
Although he went to Washington as a representative from a free state, Gwin’s political
allegiance lay squarely with the slave South. California’s press recognized as much when
they attempted to out the newly elected senator as “an ultra pro-slavery man.”133 Indeed,
from his time as a U.S. representative from Mississippi in the 1840s, to his years as a
U.S. senator from California in the 1850s, Gwin worked to further the interests of
slaveholders. His election quickly eased the anxieties of southerners like Jefferson Davis,
who had prematurely assumed that a free California would inexorably tilt the
congressional balance of power away from the South. At the helm of the state’s
proslavery Democratic party over the coming decade, Gwin marshalled the necessary
votes to align California with the slave states on major sectional issues like the KansasNebraska Act and the Lecompton Constitution. Meanwhile, he established a monopoly
on the federal patronage for positions within California and packed these offices with his
southern friends. California may have adopted a free soil constitution with Gwin’s
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blessing, but over the course of the next decade, he ensured that the state would embrace
the politics of slavery (Chapter 3).
Gwin’s sectional allegiance shone through in his advocacy for a transcontinental
railroad. As a senator from the free state of California, he claimed to work in the
interests of Union, rather than for the aggrandizement of a particular section. But his
ambitious plan for a Pacific railway, fully unveiled by 1853, called for a road that ran
almost entirely through slave country, with only branch lines radiating into the North. In
this plan, Gwin followed squarely in the footsteps of the proslavery expansionists of the
preceding decade. Like John C. Calhoun, J.D.B. De Bow and Matthew Fontaine Maury,
Gwin saw in Pacific ports and transcontinental communication the formula for American
empire. And he recognized that whichever section won that railroad would control both
the political allegiance of the West and the commercial prospects of the Pacific. Gwin’s
political projects over the coming decade made clear what historians have often
overlooked: southern expansion was never entirely about the acquisition of more slave
territory. If slavery was to be barred from California, the Pacific could still be yoked to
the South – Gwin, Maury, and others rightly reasoned – by a bond of iron.
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Chapter 2

THE GREAT SLAVERY ROAD, 1850-1859
His bondsmen may have been driven from California’s gold fields in 1849, but
five years later Thomas Jefferson Green still saw a bright future for the slave South in the
Far West. In the summer of 1854, Green traveled to east Texas to celebrate the Atlantic
and Pacific Railroad Company as it broke ground on its proposed transcontinental
undertaking. “This road is emphatically the Southern, yea, what the abolitionist truly
calls the ‘great slavery road,’” he exulted. To Green this represented a particularly
promising chapter in the longstanding campaign by southerners to extend both their labor
system and their political influence across the western half of the continent. After nearly
a decade of lobbying, slaveholding railroaders had made serious headway in their plans
for a Pacific connection. Crucially, they had recently orchestrated the purchase of
roughly 30,000 square miles of Mexican territory to make way for a proposed Pacific
railroad along a far southern route. With such a railway – built “by Southern labor both
white and black” – slavery would inexorably spill into the far western territories and
substantially boost the South’s political influence at the national level, Green predicted.1
Simply because their railroad was bound for the free state of California did not make it
any less of a proslavery project.
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Free or not, California was still viewed as a crucial – perhaps the crucial –
component to the southern dream of a western empire, a fact that has largely escaped the
scholarship on this period. The Compromise of 1850 did little to alter or diminish the
slaveholding imperial imagination. Southern expansionists continued hammering the
themes of the previous decade’s railroad campaign. First, they argued, a far southern
route would yoke the Far West to the slave South, both commercially and politically.
“[W]hen the road is finally completed to the Pacific,” the Arkansas State Gazette and
Democrat optimistically projected, “the State of California, and the States which will
intervene between that and Texas, being so intimately identified with us, in their
commercial relations, will, as a matter of course, from interest as well as sympathy, join
with our division of the country, as a common community, contending for common
rights.”2 And second, the road would provide commercial outlets to the Asia trade and its
600 million potential consumers. “The Eastern World!” Judah Benjamin proclaimed in
1852. “Its commerce makes empires of the countries to which it flows, and when they are
deprived of it they are empty bags, useless, valueless.”3 The economic fortunes of the
slave South, of course, were firmly tied to the Atlantic world and, particularly, to the
manufacturing might of Great Britain. But for many southerners like Benjamin, the
future lay across the Pacific, in the commercial promise of China.
Despite the grand visions it inspired and the political divisions it created, this
railroad campaign has received little in the way of recent scholarly attention, and
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historians have never fully explored these efforts in the context of slaveholding
internationalism.4 Scholarly oversights might be partly attributable to the unspectacular
results of this project. After all, antebellum southerners never succeeded in constructing
their great slavery road. And yet their efforts – including several near-misses – merit
closer study by scholars of American empire. Whereas proslavery filibusters have more
effectively captured the historical imagination, it was southern commercial expansionists
who presented the greater threat to antislavery politics. In contrast to would-be
conquistadors like William Walker and Henry A. Crabb, slaveholding railroad promoters
largely controlled the levers of power in Washington and sustained a prolonged and
multi-pronged campaign to extend their political vision across the continent.
Through their railroad boosterism, southerners articulated some of the most
ambitious imperial objectives of this era. They actively pursued a project that would
subdue and settle the West, tap the burgeoning markets of the Pacific coast, boost the
industrial capacity of the slave states, and unite the southern half of the continent along
what would become America’s great commercial highway.5 And these were no mere
pipe dreams, as their political opponents recognized. Indeed, northern leaders were
desperate to check these proslavery aspirations and to advance competing visions of their
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own. The result was the longest-lived political controversy of the period, which lay at
the root of other sectional flashpoints like the Gadsden Purchase and Bleeding Kansas.
Indeed, the story of the sectional conflict is largely a story of the railroad.

The Great Slavery Road at High Tide
While railroad promoters focused primarily on regional development during the
two years after the Compromise of 1850, national plans again took center stage beginning
in early 1853. As public interest in transcontinental railroad plans reached “fever heat,”
according to the American Railroad Journal, national policymakers looked to the Pacific
Coast with renewed hope.7 That year Congress devoted more time and attention to
Pacific railroad proposals than to any other subject.8 Southern railroad expansionists had
good timing, if nothing else. In the White House was Franklin Pierce, friendly to
proslavery interests and expansionists in general, while at the head of the war department
sat Jefferson Davis, his most trusted advisor. Cabinet members were known to make
speeches favorable to southern plans in Pierce’s company, the President offering no
objection.9 Davis, in particular, lent his powers to western development projects, and
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most of all, to the southern transcontinental railroad. He would oversee the Pacific
railroad surveys of 1853, while on the side sponsoring a scheme to import camels to the
American Southwest.10 In short, these were flush times for southerners with global
aspirations.
But above all it is California’s leading politician, William Gwin, who deserves
credit for reinvigorating the old debate. Born in Tennessee, educated in Kentucky, and
with land and slaves in Mississippi, the California senator did not disguise his southern
sympathies. Gwin generally followed his southern brethren in voting, and, despite his
claims to the contrary, continued to promote the best interests of his native section in his
spirited campaign for a transcontinental railroad.11 That campaign began in 1851, when
Gwin read to the Senate the California resolutions for a federally funded transcontinental
railroad – though Gwin would not launch headlong into railroad agitation until two years
later. On January 13, 1853, the California transplant pitched his plan for a multi-branch
transcontinental railroad. Starting from San Francisco, the line would sweep down the
valley of California and begin radiating eastward through the Southwest. Although he
urged his colleagues to lay aside “sectarian principles” and scorn “all sectionality,”
Gwin’s own regional bias was unmistakable. His proposed lines would run primarily
through slave country – Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Louisiana and Texas – with
additional lines into Puget Sound in the Pacific Northwest and Dubuque, Iowa, small
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concessions to the North for a railroad that otherwise resembled many southern
expansionists’ fantasies.12 Unfortunately for Gwin and his southern allies, the bill never
gained enough traction to pass.
Although southern railroad advocates failed to realize their ambitions through
Congressional legislation in 1853, they had no intention of discontinuing the fight.
Instead, they turned their attentions again to the Mexican border, where land disputes
around the Mesilla Valley seemed to open a door for the southern route. Since
negotiations over the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, southerners had been calling for
more land along the Mexican border to facilitate railroad construction across Texas and
eventually to the Pacific. In 1850, for instance, Duff Green engaged an agent in Mexico
to help bring about a negotiation of a “large grant of land including the valley of the Gila,
and extending the whole length of the northern boundary of Mexico, with the right of
occupation and of making a railroad.”13 Such audacity and persistence – hallmarks of
proslavery railroad promoters – paid off when the U.S. reentered formal negotiations with
Mexico in 1853 in order to establish a firmer boundary between the two nations, and in
the process, purchase an arid and dusty stretch of land in what is now southern New
Mexico and Arizona – seemingly uncultivable terrain. The only crop in mind, however,
was iron rails bound for the Pacific.
It was no coincidence that James Gadsden, the most outspoken proponent of a
southern transcontinental railroad, was chosen to carry out these negotiations. No
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southerner could match the railroad credentials of Gadsden. According to De Bow, the
South Carolinian was “the life of all these [western railroad] movements, and their
pioneer.”14 Two driving ambitions had recently propelled Gadsden to public prominence:
his missions to unite the South and the West and to check the anti-slavery program of
northern politicians. He moved aggressively to achieve both these goals in the early
1850s. In 1851 he headed a group of planters who petitioned the California assembly to
form a slaveholding colony in the southern part of the state, and planned to bring 500 to
800 slaves into the breakaway territory.15 His California-bound slaveholders would be
preceded by a mounted corps and a team of engineers to survey the route to the Pacific,
which could be used as both a stage coach, and later a railway. “Open such a way, and
the Railroad follows,” Gadsden declared, thus wedding his plans for a Pacific slave
colony with his transcontinental railroad promotion (Chapter 3).16 Writing of these plans
to Thomas Jefferson Green, then a California state senator, Gadsden projected a bright
future for slaveholders in the Far West.17
Although his scheme for a California slave colony eventually came to naught,
Gadsden’s bold expansionism and undisguised proslavery agenda clearly caught the eye
of President Pierce, who at Davis’s urging, appointed the Charlestonian to broker a land
purchase from Mexico. That Gadsden’s unconstitutional plans for California slavery did
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not hinder – and in fact, may have even enhanced – his political prospects, goes to show
how thoroughly the proslavery agenda had infiltrated federal policymaking by the early
1850s. Before departing for Mexico, Gadsden sought the counsel of his unofficial
sponsor, Davis. “I should be pleased to hear from you, and to receive any suggestions of
importance relative to the mission,” he wrote in May 1853. “I shall need the countenance
& encouragement of my Southern Friends, as my appointment to Mexico is said to have
been induced by my being a Southern Man.” As if there was any doubt, Gadsden
pledged to “uphold & apply” the “principles of the South” in his forthcoming
negotiations.18 Although Gadsden disguised his brazenly proslavery motives in his
public correspondence and statements, few were under any illusions. He went to Mexico
as Davis’s handpicked man, an agent of the South, and a champion of the great slavery
road.19
Opponents of southern expansion condemned Gadsden’s work. When he returned
to Washington in late December 1853 with a treaty calling for $15 million in exchange
for nearly forty thousand square miles of Mexican territory, critics came out in force.
“The friends of the Southern Pacific Railroad are the only bona fide supporters of the
treaty,” a correspondent to the Philadelphia Public Ledger complained, “and it might just
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as well be called a ‘purchase of the right of way for a railroad to the Pacific,’ as by any
other name.” That such an important diplomatic mission had been entrusted to a patently
proslavery schemer was a serious breach of political conduct, the correspondent added.20
According to the National Era, Gadsden’s negotiations had not only opened the way for a
Pacific railroad “favored by Southern Nullifiers” but also handed the present
“Slaveholding Administration” an opportunity to create two or three additional slaves
states from the new territory.21 During deliberations in the House of Representatives, hotheaded Missourian Thomas Hart Benton deemed the treaty a monumental waste of
money. A longtime supporter of a central transcontinental route, Benton ridiculed the
prospects for railroad construction through this new territory, “a country so utterly
desolate, desert, and God-forsaken, that Kit Carson says a wolf could not make his living
upon it.” He accused the treaty’s architects of orchestrating a vast conspiracy to push a
Pacific railroad through barren borderlands and into New San Diego, a yet-to-be-built
city where southern speculators would make untold fortunes.22
In the spring of 1854, the treaty passed over the strenuous objections of
congressmen like Benton, although the Senate shaved nine thousand square miles and $5
million off the final agreement.23 Gadsden griped about the scaled-down version of his
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original deal, but his negotiations had resulted in a decisive victory for proslavery
expansionists: the final strip of land, measuring about thirty thousand square miles,
provided crucial real estate for a southern railroad. Furthermore, it signaled that southern
imperialists possessed the political capital necessary to advance their designs in the West
at a time when sectional compromise was proving increasingly elusive. The last major
territorial acquisition of the era, the Gadsden Purchase moved Jefferson Davis and his
allies one step closer to fulfilling their continental ambitions.
As Congress wrangled over Gadsden’s treaty, Albert Pike of Arkansas stepped
forward at a Charleston commercial convention with perhaps the most ambitious plan yet
for a southern railroad. Deprecating the federal government for both its inaction and its
alleged northern bias, Pike proposed the formation of a Pacific Railroad Company, jointly
owned by a confederation of southern states, to build a road by the Gila route. This
company, Pike elaborated, would be authorized to negotiate with Mexico and Indian
tribes for a right-of-way, a necessary measure should the Gadsden Treaty fail in
Congress.24 Politicians’ appeals to patriotism were mere lip service, Pike argued; the
selection of the Pacific railroad route was inescapably a sectional issue. If southerners
wished to prevent their section from sliding even further behind the North, therefore, they
would have to take matters into their own hands. “Who ever heard of a Northern man
giving another an advantage in a matter of trade!” he added to great applause. A railroad
built by Congress would be a railroad along a northern line – and the South would be
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stuck with the bill. Only by uniting and building the railroad themselves could
southerners prevent the North from capturing the Pacific.25
Pike’s proposal met stiff resistance from many of the Convention’s delegates,
including prominent advocates of southern railroad development. Matthew Fontaine
Maury, for instance, deemed it “unlawful,” while others agreed that only the federal
government had the right to negotiate with foreign powers. The scheme, they argued,
was impractical at best and probably even unconstitutional. Other prominent railroaders
like Gadsden, however, sided with Pike, who ultimately carried the day, tapping strong
sectional feeling with another bombastic appeal for what he called “a sort of declaration
of independence on the part of the South.”26 Interrupted frequently by loud applause,
Pike promised action and a southern railroad at long last. “For my own part, I would
rather go and buy the right of way, than walk into the halls of Congress and ask them to
give,” he roared to immense applause.27 Voting by states, the Convention adopted his
resolution unanimously, and resolved “to secure to the South, so far as may be in their
power, the exclusive benefits and advantages of the commerce of the Pacific.” Per Pike’s
appeal, the Convention also resolved that “the Southern States, corporations and people,
are entirely able to build said road, and that no time should be lost in doing so.” Finally,
still viewing Californians as allies in the South’s push to the Pacific, the Convention
agreed to invite the state to unite in the proposed organization.28
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Outside the Convention’s halls, however, southern interest in Pike’s resolution
proved less enthusiastic. Although the Louisiana legislature eventually granted a charter
in 1855, no company was ever organized under it.29 Nevertheless, Pike’s campaign
invigorated southern railroad agitation, underscoring slaveholders’ enduring, often
pigheaded commitment to the Pacific and their readiness to drum up potentially
dangerous sectional impulses on behalf of commercial expansionism. Indeed, Pike’s
resolution is a gauge of just how far sectional feeling had progressed since the start of the
transcontinental railroad debates, and just how important the Pacific had become to
slaveholding interests. Pike and his numerous allies were quite willing – perhaps even
eager – to risk secession for commercial independence. Here was a southern declaration
of independence roughly seven years before formal separation.
Meanwhile, Jefferson Davis opened yet another front in the southern railroad
campaign. Passed in March 1853, the Pacific Railroad Survey bill authorized Davis, as
secretary of war, to assemble teams to carry out a reconnaissance of the TransMississippi West over a ten-month period—though topological work eventually stretched
into late 1854.30 The act was born out of a belief that scientific objectivity could break
the congressional logjam and settle the railroad question once and for all. Whereas
sectional motives guided the nation’s statesmen, its engineers could presumably put aside
politics in the interest of topological precision. Under great national scrutiny, six
federally appointed engineers surveyed a total of four major routes: a northern route
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between the 41 and 42 parallels, a central route along the 38 parallel, a south-central
route along the 35th parallel, and an extreme southern route along the 32nd parallel.31
Yet scientific objectivity met its limits in Davis. Feigning sectional indifference,
the secretary of war proved eager to channel this opportunity to the South’s advantage, a
fact not lost on political rivals like Thomas Hart Benton.32 To maintain the appearance of
impartiality, Davis tactfully (or perhaps cunningly) appointed mostly Northern
topological officers. In his detailed summary of the surveys, however, Davis let his
sectional bias shine. Starting with the northernmost survey, he systematically argued that
every route except that along the 32nd parallel faced severe obstacles: cost, length,
climate, or a combination of all three. Meanwhile he dismissed, as mere trifles, serious
impediments to the far southern route, such as a lack of water and timber.33 “A
comparison of the results,” Davis stated, “conclusively shows that the route of the 32nd
parallel is, of those surveyed, ‘the most practicable and economical route for a railroad
from the Mississippi river to the Pacific ocean.’” For him, this was a foregone
conclusion. But for many others, his highly suspect summary was further proof of
southern intrigue and slaveholders’ disturbing determination to drive the railroad through
their section at any price. The Pacific railroad surveys thus brought no resolution to this
increasingly fraught and increasingly sectionalized debate.34
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Had optimism been able to roll iron and lay track, southerners would have driven
their railroad into California before the ink dried on the Gadsden Treaty. Yet the Texas
State Gazette was not just whistling Dixie when it reported, “The prize is within her reach
– she will not fail to grasp it.”35 By 1854, a commercial empire stretching into the Pacific
seemed well within reach for slavery’s cotton economy. Gadsden had negotiated a
favorable purchase of land from Mexico. Davis was in control of the railroad surveys.
Arkansas and Texas were poised to extend their railroad networks and link them with
other burgeoning southern lines. And President Pierce seemed favorable to southern
expansionist aims.36 Further, slaveholders could count on a powerful body of southern
Californians to support a route through slave country. In the summer of 1853, delegates
at a San Diego convention resolved to promote the route along the Gila River into their
city, and dispatched Colonel John B. Magruder to press their case in Washington.37
Another advocate of San Diego as the western terminus, Hinton Rowan Helper, captured
the spirit of commercial manifest destiny that animated many of his fellow southerners at
the time. “There is a destiny in commerce,” Helper wrote in his California memoir, “and
fate seems determined to pour the riches of the world into our lap.”38 Indeed, the winds
of history were blowing in a distinctly southerly direction.
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Railroad Bound
When advocating for their preferred route, proslavery railroaders boasted of a
number of advantages: flatter terrain, warmer climate, shorter distances. But perhaps the
most compelling advantage the South possessed, according to some, lay in its large,
unfree labor force. As southern railroad boosters regularly noted, an enslaved workforce
kept costs down and construction on schedule. “Because it is cheaper, can be kept under
better discipline” and “worked both in summer and winter,” slave labor gave the South a
distinct edge in railway construction, bragged the president of the Charleston and
Savannah Railroad in 1855.39 One Virginian railroad promoter and stockholder
quantified such benefits. With an enslaved labor force, “the grading, masonry, and
mechanical work on railroads, and the entire construction of canals, will be less than half
the cost it would be under the system of contracts,” he estimated. Contracts worked well
enough in the free states, he argued, but the South should play to its peculiar
advantages.40
The numbers are indeed telling. Railroad construction in northern and western
states, at an average of roughly $30,000 per square mile, cost double what it did in the
South.41 According to the ledger books of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac
Railroad, a railroad corporation could own a slave’s labor for a year for roughly $120,
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compared to the weekly wages of about $7 to $10 for free white workers.

In addition to

the expense of their weekly wages, white workers in the South – often of Irish or German
extraction – brought with them the specter of labor strife. Why risk the trouble of wage
strikes, walk-offs, drinking binges, and European ethnic rivalries when cheaper, more
regulated slave labor could be had?43
This logic led to massive concentrations of slaves on southern railroad works. For
instance, out of a total labor force of 643, the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad employed
435 slaves on its projects in 1856. The overall number of slaves working in southern
railroad construction would only climb in the years following. The most careful student
of the subject found that in 1860, thirty-seven southern companies used at least onehundred enslaved laborers in railroad construction. The Atlantic & Gulf line in southern
Georgia oversaw a workforce of twelve-hundred slaves – a larger population of bonded
laborers than could be found on any single plantation in the South. Such projects
generally hired slaves from nearby planters on an annual basis, rather than owning them
outright, due to the high cost of able-bodied slave men, who were deemed most suitable
for railroad work. According to recent estimates, southern railroads collectively
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employed an average of 10,000 slaves per year at the end of the antebellum period. But
some scholars suggest that that number may have been as high as 20,000 by the eve of
the Civil War.44
Such labor practices may have suited the needs of corporations in the Southeast,
but how would railroad construction adjust to the vaster spaces and sparser populations of
the American Southwest? Here was a pressing question for anyone who seriously
contemplated a Pacific railroad. The Virginian surveyor Andrew Belcher Gray, who
knew the region as well as any white American, suggested two possibilities. “The
Papigos and Pimas Indians, by proper management, might be made very useful, in
working upon the road where there is not much rock excavation,” he argued. What
“proper management” might entail, Gray did not elaborate, although he might have
contemplated the use of Indian slaves, who circulated widely throughout the region. He
also pointed to the possibilities of cheap Mexican peon labor. Because they were
“regularly acclimated” and accustomed to hard labor, peons “might be very useful,” Gray
suggested. “I have seen some good stone work done by these peons in Chihuahua and
Sonora,” he added.45 Between the African slaves of the Southeast and the Mexican peons
and Native Americans of the Southwest, southerners like Gray could imagine an entire
continent of unfree labor, ready to serve the needs of their Pacific railroad.
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Southern railroad corporations extracted as much labor for as little cost as
possible. Railroad slaves often worked in regimented gangs, driven by overseers with
construction quotas to meet. Because railroads generally rented rather than owned slaves,
overseers were advised against beating the black laborers under their watch, yet that
hardly mitigated against mistreatment. In fact, their status as rented slaves seemed to
invite especially harsh floggings on the black laborers on the Hamburg and Charleston
Rail Road. “There they were, cutting and slashing all the time,” a former railroad slave
recalled of the overseers on the line. “After we were whipped we had to go straight back
to our work. They did not care whether we got well or not, because we were other
people’s niggers.”46 No wonder, then, that some masters took out life insurance policies
for the slaves they rented to railroad companies.47 And no wonder that some slaves
protested against mistreatment by running away, as did eighty-four bondspeople on the
Montgomery and West Point Railroad between the years 1845 and 1850.48 But for those
who stayed – and for those who were caught and returned – the possibility of death, or at
least serious injury, remained ever-present. “There was hardly a day that some of the
slaves did not get crippled or killed,” the anonymous former slave on the Hamburg and

46

[Anonymous], “Recollections of Slavery by a Runaway Slave,” in the Emancipator, October 11, 1838;
The entire recollection was serialized in six parts, appearing on August 23, September 13, September 20,
October 11, October 18, and October 21. That masters would seek compensation for the maiming or killing
of their valuable human property provided at least some security for slaves, although this does not appear to
be the case on the Hamburg and Charleston line.
47
Richmond Fire Association, Life Insurance Agreement, Feb. 17, 1858, in Richmond, Fredericksburg and
Potomac Railroad Papers, Mss 3 R4152 a, folder 366, March 1858, VHS. Under this policy, a Virginia
master paid $16 to ensure his slave, Emmanuel, for up to $800. However, the agreement stipulated that
Emmanuel would not be covered in the case of suicide or death “by means of any invasion, insurrection,
riot or civil commotion.”
48
Marrs, Railroads in the Old South, 66. Railroad corporations were in the business of tracking down
runaways. See, for instance, a runaway slave ad, unknown publication details, in Richmond, Fredericksburg
and Potomac Railroad Papers, Mss 3 R4152 a, folder 296, April 1855, VHS.

93

Charleston line recalled. “There were more killed there than at any other place I ever
worked at.”49
Even in the absence of whippings, railroad work was backbreaking. From
clearing brush, chopping down trees, and removing boulders to excavating cuts, leveling
terrain, and laying track, railroad slaves conducted their work almost entirely by hand.
Some railroad companies allowed slaves to work on Sundays and holidays for pay, but in
general, bondspeople were provided only a meager allowance of food and clothing, along
with shoddy accommodations. According to the abolitionist journalist, James Redpath,
who toured railroad construction sites in North Carolina in the late 1850s, enslaved
workers were housed in “miserable shanties along the line” and fed “one peck of Indian
meal, and two pounds and a half of bacon a week.”50 The Montgomery & West Point
Railroad spent twice as much per year to feed a horse or mule as it did a slave.51
Railroad work was particularly devastating for slave families. Although some companies
hired female slaves for jobs like washing and cooking, construction sites were a largely
male world. And as such, husbands were separated from wives, sons from parents, and
fathers from children whenever railroad contractors visited the plantation for recruitment.
As Redpath lamented of such conditions, “Poor fellows! in that God-forsaken section of
the earth they seldom see a woman from Christmas to Christmas.”52
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Slaves not only worked the railroads, they also rode them – though very rarely of
their own free will.53 Indeed, railways became the favored means of transporting slaves
quickly and cheaply for sale across the southern interior. Some corporations incentivized
this commerce by shipping bonded children for free and by offering discount rates for
adult slaves. On the South Carolina Railroad, for instance, slaves and dogs traveled for
the same price.54 For Jacob Stroyer and many other slaves, railroad depots were the sites
of tragic human spectacles, to which bondspeople were driven “like so many cattle” and
packed onto cars for sale. Decades later, he was still haunted by the memory of such a
station, where a group of slaves from his plantation, including his sisters, had been loaded
onto train cars. As the cars began to pull away “the colored people cried out with one
voice as though the heavens and earth were coming together,” Stroyer recalled. “We
heard the weeping and wailing from the slaves as far as human voice could be heard.”55
For Stroyer and thousands of others this was tragedy, but for southern planters
and businessmen it was a highly lucrative commerce. Scholars have argued that railroad
development fueled the steep rise in slave prices during the 1850s. By opening vast new
areas for agricultural development and by increasing the demand for bondspeople on
construction projects, railroad growth placed a high premium on slave labor.56 This was a
self-perpetuating cycle: as lines were extended into the southern hinterland, more acreage
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came under the cultivation of slave labor, which in turn made more bonded workers
available for hire by railway corporations.57 It did not take a particularly fanciful
imagination to foresee this cycle repeating itself across the Far West with the
construction of a Pacific railroad. Indeed, Thomas Butler King of Georgia pointed to the
mutual relationship between slavery and railroad construction in promoting his
transcontinental enterprise, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company. With a reliable rail
connection, Texas would become a planter’s paradise, Butler argued, drawing
slaveholding emigrants from the worn out soils of the East into the untapped cotton
frontier of the West.58 As King, James Gadsden, and others had insisted for years, an
empire of slavery and plantation commerce would thus march in step with the railroad.
Recent trends in railroad development across the South buoyed the hopes of such
expansionists. Southerners had been early and eager adopters of the railway. At 136
miles, the line from Charleston to Hamburg, completed in 1833, was the longest railroad
in the world at the time.59 But it was not until the 1850s that southern railroad
construction took off, on the backs of enslaved laborers. During that decade, the slave
states laid down over 8,300 miles of track, as well as a staggering number of junctions,
depots, and terminal points, thereby providing their white citizens with better railroad
facilities and infrastructure than could be found in many parts of the North. Every
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slaveholding state more than doubled its total rail mileage in the 1850s. Outside of the
Northwest – where development also proceeded at a feverish pace – only New Jersey,
Pennsylvania and Delaware matched that rate of growth.60 Cotton, slaves and railroads
constituted three mutually reinforcing pillars of the southern economy in the 1850s, and
for anyone with a stake in such enterprises, these were flush times. From the perspective
of successful southern railroaders, perhaps the Pacific did not seem so very far away.
While writers from Ralph Waldo Emerson to Leo Marx have disparaged slavery’s
relationship to the railroad and the modern world in general, the southern expansionists of
the 1850s were anything but backward looking.61 Indeed, American slaveholders pursued
the most advanced technologies and promoted the most extensive public works on the
continent – and perhaps the globe.62 As Walter Licht suggests, had South had won its
independence, it would have ranked among the top six most industrially advanced nations
in the world.63 Nothing showcased slaveholders’ commercial savvy or modernizing
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impulses quite like their commitment to railroad development.

64

That southerners

advanced slave labor to achieve this end does not signify that they had turned their
collective backs on the modern age. In fact, as Matthew Karp has argued, mid-century
southerners had good reason to believe that liberalism was on the wane, unfreedom on
the rise, and that a political economy built on plantation agriculture was the surest means
to international ascendency.65 After all, as cotton boomed and slave prices soared in the
U.S., abolitionist Britain began importing coolie laborers to its West Indian sugar
colonies, an implicit concession that slave emancipation had proved bad for business.
Slaveholders may have lamented their dependence on northern industry and shipping, but
global developments seemed to indicate that the path forward – and ultimately the road to
the Pacific – would be blazed by slave, and not free, labor.
If southerners were economically ambitions and forward-facing, can we then call
them capitalists? This question has been at the center of a growing body of literature,
which traces the enterprising spirit, acquisitive nature, and global connectedness of
slaveholding Americans. Historians like Walter Johnson, Seth Rockman, Sven Beckert,
and Edward Baptist, among others, have powerfully illustrated how global capitalism fed
off the slave-grown products of the American South. And they have shown how

64
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slaveholders, in turn, embraced an international market that made them among the richest
individuals on the continent.66 Yet this literature, while providing fruitful ways of
thinking about the American South in its wider world, has perhaps overstretched. The
problem stems partly from imprecise terminology. Without a working definition of
capitalism, the concept lacks specificity and consistency – and often, by extension,
usefulness. When, say, Eugene Genovese deployed the term, he had in mind very
different defining characteristics than those described by James Oakes, for example.67 At

66

Edward Baptist’s The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism (New
York: Basic Books, 2014) is hardly the only work in this canon, contrary to what its title might imply.
Scholars have been grappling with the relationship between slavery and capitalism since at least Eric
Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944, 1994). For more
recent reflections, see James Oakes, The Ruling Race: A History of American Slaveholders (New York:
Norton, 1982); Thomas Bender, ed. The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in
Historical Interpretation (University of California Press, 1992); Walter Johnson, “The Pedestal and the
Veil: Rethinking the Capitalism/Slavery Question” Journal of the Early Republic 24 (summer 2004);
Johnson, Soul By Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1999); Tom Downey, Planting a Capitalist South: Masters, Merchants, and Manufactures in the
Southern Interior, 1790-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006); Seth Rockman,
“What Makes the History of Capitalism Newsworthy?” Journal of the Early Republic, 32 (Fall 2014); Sven
Beckert and Seth Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American Economic
Development (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); Sven Beckert, “Slavery and
Capitalism” Chronicle of Higher Education (December 12, 2014); and Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A
Global History (New York: Knopf, 2014). For works that often deal more implicitly with this question, but
still foreground the modern economic thinking of slaveholders, see Mark M. Smith, Mastered by the Clock:
Time, Slavery, and Freedom in the American South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1997); Joyce Chaplin, An Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation and Modernity in the Lower South
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Bruce Eelman, Entrepreneurs in the Southern
Upcountry: Commercial Culture in Spartanburg, South Carolina, 1845-1880 (University of Georgia Press,
2010); John F. Kvach, , De Bow’s Review: The Antebellum Vision of a New South (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 2013); Brian Schoen, The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the
Global Origins of the Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); and Marrs, Railroads
in the Old South.
67
For years, Eugene Genovese has been the preferred whipping boy for scholars of slavery and capitalism.
Yet in refuting his theories, these historians sometimes forget that Genovese’s slaveholders were never
divorced from the world of nineteenth century capitalism. Genovese never lost sight of the fact that,
“slaveholders operated in a capitalist world market, they presided over the production of commodities, and
they had to pay attention to profit-and-loss statements,” Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The
World the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage, 1976), 297. His most influential and carefully argued work on
the subject is The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South
(New York, 1965). Perhaps historians writing today should heed his warning: “if every commercial society
is to be considered capitalist, the word loses all meaning.;” see pp. 14-23 for this discussion.

99

times, this new scholarship risks conflating commercial savvy with a genuine capitalist
ethos, and thereby blurring the line between the political economies of the antebellum
North and South.68 This depiction of capitalist slaveholders is not a portrait that
antebellum southerners themselves would have recognized.69 They defined themselves
and their political economy in stark contradistinction to what they believe existed in the
North, and their dependence on chattel slavery created an ideological worldview – while
certainly profit-oriented – profoundly at odds with that of their Yankee counterparts.70
For them, capitalism was more than just a set of economic practices; it was a social
system.71 Antebellum America was a house divided against itself in more ways than one.
The proslavery push to the Pacific was meant to further distinguish and liberate
the southern political economy from what they called the northern, industrial yoke. As
Albert Pike had proclaimed in Charleston in 1854, a southern transcontinental railroad
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would be, in effect, a declaration of commercial independence from the North, while also
ensuring stronger ties to the rest of the world. Slaveholders craved additional markets
across the globe for their agricultural products, markets that could be reached without the
interference of northern processing and shipping. Direct trade with the 600 million
consumers of Asia was the ultimate objective. And if the vision was grandiose and the
details fuzzy, this proto-nationalist campaign for regional autonomy was nothing to scoff
at, as the proslavery victories of 1853 and 1854 had made clear. In the process,
southerners aimed to strengthen their ties to the American Southwest, linking the region
to the agricultural economy and the political ideology of slavery. The struggle for the
West became particularly fractious because these were not just two capitalist economies
with different labor forces. These were competing visions of empire.

The Limits of Southern Railroading
Proslavery victories appear even more remarkable when considering the strength
of northern opposition and the depth of intra-regional competition. The expansionists of
the Deep South had to contend against a vast field of rivals, from the well-organized
railroad promoters of the North, to the strict constructionists of the Democratic Party, to
the numerous competitors across the South itself. Indeed, many of the greatest
challenges that proslavery imperialists faced came from within their own section. As
historian William Freehling has argued, there were ‘many Souths’ in the slaveholding
states during the antebellum period, and despite numerous efforts to close ranks against
the perceived threat of Yankee encroachment, southerners succumbed to internal
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divisions more often than not.
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Such rivalries were exacerbated by the potential spoils of

railroad development.73
From Asa Whitney’s first petition in 1845 to the outbreak of the Civil War,
northerners agitated for a range of routes across free soil. Increasingly during the 1850s,
voting on Pacific railroad bills followed sectional lines, and antislavery forces proved
eager to divert attention from the popular 32nd parallel route. For well over half a decade,
Whitney kept up his one-man campaign for a railroad into the Pacific northwest, although
he eventually discontinued the fight by the early 1850s.74 Other northerners picked up the
torch, however. A free soil possibility gained greater visibility with the work of
Theodore Judah, a Yankee engineer and surveyor, whose efforts, years later, would pave
the way for the construction of the Central Pacific Railroad. Initially, however, he was
widely derided as “Crazy Judah” for his suggestion that a railroad might cross
California’s Sierra Nevada, then thought to be an insurmountable range.75 By the end of
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the decade, the soldier, explorer, and expansionist William Gilpin gave the far northern
route a sensationalist twist in his imaginative The Central Gold Region (1860). He
argued that the center of American power would eventually shift to the Mississippi River
with Denver as the metropolis of an American empire that would face west toward Asia.
The ultimate objective was “to disinfect ourselves of inane nepotism to Europe” and
establish a firmer Pacific orientation, a geopolitical reordering that would be
accomplished with a transcontinental railroad terminating at the mouth of the Columbia.
Thus, Gilpin revitalized interest in Whitney’s original far northern terminus, while
articulating a more ambitious vision for the future of American empire on the Pacific.76
But the most dogged opponent of the Gila River route came from within the South
itself. Missouri senator Thomas Hart Benton rarely missed an opportunity to scold
proslavery congressmen for their sectional bias (although he was motivated by selfinterest as much as the next politician). Recall that Benton lambasted, in no mixed terms,
the Gadsden Purchase and the southern route it was designed to expedite, as well as the
railroad surveys under the aegis of Secretary of War Jefferson Davis. Instead, he put
forward, again and again, a route that would begin at St. Louis and follow a more central
path along the 35th parallel to San Francisco.77 Fellow Missourians, like John S. Phelps,
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were also critical of the far southern road, as too distant from the main arteries of
American commerce.78 Thanks to the persistence of Benton, Phelps, and others within
Missouri, St. Louis would become the primary competitor to Memphis as the preferred
eastern terminus within the South. Yet slaveholding expansionists ultimately had the last
laugh. Benton’s hostility to the westward extension of slavery earned him powerful
enemies. The Missouri legislature denied him a sixth senate term in 1851, and by 1855,
his opposition to Kansas-Nebraska ultimately drove him out of the House as well. A
congress free of Thomas Hart Benton was a distinct victory for champions of a great
slavery road.79
The advocates of a line across the 32nd parallel also had to contend with a rival
further south. New Orleans shipping interests rightfully saw the Memphis movement as a
threat to their stranglehold on the western trade, and thus remained less committed to
railroad construction so long as they controlled southern river transportation.
Businessmen in New Orleans would eventually join the transcontinental railroad frenzy,
but before then, many within Louisiana considered various connections through Mexico
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and Central America as the most viable paths to the Pacific.

J.D.B. De Bow, who

operated his Review out of New Orleans, was among the most prominent early defenders
of a route across Mexico’s Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Led by Pierre Soule and Judah
Benjamin, the Tehuantepec Railroad Company sought a right-of-way through Mexico,
rather than construction through Texas, in order to preserve the commercial power of
New Orleans.81 Despite the high-profile support and lobbying of these expansionists, a
railroad across the Mexican isthmus was not constructed until 1894, under the presidency
of Porfirio Diaz and roughly three decades after American slavery itself had been
abolished.82
Other central American projects proved more rewarding – despite substantial
initial investments. After five years, $8 million, and the deaths of thousands of workers,
the New York based firm of William Aspinwell finally succeeded in constructing a
railroad across the isthmus of Panama by 1855. Until Vanderbilt slashed prices for his
competing route across Nicaragua, Aspinwell ruled the shipping business that carried
goods, gold, and immigrants to California and back again. The company netted $6
million in profits in its first seven years of operation, and at one point commanded the
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highest price, per share, of any stock on the New York Stock Exchange. The proslavery
push for a transcontinental railroad was, in many ways, an attempt to cut into the profits
of these private shipping enterprises, and to demonstrate that southerners could also
compete in large-scale transportation enterprises.83
Among Democratic railroad promoters, the issue of funding presented a potential
sticking point. Should individual states pay for railroad construction within their borders,
or should the federal government bankroll the entire project? In other words, was such a
sweeping federal undertaking – which even the most conservative estimates placed at
over $100 million – compatible with the states’ rights position so many southern
politicians claimed to represent?84 As Gwin grumbled in his memoirs, it was often these
strict constructionists, along with “extremists, north and south,” who stymied railroad
bills.85 It was probably men like Zedekiah Kidwell of Virginia who Gwin had in mind.
“Government was instituted for the protection of its citizens against foreign invasion and
domestic insurrection,” Kidwell declared in a minority report on an 1856 Pacific railroad
bill, “and not to enter into the freighting business, or into railroad building, for the benefit
of the trading and travelling classes.” Even if it could be built, he argued, such a railroad
would require “a sum of money greater, probably, than is yearly earned by all the
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shipping of all the oceans of the world!”

86

Of course, southern Democrats like Kidwell

did not have a monopoly on strict constructionism. The abolitionist and New York
congressman Gerrit Smith opposed a Pacific railroad for similar reasons, as he outlined in
an 1854 speech, published as Keep Government Within Its Limits. “Let Government build
this road,” he claimed, “and there will be no assignable limits to its future departure from
its own province, and to its future invasion of the province of the people.”87
Slaveholders who opposed federal funding on such a massive scale could have
found a more suitable alternative in the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company of Robert
Walker and Thomas Butler King, a private enterprise. Both Walker and King came to the
railroad business with well-established proslavery bona fides. Walker, although born in
Pennsylvania, had come of age politically in Mississippi and served as James K. Polk’s
treasury secretary. President Franklin Pierce later attempted to appoint him minister to
China, but Walker declined. King, another transplant from the North, represented
Georgia in the House of Representatives through the 1840s, where he distinguished
himself as one of the South’s foremost naval expansionists, promoting steamship lines in
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. During the gold rush, he moved to California to seek
higher political office, though he was bested by William Gwin in the state’s first
senatorial election. Chartered in 1852 and capitalized at $100 million, their Atlantic and
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Pacific Railroad proposed to follow the line favored by the Deep South’s expansionists.
This was the project that Thomas Jefferson Green praised so highly as the “great slavery
road.” And like so many proslavery enterprises of this ilk, it soon attracted the criticism
of the northern press. Cornelius Peebles, the editor of the New York Examiner,
dismissed Walker as a “flibberty-gibbet,” who was heading a team of “Southern
slaveholders” in the process of committing “a gross fraud on the stockholders of the
Company.” A southern company running on northern capital, the entire enterprise was
not worth a fraction of the $100 million they claimed for their stock, Peebles argued.88
Ultimately Walker and King failed to secure a charter to construct a line through Texas –
which probably came as no surprise to Peebles – and thus the Atlantic and Pacific
Railroad Company effectively folded.
But the board members did not concede defeat so easily. They reorganized and
renamed the operation, not once but twice, and continued fighting for transit rights
through Texas.89 In an effort to win favor for their project, they commissioned Andrew
Belcher Gray of Virginia to conduct a survey of the American Southwest. A more
seasoned surveyor or keener advocate for the far southern route could have hardly been
found anywhere in the country. Gray had served as the chief surveyor of the USMexican boundary commission, and his report was used to justify the $10 million
congressional allocation for the Gadsden Treaty. His subsequent survey, under Walker
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and King’s renamed Texas Western Railroad Company, reiterated his earlier findings
about the feasibility of a railroad through the Southwest. Gray’s operation was
substantial, and once again showcased the lengths to which southerners were willing to
go to promote their preferred route. Five months and 2,2000 miles later, Gray and his
company of 26 men – who hailed almost exclusively from Texas, except for one
Kentuckian and Gray himself, a Virginian – compiled perhaps the most exhaustive
argument to date for the great slavery road. Published in 1856, the report was a brief for
the practicality of railroad construction as well for the riches, both agricultural and
mineral, that could be found across this route. For a total cost of $45 million, Gray
predicted, the South could secure a highway for the transport of “cotton, tobacco, wheat,
corn, hemp and wool,” across the West, and in the process, transform “the whole valley
of the Rio Grande, from Santa Fe to the Presidio del Norte, the extensive interior of
Sonora, Chihuahua, New Mexico, and Texas,” into a tributary for plantation commerce.
The road would ultimately terminate in the port of San Diego, where Gray had invested
personally.90
Even as they cheered such private enterprises, a majority of proslavery leaders
agreed on the necessity of federal aid for such a project.91 The buccaneering spirit of
individual politicians explains much of this logic. After all, railroading was big business,
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and slaveholding leaders were just as eager to snatch the financial fruits of internal
improvements as their Yankee counterparts. On the matter of railroad development,
southern politicians had been reaping the rewards of federal largess since 1850, when
Congress began offering free land to railway corporations in order to incentivize
settlement and development. The land was distributed in a checkerboard pattern, with
alternating plots either available for sale to the public or given gratis to railroad
companies. As historian Scott Reynolds Nelson illustrates, southern politicians were
particularly adept at bending railroad legislation to proslavery ends. Senator David Rice
Atchison of Missouri and his proslavery allies, for example, capitalized on land
giveaways for the benefit of themselves and their allies. Because of this clique, writes
Nelson, “when land grants to railroads began in 1850, most went either through southern
states or toward them.”92
Southern Democrats could easily shelve their state rights scruples when properly
enticed by the financial windfall of a transcontinental railroad through their region.
Centralization at the federal level, which so many slaveholders decried through the 1850s
and beyond, was only considered a menace when it threatened slavery and southern
economic interests. Strict constructionism generally took a backseat to imperial
imperatives. For example, slaveholders relinquished their state rights doctrine when
presented with the opportunity to acquire Louisiana from France in 1807. They
embraced federal power when, in the 1830s, the military cleared valuable plantation real
estate by forcibly relocating Indians from lands in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and
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Mississippi. They cheered the annexation of Texas and the conquest of New Mexico and
California, again made possible only through overwhelming federal force. They cried
foul when several northern legislatures turned state rights to their own advantage by
passing so-called Personal Liberty Laws in opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.
And they endorsed the federal judiciary when it handed down its proslavery ruling in the
Dred Scott case. As the long history of proslavery politicking makes clear, the only
consistent element of the southern state-rights mantra was its inconsistency.93 State rights
was a banner to be unfurled whenever politically and economically expedient, then
quietly stashed when the full force of the federal government was needed.94
In their maneuverings at the federal level, the slaveholding advocates of westward
expansion achieved a pyrrhic victory by mid-decade. Bleeding Kansas is remembered
today as perhaps the decisive flashpoint in the nation’s spiral towards civil war. At the
time, however, it was seen largely as the byproduct of the intractable Pacific railroad
feud. Indeed, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 had its roots in opposition to the great
slavery road.95 As observers noted, railroad construction would have to be accompanied
by white settlement along its path, and Nebraska, prime terrain for a central railway, had
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been guaranteed to native populations since 1834. So long as Indian Country remained
closed to white settlement, the odds on a northern route winning the Pacific railroad were
slim. On the other hand, the 32nd parallel route ran through lands – if occupied by
potentially hostile Indian tribes – at least open to white settlement. When it appeared as
if the southern route had become the clear favorite, northerners moved with alacrity.
Benton took an early lead in campaigning for a railroad from St. Louis and for the
accompanying organization of Nebraska, and soon thereafter Willard Hall and William
Richardson spearheaded a bill in the House. Just as the Senate was debating one of
William Gwin’s southern-oriented Pacific railroad proposals in 1853, Hall made a plea
for a more northerly route, accompanying the opening of Nebraska. “Why, everybody is
talking about a railroad to the Pacific ocean,” he complained. “In the name of God, how
is the railroad to be made if you will never let people live on the lands through which the
road passes?” Without the organization of Nebraska, he rightly noted, Congress would
likely be forced to settle on some point in Texas as the road’s eastern terminus.96
Overwhelming opposition from southerners in the Senate, including William Gwin,
effectively killed the original bill.
Stephen Douglas revived the Nebraska question the next year, but this time with
the support of the South. To gain these crucial votes, he made what many northerners
regarded as a Faustian bargain: his bill repealed the Missouri Compromise line, split the
western territory into two halves – Nebraska and Kansas – and left the slavery question to
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the dictates of popular sovereignty. Ironically, a bill that had, as one of its aims, the
facilitation of another railroad route, ultimately served to derail the Pacific railroad
debate.97 The ensuing conflict between free soilers and proslavery squatters in Kansas
pushed sectional tensions to a near breaking point and thus effectively foreclosed the
possibility of compromise over a transcontinental railroad by about 1856. Northerners
would not countenance a southern route, while southerners closed ranks against
construction along a northern line. Congressmen would continue to agitate for various
Pacific railroad routes, but with increasing jadedness. Of all the casualties produced by
Bleeding Kansas, the most politically consequential was the Pacific railroad.98

Jefferson Davis’s Camels and the Far, Far West
And yet, southern dreams of a Pacific empire did not die on the bloodied soil of
Kansas. As railroad bills languished in a factionalized Congress, some southerners
turned their attention to corollary projects in their ongoing efforts to link South and West
and harness the Pacific trade for their plantation economy. Jefferson Davis, for instance,
sought to import camels from the Levant in an attempt boost infrastructural development
in the Southwest, while another group of southerners looked to Hawaii as the next
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available field for American expansion. Slaveholders thus proved eager to exploit
overseas resources and harness international strategies to further their expansionist aims.
When Davis first introduced his esoteric plan for an American camel corps in
1851, he was almost laughed out of the Senate. But when his fellow senators finally
stopped snickering, they had to take stock of a very serious proposal. Beginning with a
modest appropriation of $30,000 for the importation of 30 camels and 20 dromedaries,
Davis expected to eventually revolutionize transportation in the American Southwest,
using animals that he believed could overcome the region’s powerful Indian tribes and
provide protection for both settlers and mail routes. Davis praised the camel as the “ship
of the desert,” destined to become “the greatest stroke of economy which has ever been
made in regard to transportation.”99 After four years of lobbying, he finally won his
camel corps by 1855, and dispatched a team of officers to the Levant with detailed
instructions on how and where to acquire the animals. A year later, thirty-four camels
from North Africa and the Middle East made their first appearance in Texas.100
Davis’s camel scheme was of a less patently proslavery nature than his railroad
agitation, although it still had a decidedly southern flavor to it. After all, these camels
were bound for the Southwest, across terrain that Davis and others hoped would soon
host a southern transcontinental railroad. As he recognized, railways and overland roads
would not build themselves. They had to be carved out of Indian country and guarded
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against Native peoples. Furthermore, almost 2000 miles separated the Pacific Coast from
the Mississippi Valley, with no major intervening rivers crossing east to west. Camels,
Davis reasoned, would help subdue this region and therefore expedite travel for
westward-bound settlers. To Davis, easy transit across this southernmost corridor would
facilitate the expansion of proslavery interests. “If we had a good railroad and other
roads making it convenient to go through Texas into New Mexico, and through New
Mexico into Southern California,” Davis mused privately to a friend in 1855, “our people
with their servants, their horses and their cows would gradually pass westward over
fertile lands into mining districts, and in the latter, especially, the advantage of their
associated labor would impress itself upon others about them.”101 By this logic,
slaveholding imperialism did not require grand conquests; it simply called for
infrastructural development. And camels could play a vital part in bringing that about.
For years to come, Davis would defend his camel corps against accusations that
the project was a thinly veiled proslavery plot.102 He had always been careful to maintain
a nationalist, rather than sectional, posture whenever discussing the project, yet criticism
persisted.103 Amid rising sectional tensions, Congress refused to appropriate funds for the
experiment in 1858, 1859, and 1860. By 1859 more than 80 camels were scattered across
forts in California and Texas, but popular support for the experiment had waned.
According to historian Thomas Connelly, the public could never quite look beyond the
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camel’s “personal habits of regurgitating on passersby or blowing a bloody bladder out of
its mouth when frightened, its acute halitosis and general bad odor, its fierceness during
rutting season, its voluminous sneeze, its shedding of large clumps of hair until it looked
perfectly hideous, and its awkward appearance.”104 Camels, in short, did not endear
themselves to American travelers.
Quixotic though this project may seem in hindsight, the camel corps highlights
Davis’s commitment to southwestern development and his versatility in bringing such
dreams to fruition. Davis sought global solutions in order to master American space. He
endured the initial derision of Congress to pull off an expensive and logistically difficult
operation. After all, camel transport was a key component to his imperial vision, a link in
a transportation network that would bring the slaveholding South into the Far West.
As Davis’s camels made their way across the Southwest, another group of
southerners turned their attention overseas to a budding field of interest: Hawaii, or the
Sandwich Islands as they were often known. If transcontinental railroad ambitions had
been partly checked by mid-decade, the related project of commercial, and perhaps
territorial, expansion into the Pacific’s islands sustained the imperial inclinations of
proslavery partisans. From their perspective, the Pacific appeared more like the far, far
West than the Far East. Ever since Asa Whitney’s first railroad memorial, the connection
between a transcontinental railway, the Sandwich Islands, and Asian trade were firmly
linked in the American mind.105 In the first of many articles on Hawaii, an 1847 issue of
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De Bow’s Review made that connection more explicit. “Taken in connection with the
great purposes of a canal now contemplated between the oceans, or a railroad, [the
Sandwich Islands have] a most special bearing and application.”106 If a transcontinental
railroad boosted Pacific commerce in the way many predicted, Hawaii would become an
ever-more essential link – as a coaling station, commercial entrepot, and exporter of
agricultural goods – between the United States and the 600 million consumers of Asia.
And there was reason to believe that whichever section controlled the railroad might also
control the political fortunes of the Sandwich Islands.
Like J.D.B De Bow, William Gwin was enchanted by the Hawaiian Islands and
pushed aggressively for annexation. In an unanticipated Congressional debate regarding
Cuba in December 1852, Gwin attempted to divert attention from the Atlantic to the
Pacific. “There are other islands beside Cuba in which the United States are interested,”
he reminded his colleagues. “There are a set of islands called the Sandwich Islands,
which we in California look upon as our summer residence. And when the Senator from
Virginia talks about ripe fruit, it ought to be known that that fruit is ripe also, and ready to
fall.”107 It was no coincidence that the same men pushing for the Pacific railroad were
the ones calling for annexation – or at least the commercial domination – of Hawaii.
Pacific expansionism and the transcontinental railroad were part of the same imperialist
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thrust. And proslavery writers and politicians comprised a key component of this
movement.
For those interested in the Pacific islands, labor stood out as a particularly thorny
problem. In her 1852 work, The Sandwich Islands as They Are, Not as They Should Be,
Elizabeth Parker, wife of an American official in Hawaii, argued that the fertile islands
could not afford to maintain free labor. “Whether, eventually, these Islands should be
annexed to the United States, or become an independent republic, the introduction of
slavery is indispensable to their value,” she wrote. With the sort of determinism that
marked many of her contemporaries’ outlooks, Parker added, the “nature of the climate”
dictated that “slavery will certainly exist, ere many years be passed.”108 Although no
other Pacific enthusiast would so explicitly endorse the introduction of slavery to the
Sandwich Islands, proslavery advocates like Francis Poe fretted over a distinct labor
problem on the islands, due to the alleged indolence of the natives.109 Under the name of
Dr. Wood, another observer in De Bow’s Review echoed concerns about native indolence,
yet saw coolie labor from China as a poor substitute. Instead, he wondered whether the
Hawaiian economy would not benefit from a return to a feudalism. In language echoing
proslavery polemics, Dr. Wood suggested that the islanders’ “naturally inoffensive
natures and child-like docility” and “their disposition to be guided” rendered them fit
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subjects for a type of ameliorated serfdom. Under such a system, the rich soils of the
islands would finally reach their full potential, yielding stores of coffee, sugar and
cotton.110 While southerners never reached a consensus on a favored labor system for
Hawaii, most agreed that more exploitative methods were needed to rouse the native
population from its inborn sloth. Fortunately for these expansionists, Anglo-Americans
were coming to represent an increasing proportion of the islands’ population, especially
among the elite and landholding echelons of society. Like the diminishing Indian tribes
of the continental United States, the Sandwich Islanders, according to many observers,
were marching steadily toward extinction.111 Demography, climate, location – all of
these factors seemed to invite American expansion into the Pacific.112
Southerners’ calls for expansion into the Pacific isles – especially those that
littered De Bow’s Review throughout the 1850s – smacked of what could be called
maritime manifest destiny, a rhetoric that rang with the same bombast as the ongoing
railroad boosterism. A glance at American commercial developments in the Pacific was
cause enough for nationalist chest-thumping, according to De Bow. “With Great Britain
we are now contending for the sceptre of the seas; and it behooves us, like her, to watch
the mass of the world, and open relations with the uttermost isle,” the Review declared in
a familiarly triumphalist mood. “There is a glorious field before us, and we have nothing
to dread from the rivalry of any contemporary nation. The hardy spirit of our enterprise
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has lost nothing since the days of Burke.”

As railroad promoters never failed to

mention, a transcontinental highway would assure commercial dominance in the Pacific,
effectively realizing the dream of Columbus: to reach Asian markets from the west.114
Finally in possession of the continent, the United States seemed poised to continue
expanding across the Pacific.

The Lesser Slavery Road
Perhaps even more so than the camel corps or the allure of the Sandwich Islands,
the campaign for an overland mail route revived the expectations of proslavery
expansionists. Nearly forgotten by scholars today, the Butterfield overland mail road was
a cause célèbre of the late antebellum era and one of slaveholders’ greatest coups. The
project did not begin as a sectional affair, however. In March 1857 Congress passed a
$600,000 appropriation for the construction of an overland road from an undetermined
point in the Mississippi Valley to San Francisco. The price tag was high but the payoff,
many congressmen reasoned, would be substantial. Not only would this new road
provide faster, more regular mail service to the Pacific coast, but it was also expected to
offer a safe overland trail for westering emigrants. If successful, this route was also
anticipated to become the precursor to the long-awaited Pacific railroad. Iron rails, went
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the logic, would follow this emigrant’s trail, and east and west would finally be
connected along a well-traveled, federally-financed corridor.
To avoid the sort of sectional standoff that had so frequently stymied Pacific
railroad bills, the route’s location was left to contractors, who began submitting bids in
summer 1857. There was just one problem, however, and his name was Aaron V.
Brown, U.S. postmaster-general. Former law partner of James K. Polk, congressman,
governor of Tennessee, and a champion of Texas annexation, Brown had established his
credentials as an avowedly “strong Southern man.”115 Recently appointed postmastergeneral by President Buchanan, Brown disliked all nine routes proposed by the bidders,
likely because none passed south of Albuquerque. So Brown took it upon himself to
designate a new route and forced all contractors to conform to his geographic strictures.
In direct violation of the congressional act, Brown stipulated a bifurcated route beginning
at St. Louis and Memphis (his hometown), then converging at Little Rock, before
swinging through Texas to El Paso, Fort Yuma, and Los Angeles, and finally up the
valleys of California to San Francisco. In total, his route added 600 miles to the longest
alternative bid.
In an era of brazen proslavery maneuvers, Brown’s re-routing of a congressional
act ranked near the top of the list. Although this overland road would not necessarily
serve the expansion of chattel slavery itself, it would advance the interests of the slave
states through which it passed. As the logic went, settlers from these states would fan out
along the route, and even if they failed to bring their slave property with them, they
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would certainly bring their proslavery politics, further strengthening ties between the
South and the Far Southwest. As the Pacific railroad was ultimately expected to trace
this mail route, Brown’s maneuver also marked a signal victory for the prospects of the
“great slavery road.” “The route for a Southern railroad and the establishment of the
Great Overland Mail line upon that route, are considered parts of the same system,” the
Sacramento Daily Union lamented in December 1857. “[U]ndertaken with the view of
connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific,” these two projects were “devised” to enable “a
population from the Southern States [to] naturally take possession of the country over
which the railroad and mail line will pass.”116 Between the mail route and anticipated
railroad, the westward flow of migrants and commerce would follow a decidedly
southern course, thereby ensuring a continental reach for proslavery politics. Just as
Davis pursued the lodestar of sectional aggrandizement at the expense of national
interests, Brown ran roughshod over Congressional mandates to advance a pro-southern
agenda in the West.117
Postmaster Brown did little to disguise his southern partisanship in his official
report. Like Davis before him, he dismissed more northern routes as excessively cold
and inaccessible. Along a northern route, the mail would not reach the Pacific coast in
the 25-day window stipulated by the act. In addition to these delays, Brown argued,
travelers would also be imperiled. He imagined passengers along an Albuquerque route,
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“benumbed by the cold for more than a week, overcome by the loss of sleep.” Such a
route, “under circumstances of so much severe exposure, would, in a few years, mark
every station with the fresh graves of its victims,” Brown grimly concluded.118 He
rightfully argued that the southernmost route was flatter and warmer, but implausibly
claimed that it also suffered from less water scarcity than the alternatives. He invited
northern opposition when he boasted that his mail route would link up with a vast
southern transportation network, feeding off “all the great railroads of Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky… and New Orleans and
Texas.”119
Brown struck a decidedly imperialist note in the final part of his report. Not only
would this road contribute to southern transportation fortunes, help populate western
territories, and bind the eastern U.S. to the Pacific, it would also facilitate southwestern
empire along the U.S-Mexico border, potentially serving as a springboard for future
conquests. “In time of peace it will shed its blessings on both nations,” he argued,
“whilst in time of war it will furnish a highway for troops and munitions of war, which
might enable us to vindicate our rights, and preserve untarnished our national honor.”120
Again, western transportation facilities and empire fit hand-in-glove. Fittingly, Brown
drew on another great western expansionist to justify his work: Jefferson Davis. He cited
Davis as the ultimate authority, “who collected a larger amount of reliable information on
this subject than any other person,” and who also favored this southernmost route.121
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Indeed, Brown’s arguments for a southern overland mail route and Davis’s earlier
arguments for a southern transcontinental railroad are largely indistinguishable.
Although Davis’s report only deepened the conflict over the Pacific railroad, it enjoyed
something of an afterlife through Brown’s maneuverings and thus helped achieve a
substantial proslavery victory in southwestern transportation.
With a southern overland mail route thus secured, the slave states applauded their
newest champion. The Alexandria Gazette called Brown’s report “clear, simple, and
comprehensive,” while the Memphis Daily Appeal cheered him as “able and masterly.”122
Brown, after all, had become a hometown hero in Memphis, and the Appeal took note.
“The citizens of Memphis, especially, should thank and remember him for the strong
stand he has taken for their city as a terminus, and for the unanswerable arguments he has
so successfully brought to bear to sustain it,” the paper argued.123 Shortly after the
opening of the route, an observer in Texas noted that already “settlements are rapidly
extending westward along the route. Even at such an early stage in the road’s history, he
concluded, “the Overland Mail Route is really a magnificent enterprise, and one of the
greatest achievements of American progress.”124 President Buchanan, a strong southern
sympathizer despite his Pennsylvania origins, was equally jubilant. “It is a glorious
triumph for civilization and the Union,” he announced. “Settlements will soon follow the
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course of the road, and the East and the West will be bound together by a chain of living
Americans, which can never be broken.”125
Northern outrage was proportional to the audacity of Brown’s act. The Chicago
Tribune called it “One of the greatest swindles ever perpetrated upon the country by the
slave holders,” while an equally indignant Ohio State Journal dubbed it “a shameful
outrage” and a “revolution of law.”126 The road would enrich not only the slave states,
the Journal added, but Brown himself, who purportedly owned real estate across the
route he selected.127 Meanwhile the National Era protested, “The South demanded the
sacrifice of the public convenience upon the altar of Slavery propagandism, and the South
must be gratified at every cost.”128 The San Francisco press echoed many of these
complaints, noting that all mail and passengers would have to be routed through Los
Angeles, a proslavery bastion, before ultimately reaching the much more populous areas
around the San Francisco Bay. “Under the miserably short-sighted policy of the
Executive,” the San Francisco Bulletin complained, “California is made to suffer, and the
public Treasury is robbed” – and all for a route that passed too far south to attract a
critical mass of passenger traffic.129 These faultfinders could have applied to this
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overland road what was once said of the regional San Antonio-San Diego line: It was a
route “from no place through nothing to nowhere.”130
Northern and border state congressmen also lambasted Brown’s road, linking it to
a longer history of proslavery scheming in the Far Southwest. In a lengthy and
impassioned speech, Representative Francis Blair of Missouri connected the dots
between the Gadsden Purchase, Davis’s Pacific railroad surveys, the camel corps, and
now this overland mail route. “Why was it that an appropriation of $10,000,000 to
purchase Arizona, appropriations to import camels, to bore artesian wells, and to print an
endless series of the most costly books… could be made during the dominancy of the socalled Democracy, and no effort whatever made to find a line for the central route?” Blair
demanded. The answer, of course, was simple. The “southern faction” forced the hand
of both the executive and Congress to “dictate absolutely its policy.” The newest
outrage, Brown’s overland mail road, was yet another example of proslavery
expansionists sacrificing national interests and considerable capital to advance their
sectional agenda, Blair added.131 In later debates in the senate, other critics piled on.
Lyman Trumbull slammed the postmaster general for overriding congressional will to
build a road “as crooked as an ox-bow” and a good deal longer than originally
advertised.132 To Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, the new mail road would pass
along a “desert route, now and hereafter to be known, I trust, as the disunion route.”133
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As these congressmen recognized, the stakes were high in the contest for western
transportation, and slaveholders again held the winning hand.
Despite hearty protest, in September 1857 A.V. Brown awarded the contract to
John Butterfield, a New York expressman and personal friend of President Buchanan.
Twice-weekly mail service was to begin one year later, a formidable task even with the
resources at Butterfield’s disposal. He had to construct a road that ran over 2800 miles of
terrain that, for much of its expanse, was sparsely populated, rugged, and short on water.
There was also the problem of Indian tribes. To secure the right-of-way through their
lands, Butterfield would distribute more than $10,000 per year to Native Americans in
the region. His team also dug a series of wells along the route and constructed roughly
200 stations. For the transport work ahead, the line purchased 100 coaches, 1000 horses,
500 mules, and recruited nearly 800 men. All told, it was an impressive undertaking, and
by 1860 the Butterfield line was carrying more letters than the U.S. steamship service.134
Although the vast majority of westward migrants continued to use the central overland
trail, settlements along the Butterfield route grew considerably, especially in Texas. The
population of chief towns along the route nearly doubled, while smaller settlements also
sprung up along its path. In these new towns, the line’s stations often served as the
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commercial center.

Ultimately the line would not outlive the sectional crisis that it did

so much to exacerbate. The famed but short-lived Pony Express, which followed a
central route, originated in 1860 as a response to the far southern Butterfield road. With
secession, the Butterfield company moved its operations to the central line, although
Confederates continued to move over the old route.136
The Butterfield line could be considered the postscript to over a decade of
proslavery scheming for a transcontinental railroad. Southerners did not win their “great
slavery road,” but with the construction of the overland mail route, they secured what
many considered the next best thing. The Butterfield line only accelerated the migration
and commercial exchange that had been conducted between the slave states and the
Desert West for decades. And it stood as a physical representation of the connections
between South and Southwest. That the route was established over the fierce resistance
of northern politicians highlights just how adept southerners had become in advancing
their western agenda. Between the Gadsden Purchase, the Pacific railroad surveys,
Jefferson Davis’s camel corps, and finally the overland mail route, slaveholders
consistently outmaneuvered their adversaries to dictate infrastructural policy for the Far
West. And in the process, they facilitated the westward movement of southern-born
settlers, a demographic phenomenon that would have significant consequences for
sectional politics in places like New Mexico, Arizona, and California.137
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Conclusion
Even as sectional battle lines hardened, proslavery railroad promoters persevered
in their old crusade. Within Congress, Jefferson Davis continued agitating for a southern
route almost until the eve of secession.138 And William Gwin, perhaps the most tireless
campaigner of all, still hoped to bind East and West along one continuous rail line. More
emphatically than any other major figure of the time, he continued to articulate the dream
of commercial empire that southern railroad advocates, in particular, had made so
familiar over the course of the last decade. Rising to speak on December 14, 1858, he
proceeded to deliver one of his most impassioned speeches on behalf of the Pacific
railroad. Rehashing many of the old arguments about the bounties of Asian trade, Gwin
spoke with a sense of urgency seasoned by a career of failed transcontinental schemes.
He predicted that the railroad would, if built, quickly double the nation’s wealth and lead
the United States past Great Britain as the dominant commercial power of the world.
Especially promising to Gwin was the untapped market of Asian cotton consumers. In
words that could be considered an antebellum anthem for American economic
imperialists, Gwin declared:
Commerce is power and empire. Its conquests are greater, more universal
and enduring than those of arms… Give us, as this railroad would, the
permanent control of the commerce and exchanges of the world, and in the
progress of time and the advance of civilization, we would command the
institutions of the world – not like the colonies of Rome, by the sword and
vassalage, but by that irresistible moral power which would ultimately
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carry our institutions with our commerce throughout the sphere we
inhabit.139
Such a statement would have found countless adherents roughly forty years later.
By that time, the credo of economic expansionism had worked its way into the nation’s
very marrow. Gwin himself would have been especially pleased by developments in the
Pacific – the railroad had been built, Hawaii had been annexed, and the wealth of Asian
markets was increasingly flowing into Pacific harbors. The United States entered the
twentieth century as a newly minted world power, fully conscious of its growing
commercial clout. But such an empire did not emerge suddenly and without warning
from the spoils of the Spanish American War, nor was it the vision of enterprising
Yankees alone, as the traditional narrative might have us believe. Indeed, it was decades
in the making. And some of its earliest and most persuasive visionaries were southerners,
like William Gwin, James Gadsden, and J.D.B. De Bow. Their western ambitions did not
die in 1850, nor did they stop short at California’s coast; they endured through the decade
and stretched across the entire Pacific world. Proslavery filibusters have more
successfully captured the historical imagination, but their imperial vision was often
dwarfed by the ambitions of railroad promoters. With iron rails rather than the sword,
these expansionists sought to bind South and West, arrest sectional decline, and open vast
new markets for southern trade. And for at least a few years in the 1850s, the world truly
seemed theirs for the taking.
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Chapter 3

THE SOUTHERNIZATION OF ANTEBELLUM CALIFORNIA,
1850-1859
When California was admitted to the Union as a free state in 1850, its troubles
with slavery had, paradoxically, only just begun. The very next year, James Gadsden
spearheaded a national movement to settle a colony of two-thousand bondspeople and
their white masters on the Pacific Coast. As they moved across the Southwest, this slave
colony would pioneer the preferred route for a far southern transcontinental railroad,
Gadsden predicted, thereby linking the enslaved East with the re-enslaved West.1 Brazen
(and unconstitutional) though his scheme may appear in hindsight, Gadsden was in good
company at the time. Indeed, his plan was merely the opening wedge in a decade of
proslavery operations on the ostensibly free soil of California. And while black slave
labor never became a cornerstone of the state’s economy, the ideology upon which it
rested would achieve a dominant position in California’s political discourse.
Disproportionally represented in the statehouse, the local courts, and Congress, southern
emigrants to California bent the state’s political path toward a distinctly proslavery end.
They marginalized free soil politics and ensured that the slave South and the Far West
were separated by a thin – and at times imperceptible – line.
As Steven Hahn has argued, slavery was a national institution in antebellum
America. With the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, runaways could
expect no refuge, though they may travel thousands of miles from the heart of the
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plantation belt. Meanwhile, masters roamed the streets of northern cities and sojourned
throughout the federal territories with their slave property – practices that received a
judicial blessing from Chief Justice Roger Taney’s court in the 1857 Dred Scott
decision.2 And yet the dominant historical narrative still defines the slavery extension
controversy in geographically narrow terms. Kansas, in these accounts, marks the
western limit of the sectional crisis of the 1850s.3 To be sure, several local histories have
explored California’s relationship to slavery and the statewide political struggles that
resulted. But, often lacking a national framework, these histories lose sight of the
broader issues that made California’s antebellum politics so fractious in the first place.4
The political history of American slavery should be viewed through a wide-angle lens
that incorporates both the eastern and western halves of the nation – from grand visions
of empire to the local initiatives that brought the sectional crisis into the Far West. As
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antebellum Americans recognized, the struggle over slavery unfolded on a truly
continental scale.
The proslavery political culture of California should be understood, this chapter
argues, as the outgrowth of the slave South’s expansionist agenda. One of Jefferson
Davis’s many California correspondents, Lewis Sanders, recognized the connection
between the imperial projects of the South and local politics in the West when he wrote
of the need for internal improvements. “Of all things most desired here is a national road
or high way” along a southern route, he reminded Davis. By encouraging migration from
the slave states, he continued, such a road would give southern interests “a controlling
influence in the country and thereby put a check to mad fanaticism.” Sanders need not
have worried about California being overwhelmed by the “pestilence” of New England,
however.5 Slaveholders may have failed in their grand plans for a Pacific railway, but
they succeeded in achieving one of the road’s major objectives: to politically link the
South and the Far West. With slaveholding leaders like William Gwin at the helm,
California voted more like Virginia than Vermont throughout the 1850s, thereby ensuring
that the South would continue to wield a disproportionate influence within Congress. In
their fealty to proslavery doctrine, California’s politicians proved that southern political
expansion was no mere pipe dream. Indeed, Californians gave shape and substance to
proslavery visions of empire in the West.
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Somewhat counterintuitively, this frontier state, thousands of miles from the
major debates then unfolding in Washington, provides an especially illuminating
perspective on the sectional crisis. In fact, antebellum California can be understood as
both a political bellwether and as a microcosm of the struggles that convulsed the entire
nation. With a larger, more urban population in the northern part of the state and a
smaller, more agricultural and more proslavery population in the southern section,
California’s demography roughly approximated that of the nation as a whole. As within
the federal Congress, a smaller and better organized faction of proslavery politicians
exercised an outsized influence in the California legislature. Furthermore, in both
California and at the national level, the Democratic coalition that had ruled through much
of the period fractured along sectional lines in the wake of the Kansas controversy. Even
some of the violent episodes of sectional controversy, like the caning of Charles Sumner,
were prefigured in California’s political fracas. Finally, the secessionist impulses that
motivated the fire-eating faction of the slaveholding class in the South had an analogue in
southern California’s own separatist movement. California can thus be seen as a regional
stage on which its political actors played out a national struggle.

James Gadsden’s California
From its inception, California’s legislature made clear that the state’s free soil
constitution did not guarantee free soil politics. This was the same legislature that had
elected William Gwin to the U.S. Senate, after all, and it was also the legislature that
placed brazen slaveholding expansionists in senior roles. Having recently been chased
out of Rose’s Bar with his company of fifteen slaves, Thomas Jefferson Green found a
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comfortable position as the chairman of the Finance Committee of California’s governing
body. Dismissed by a fellow senator as “unsuitable a man as could be” who “made
nonsense of everything that was done,” Green nevertheless wielded powerful influence
within the statehouse. What became known as the ‘Legislature of a thousand drinks’
earned its appellation from Green’s frequent invitations to imbibe from his massive
whisky supply just outside the main hall.6 Such liberality, along with his personal fortune
and his military reputation gave Green a stature that few in that body could match. The
fact that six fellow Texans also sat in this first legislature only reinforced his influence. 7
It was leaders like Green who ensured that James Gadsden and proslavery schemers of
his ilk would receive at least a respectful hearing.
Although the legislature had not yet split along party lines in 1849-1850, divisive
sectional and racial issues did indeed creep into its proceedings, as they would continue
to do for the next decade. By 1850, the state’s southern senators took a stand on the
national slavery issue, resolving that “any attempt by Congress to interfere with the
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institution of slavery in any of the territories of the United States would create just
grounds of alarm in many of the States of the Union.”8 That same year, legislators passed
a law prohibiting African Americans, mulattoes, and Indians from testifying against
whites in a court of law. Returning to issues raised in the constitutional convention one
year earlier, lawmakers also introduced bills to bar black migration into the state and to
require the deportation of all manumitted slaves. These bills failed, but the message
came across loud and clear: California was to be a white man’s state.9
To be sure, southern-born lawmakers did not have a monopoly on racially
restrictive legislation, although they proved, on the whole, more eager to adopt such
statutes.10 In fact, it was the Democratic record on racial politics which helped give that
party its undisputed legislative majority – aside from a brief Know Nothing insurgency –
through the antebellum period. California’s Democrats and Whigs, and later
Republicans, agreed on some of major issues of the day, especially the need for federal
spending on western infrastructure. On an annual basis, the state’s various parties all
adopted pro-Pacific railroad platforms, for instance. But Democrats – or more
specifically, the powerful southern-born faction of the party – distinguished themselves
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by branding their political adversaries as abolitionist subversives and racial egalitarians.
This was an especially effective tactic in a state that harbored a large working-class white
community, jealous of its political prerogatives and profoundly uneasy about black and
Chinese immigration into the state.11 Not all of these white voters were overtly
proslavery, of course. But a critical mass of them were indeed deeply anti-abolitionist,
and they often supported the southern wing of the Democratic party, as the faction most
likely to block African American advancement and thus preserve white rule.
California’s proslavery faction further entrenched its position through aggressive
electioneering and strict party discipline. Fremont, who had drawn the short straw when
appointed to the U.S. Senate in late 1849, served less than a year in office before he came
up for reelection. The abolitionist merchant, John Batchelder Peirce, saw little hope for
the Pathfinder, due to his free soil politics. “I am fearful we shall send a pro Slavery
man,” he wrote to his wife from San Francisco in December 1850. “For the active
Politicians here are Southern men.”12 Peirce later speculated that the state’s political
profile had formed in such a way because “the Northern men are engaged in business
leaving Political affairs to those who have nothing else to do.”13 There could be some
truth to this assumption. At its height, the population of California residents originating
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from slave states stood at just 33 percent, yet southerners prevailed in election after
election.14
In any case, Peirce’s supposition that Fremont could not survive politically in
such a proslavery climate was certainly accurate. No amount of celebrity could help the
Pathfinder overcome the base of ultra southern legislators who threw their weight behind
Solomon Heydenfeldt, a strong proslavery man born in Charleston, South Carolina. Also
on the ballot was Thomas Butler King, the Georgia planter who had made his name as a
naval expansionist and would later partner with Robert J. Walker in a southern
transcontinental railroad scheme. In this crowded field, Fremont came nowhere near the
necessary votes for reelection, even after a dizzying 142 ballots. Nor did any other
candidate, however, and thus the legislature decided to postpone the election until
January 1852. This would not be the first time that Fremont faced humiliation at the
hands of California’s proslavery faction.
The ousting of Fremont represented an early victory in a decade that was to see
the proslavery advantages mount. In the postponed senatorial election a year later, John
B. Weller came out triumphant. Although born in Ohio, Weller was married to the
daughter of a slaveholding Virginia congressmen and his political allegiances reflected
those connections. He would become California’s leading Doughface – a proslavery
Democrat from the North in the mold of James Buchanan – who had opposed the Wilmot
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Proviso and spoke in favor of slavery’s further expansion.

Together, he and Gwin gave

southern interests a strong backing in Congress. With such representation, one California
pioneer could write – with only some exaggeration – that “the State of California was as
much under the control of the Southern wing of the Democratic party as South Carolina,
and voted in Congress for Southern interests to all intents and purposes.” It was a place,
he continued, “as intensely Southern as Mississippi or any other of the fire-eating
States.”16
It was also a place that nurtured the imperialist fantasies of James Gadsden.
Several years before signing the treaty with Mexico that bore his name, Gadsden began
conspiring with Thomas Jefferson Green and others to plant a slave colony on
California’s ostensibly free soil. Green was the appropriate correspondent for such an
adventure. The Texan had overseen one of the largest slave migrations into California
just a few years before, when he carried a group of fifteen bondspeople into the diggings
of Rose’s Bar. Gadsden thus wrote to Green in December 1851 to outline his vision for a
slaveholding territory in California that would marry southern-style plantation agriculture
with western-style mining operations, somewhere near the San Joaquin River in Central
California. “We must introduce rice and cotton and sugar,” Gadsden mused, along with
the continued exploitation of California’s mineral resources. With such lucrative
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slaveholding enterprises, “no power can vie with that which is washed by the Pacific,” he
argued.17
But Gadsden’s colony was to be more than just a mining and agricultural venture;
it was also to serve as the opening wedge for the construction of a Pacific railroad along a
far southern route. Writing to another proslavery ally several days later, Gadsden
explained how his colony could blaze a trail across the Far West and thus mark out a
suitable path for future railway development. “Open such a way, and the railroad
follows,” he projected. With federal protection, “you will see us with some 500 to 800
domestics with 200 to 300 axes, opening the highway to the cultivation and civilization
of the shores of the Pacific.”18
In early 1852, Gadsden rallied over 1200 prospective settlers from South Carolina
and Florida and petitioned the California government to enable them to settle in the state
with their 2000 slaves. Along with Thomas Jefferson Green, Gadsden enlisted the aid of
Isaac Edward Holmes, a former South Carolinian congressmen-cum-San Francisco
lawyer, and Archibald Peachy, originally of Virginia and now chair of the Judiciary
Committee. It was Peachy who introduced Gadsden’s petition to the California
legislature, which then sent it to the Committee on Federal Relations.19 There, however,
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the plan finally and quietly died.

20

Thus, much like the stillborn 1850 Mississippi plan

for a California slave colony, Gadsden’s scheme never moved far beyond the realm of
imagination. Yet these efforts were reflective of a resilient political movement that
refused to cede the Far West to free labor. In fact, that such a memorial, in brazen
disregard of California’s constitution, would even receive a hearing in the legislature
speaks volumes about the proslavery currents then sweeping through the state’s
governing body.
Gadsden himself carried no slaves into California, but a handful of fellow
southerners continued to move their human property westward in defiance of state law.21
Frederick Douglass’ Paper reported, for instance, on a Maryland slaveholder who was
preparing to transport his slave into California as late as December 1852.22 More
alarming, though, were the reports coming from South Carolina that year. According to
the Charleston press, the steamship Isabell made at least two journeys with Californiabound slaveholders and their chattel property aboard, carrying first 39 slaves and then 55
slaves in these two trips. “It would seem that this slave emigration is not an accident, or a
spontaneous movement,” the National Era fretted, “but that it is part of a system of
measures concerted between Slavery-Propagandists on the Atlantic and Pacific
seaboards.” California was technically free soil, the paper continued, but the state

20
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nevertheless continued to harbor black slaves and their masters in isolated mining
communities “where the only law is that of force.” In such circumstances, “how are
[slaves] to know their rights, and who is there to assert them?”23 This is precisely the
logic that moved Robert Givens to write to his father in September 1852 on the security
of slave property in California. “I don’t consider there is any risk in bringing Patrick
[one of the family’s slaves] alone… as no one will put themselves to the trouble of
investigating the matter,” he wrote. “When he gets in, I should like to see any one get
him out.”24
Despite the best efforts of Gadsden and aside from the noteworthy trips off the
Isabell, slaveholders never mustered the importation, en mass, of bondspeople to the
West. Yet they did devise a number of stratagems to ensure that slavery would continue
in free-soil California under other guises. A common strategy was to establish
agreements with slaves themselves in order to bind their labor for a fixed term. Taken
into California as presumed slaves, African Americans would only win their freedom, per
these agreements, after working for a set number of years or after earning a certain
amount of money. In this way, the contract – a hallmark of free labor ideology – became
a tool for the perpetuation of bondage.25 For many African Americans, this meant that
they would not win freedom until years after the passage of California’s antislavery
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constitution. For instance, it took Peter Green, the former slave of Thomas Thorn
(Chapter 1), until 1855 before a justice of the peace certified that his “obligation has been
complied with” and that he was “legally discharged.”26 Similarly, Biddy Mason and
thirteen fellow slaves only won their release from their master in 1856, after having been
transported to California from Texas in 1851.27 In other cases, aspiring masters sought
the unpaid labor of African Americans by claiming legal guardianship over them. John
Rowland, for instance, went to court in order to adopt Rose, an African American child,
maintaining that her mother was unable to provide adequate care and thus Rose should be
relocated to a white home.28 Framed as an act of charity, Rowland’s intention was very
likely to bind Rose as an unfree domestic laborer.
The landscape of unfreedom in the Far West consisted of more than just African
American slaves. The state’s shrinking, but still substantial, Indian population provided a
ready source of bound labor for many landowning Californians. American emigrants to
California readily adopted forms of Indian debt peonage that had flourished under
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Mexican rule. Cave Couts, a transplanted slaveholder from Tennessee, established a
large ranch near San Diego, making use of Indian debt peons, bound apprentices, and
convicts. To the best of his ability, Couts recreated a southern plantation in the American
West, substituting cheaper, unfree Indian laborers for black slaves.29 The parallels
between Couts’s rancho and a southern plantation were not lost on the nineteenth-century
historian Hubert Howe Bancroft, who noted that, even after the Civil War, “everything
about Guajorne [Couts’s estate] had the air of the home of a wealthy southern planter.”30
Los Angeles also featured its own Indian “slave mart”. After a long work week,
several hundred Indians customarily gathered on Saturdays near Los Angeles’s Calle de
los Negros to drink, gamble, and fight. Municipal authorities would wait until these
Indians were thoroughly inebriated by sundown on Sunday, and then drive the most
incapacitated into an open-air coral. On Monday morning these Natives would be
auctioned off to the highest bidders for a week of labor. If they were paid at all, it was
often in alcohol, thereby ensuring the whole process could begin again the next
weekend.31 By the 1850s this Indian auction had become the second most important
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source of municipal revenue, second only to the licensing fees imposed on Los Angeles’s
drinking and gambling venues. The practice would continue into the early 1870s. In their
search for bound labor, Californians learned to look beyond the black-white binary.

A State Divided Against Itself
Although individual slaveholders certainly derived significant advantages from
the exploitation of Native peoples, when southern imperialists imagined the possibilities
for unfree labor in the West, they spoke primarily of black slavery.32 Perhaps most
promising for proslavery expansionists was the long-lived state division campaign,
intended to create, many presumed, a slaveholding territory in southern California.33
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Reflecting the demographic and political divisions of the nation as a whole, the lower
half of California was more distinctly southern in origin and proslavery in outlook than
the northern portion of the state. It was, therefore, a natural target for slaveholding
imperialists. If only the southern counties could be split from California, they reasoned,
this territory could jettison the antislavery constitution of 1849 and become a magnet for
southern emigrants and their human chattel. This is precisely what Mississippi’s two
senators, Henry Foote and Jefferson Davis, had in mind when, during the debates of
1850, they attempted to extend the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific coast.34 And
it also may have motivated William Gwin’s earlier attempts to enlarge the state
boundaries during the constitutional convention debates.35 In many ways the state
division movement represented a continuation of James Gadsden’s scheme by other
means. Gwin, Foote, Davis, and Gadsden were all driving at the same objective: to
override California’s free soil constitution and secure a foothold for slavery on the Pacific
coast.36
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One of the first state division efforts centered on Los Angeles, where leading
citizens called a meeting in September 1851 to rally support and pledged “to use every
effort to produce a separation of the Southern portion of the State from the Northern.”37
A subsequent convention attracted thirty-one delegates from the counties of Los Angeles,
San Diego, Santa Barbara and Monterey, who reiterated complaints of inequitable
taxation and unanimously endorsed a plan for the formation of a separate territory in
southern California.38 Over the subsequent decade, the state legislature fielded petitions
for state division on a nearly annual basis.39 The justifications for such an action – in
addition to the ubiquitous tax complaints – were regularly rehearsed: the sheer size of the
state; the distance separating southern residents from their capital; and the regional
imbalance in legislative representation.40
In all the pleas for state division mustered by southern Californians, one issue
remained conspicuously unstated – that of slavery. Yet few were blind to the sectional
implications of this campaign. As slaveholders had argued since the 1840s, southern
California constituted ideal terrain for the extension of the South’s peculiar institution.
Robert Givens, son of a Kentucky slaveholder, predicted that if California were to be
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divided, “the southern division will become a slave State.” He continued, “It is settled
almost entirely by Southerners, and they will exert themselves to the utmost extent to
carry the day.”41 Hinton Rowan Helper noted similar developments with similar
consequences. “The applicability of slave labor to the soil of Southern California is now
becoming a theme of discussion in that region, and it is probable that the experiment will
one day be tried,” he wrote. The state division issue had already “occupied the attention
of the legislature,” Helper continued, “and while it is generally admitted that the people
are about equally divided upon the measure, it is universally conceded that, in case of its
adoption, the southern portion will establish the laws and institutions of Virginia and
Louisiana.”42
As Givens, Helper, and others recognized, southern Californians themselves were
especially zealous in the cause of slavery. Between the Indian slave mart of Los Angeles,
the plantation-style rancho of Cave Couts, and a small slaveholding Mormon population
in San Bernardino, residents of the region had already demonstrated a decided interest in
systems of unfree labor.43 Demography alone gave the slave states a claim to southern
California. Of the U.S.-born population living in Los Angeles County in 1860, 52
percent hailed from the slave South. To be sure, this represented only a slim majority of
the Anglo-American population, but at a time when only about 39 percent of the nation’s
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population as a whole had been born south of the Mason Dixon line, Los Angeles could
indeed be considered a comparatively southern place.44
Los Angeles’ geographic position helps explain its southern character. The
second-most heavily traveled overland route to California, the Gila River trail, terminated
in southern California. At the height of the gold rush in 1849, roughly 6,000 AngloAmericans traveled over this trail, a majority of whom came from Texas. Although most
would continue northwards to the gold fields near Sacramento, a number of these
argonauts eventually settled in the Los Angeles area.45
What made southern California particularly hospitable to proslavery interests was
not necessarily the numerical advantage that white southerners in the region enjoyed, but
rather, the political culture they created. In California, proslavery Democrats wielded
power well beyond their numbers, and that was no less true in the southern part of the
state. With the support of their Spanish-surnamed allies, proslavery migrants made free
soil politics anathema in Los Angeles County.46 While William Gwin pulled the strings
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of the proslavery Democratic machine from his senate seat in Washington, his close
friend Joseph Lancaster Brent – a Maryland native and future Confederate general –
presided as the party boss of Los Angeles. A staunch supporter of slavery and a
perennial ally to the region’s Mexican-born elite, Brent ensured that his fellow
southerners were well positioned in local governance. As he noted in his memoirs, Brent
had become “so decidedly the leader in Los Angeles politics” by mid-decade, “that… no
one could be elected whom [he] did not support, and no one defeated whom [he]
befriended.” Charles E. Carr, a Louisiana native and California state legislator, would
later claim that Brent carried Los Angeles in “his vest pocket.”47 Thanks to partisans like
Brent, antebellum Los Angeles could be considered the far western outpost of the slave
South. And as such, it offered a tempting and attainable target for proslavery
expansionists.
In 1852 the state legislature made a particularly cunning play for state division.
Spearheaded by Henry Crabb, the son of a prominent Tennessee slaveholder, a group of
politicians began agitating for a new constitutional convention in order to remedy, they
argued, certain points on taxation and public expenditures. Their true intention, however,
was likely to legalize slavery in the Far West by splitting off the southern part of the state
as a separate territory. Their call for a new convention passed the state assembly but
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narrowly failed in the senate, due to clever obstructionist efforts of the antislavery
stalwart David Broderick.48 But the fight was far from over (see Chapter 4). Too much
was at stake – not just the matter of slavery in the Far West, but also of southern
representation in Congress. Even if bonded labor never took root along the Pacific, an
independent southern California – with its population of staunch southern partisans –
would nevertheless provide a powerful bulwark for proslavery politics at the national
level.
A former Illinois congressman by the name of Abraham Lincoln saw the farreaching consequences of this political movement then unfolding at the edge of the
continent. As southerners continued to press for California state division, Lincoln looked
on with growing unease. In a list of resolutions that he drafted yet never delivered, he
addressed a number of proslavery initiatives, including the re-opening of the African
slave trade, the Kansas-Nebraska controversy, and California’s territorial movement. His
draft of January 1855 urged Congress, “To resist, to their utmost, the now threatened
attempt to divide California, in order to erect one portion thereof into a slave-state.”49
Here was the slave power at work, Lincoln’s resolutions suggested, from the shipping
lanes of the Atlantic to the shores of the Pacific.50
Although foiled in their early attempts at state division, California’s southernborn politicians fought for proslavery rights on more than one front. While some free
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states like Massachusetts challenged the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, California’s
politicians ensured that the Pacific slope would remain a particularly inhospitable place
for escaped bondspeople and their abolitionist allies. One San Francisco paper, for
instance, cheered slave catchers in their hunt for Frederick Douglass and hoped for his
return “to perpetual labor in the most menial capacity at the South.”51 In 1852 the
California legislature voted to burn all abolitionist circulars that had found their way into
the state, thereby handing southern slaveholders a far western ally in their campaign to
ban and eradicate antislavery literature.52 True, California’s abolitionists scored some
victories in the early 1850s, driving out the occasional slaveholder who had dared to
trespass on free soil. But those victories were rather limited in scope, as abolitionist John
Batchelder Peirce confessed to his wife. “As to your fears about my taking too active a
part in the anti slavery affairs here – I don’t do anything,” he wrote in the summer of
1851. “I can’t for there is nobody to cooperate with scarcely. We have no organized
society here and nothing to act on but now and then a slave case.”53
Western abolitionists like Peirce suffered a bruising defeat in 1852 with the
passage of California’s fugitive slave act. Although California had effectively outlawed
slavery in 1849, there were still hundreds of enslaved blacks in the mining regions,
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according to Peirce’s own estimates, and no legislation to define the status of those who
had been carried into the state prior to the passage of its antislavery constitution. The
1852 law – drafted by Henry Crabb, who was simultaneously lobbying for a new
constitutional convention – clarified matters in a distinctly proslavery manner.54 Crabb’s
bill mandated state aid for the recapture of fugitives, and, more crucially, allowed masters
to return to the South with their slave property. California’s free soil constitution, it
stipulated, did not guarantee freedom for the black slaves still laboring within the state.
The bill sailed through the state assembly, 42 to 11, and passed in the senate, 14 to 9,
with aid from James Estell of Kentucky, who owned more than a dozen slaves on his
Solano County farm.55 As it was initially intended, the act gave masters one year in
which to return to the South with their human chattel, but it was extended for an
additional two years by the state’s proslavery legislature.56
Whereas historian Leonard Richards described the law as “largely symbolic,”
Stacey Smith has convincingly demonstrated that it had very real consequences for
California’s 2,000 resident African Americans, both slave and free. Crabb’s bill, she
argues, amounted to a “three-year suspension of the antislavery constitution” and exposed
California’s blacks to fraud and kidnapping. Because African Americans could not
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testify against whites in California’s courts, they were especially vulnerable to charges of
fugitivism and therefore re-enslavement. Indeed, with the fugitive slave law in hand,
California’s jurists, on the whole, ruled in defense of slaveholders. In dozens of cases
between 1852 and 1855, they rejected the freedom claims of African Americans and
remanded them to their owners.
The state Supreme Court rendered a particularly consequential ruling in the case
of three previously liberated African Americans, Robert Perkins, Carter Perkins, and
Sandy Jones. The men had been carried to California during the gold rush, only to be
emancipated in 1851, shortly before their master returned alone to Mississippi. But upon
the passage of the fugitive slave law one year later, their former owner’s cousin
reclaimed the ostensibly liberated slaves. When their case came before the supreme
court, the two presiding judges, both southern-born Democrats, ruled in favor of the
master’s cousin, effectively re-enslaving the three African Americans and giving firm
legal backing to state’s fugitive slave law. It was a ruling that, in many ways, prefigured
the Dred Scott decision of 1857 by sustaining slaveholders’ rights to carry their human
property across free soil without risk. The highest court in California had spoken: slavery
was national.57
Such decisions deepened the divisions between antislavery and proslavery forces
within the state, and attracted national and international attention to California’s political
battles. The Perkins case, in particular, galvanized the small abolitionist community in
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California, which would continue to press freedom suits for the enslaved and to lobby
against the ban on black testimony.58 But in such a proslavery state, theirs was an uphill
battle. Abolitionists as far away as Britain recognized as much when, in 1854, one
antislavery advocate noted that America had effectively “extended the legalization of the
traffic to California” – a reference, most likely, to the security that masters enjoyed under
the state’s fugitive slave bill.59
Martin Delany, a leading black abolitionist, similarly lamented proslavery
developments in the Far West. “California by three successive acts of the legislature, has
granted to slave-holders the right to take their slaves into the State, for and during the
term of three consecutive years;” he claimed in an 1855 speech in Pittsburg, “and now
seriously contemplates its permanent establishment, which doubtless will be
consummated during the next year.”60 The wholesale reintroduction of slavery to
California never came to pass, as Delany and others had feared, but southerners would
continue to wield an outsized influence in the legislature and in courtrooms across the
state. They pressed their advantages as California divided against itself. Half a decade
after the passage of its antislavery constitution, California was less free than ever.

William Gwin’s California
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Perhaps the most remarkable fact of California’s early political history is the
degree of control that proslavery southerners were able to maintain despite their
numerical disadvantages. They owed much of this success to one man in particular,
William McKendree Gwin. The Mississippi planter-cum-California kingpin built an
extensive network of proslavery Democrats within the state, giving shape to the political
faction that would become known as the Chivalry. Although the etymology of the name
is somewhat obscure, the Chivalry originated in the early 1850s as a pejorative for the
proslavery wing of California’s dominant Democratic party – most likely as a play on the
feudal sensibilities of antebellum southerners.61 Through the decade, Gwin served as the
de facto leader of this faction, and used his influence at the national level to fill
California’s federal posts with his southern friends. Gwin was as generous to his allies as
he was unrelenting with his enemies, and, like many southerners in California, he
resorted to the duel when sufficiently antagonized.62 Resilient and ambitious in equal
measures, Gwin weathered the vagaries and violence of California politics to steer the
ship of state in a consistently southern direction. Indeed, under his direction, antebellum
California became something of a client to the slave South.
When not lobbying for federal appropriations or a Pacific railroad through slave
country, Gwin was often calling in personal favors to staff California’s plum posts with
likeminded southerners. As the state’s ranking senator through most of the decade, Gwin
essentially wielded veto rights over any federal appointment to California. Even during
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his two years out of office, from 1855 to 1857, he spent much of his time in Washington
as a presidential confidant. Gwin distributed these plums in return for political fealty.
And there were plenty of positions to go around: the state required a legion of appointees
to staff its courts, the postal service, the Indian Office, the land office, the San Francisco
Custom House, and a number of lesser positions. The Collector of Ports of San Francisco
alone controlled a staff of 80 to 200 men. While California’s mines yielded diminishing
returns, federal jobs continued to pay, and to pay well, through the decade. In this way,
Gwin and the Chivalry enforced a strict sense of party discipline that helped them
overcome their relatively small base of southern-born voters within the state. In
distributing these plums, Gwin was transparently sectional. He “proved treacherous to
his northern friends and always favored the south,” the former state senator Elisha Crosby
recalled. “No northern man, no friend at the north who was known to be strongly against
slavery ever received anything at his hands. Every thing he did was in favor of Southern
interests.”63 The San Francisco Customs House came to be known as the Virginia
Poorhouse, “from the number of scions of the first families of Virginia that were stowed
away there on fat salaries.”64
But if Gwin’s allies were legion, so too were his enemies. In the scramble for
political office, those overlooked by the Chivalry machine often turned to Gwin’s main
rival, David D. Broderick, a Democrat from New York. John Bigler, the state’s governor
from 1852 to 1856, did just that after finding himself consistently outmaneuvered by
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Gwin in the contest for spoils. Writing to his brother – then serving as governor of
Pennsylvania – Bigler complained that the Pierce administration “listens to Gwin” and
that “we are not heard or consulted.”65 Hitching his political fortunes to the anti-Chivalry
faction, Bigler reinforced the influence of Broderick and ensured that the biggest threat
to Gwin’s control would come from within the Democratic party itself. While Gwin
headed the Chivalry, Broderick marshaled what became known as the Shovelry, a faction
of mildly antislavery northerners who sought to block the overtly pro-southern agenda
that currently prevailed within California. By mid-decade if not earlier, the Shoverly – a
play on the working-class roots of leaders like Broderick, the son of a stonemason –
represented a powerful alternative and consistent check on the proslavery politics of
California’s southern leadership.
Like Gwin, Broderick inspired (and demanded) strong demonstrations of loyalty
from his political allies. He was, after all, an acolyte of New York’s hierarchical
Tammany machine, and he carried those lessons to California, where he became an “able,
powerful and autocratic leader of his wing of the party,” in the words of the
contemporary observer, James J. Ayres.66 The Chiv leader, Milton Latham, was merely
repeating a common refrain when he described Broderick as one with “the peculiarity of
tying to him his supporters in the most wonderful degree.”67 He was “implacable as an
enemy, but unswervingly true to his principles and his friendships,” Ayres recalled. “the
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idol of the rougher classes, [Broderick]… controlled them to his iron will by a supremacy
that brooked no question.”68 In many ways, the leaders of the Chivalry and Shovelry
factions were natural counterpoints. Broderick, the product of the bare-knuckle ward
politics of New York’s working-class communities, resented the aristocratic hauteur of
Gwin, the wealthy planter.69 Yet despite their vastly disparate backgrounds and
constituencies, both leaders employed similar tactics in order to gain an edge in the
rough-and-tumble political climate of antebellum California. Both the Chivalry and the
Shovelry resorted to bullying, ballot stuffing, and outright violence to win votes.70
Broderick was by no means an abolitionist, but the brazen agenda of the state’s
Chivalry leaders consistently drew the New Yorker into the controversy over slavery and
black rights – or lack thereof. As early as 1850, Broderick, then in the state senate,
helped defeat an act to exclude African American migration into California. His
opposition to Gwin intensified in 1852 after the Chivalry leader blocked Broderick’s bid
for the open U.S. Senate seat and instead secured the election of the doughface John B.
Weller. That same year, Broderick distinguished himself in the struggle against the
proslavery faction when he took a stand – albeit a futile one – against Henry Crabb’s
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fugitive slave bill. Broderick had more luck in another contest against Crabb, when he
derailed the Tennessean’s attempts to call a new constitutional convention, which, many
assumed, was intended to force a division of the state. The next year, Broderick
triumphed over the proslavery wing of the party when he helped secure the gubernatorial
election of John Bigler over several southern-born rivals.71 With each successive
struggle, the gulf widened between the two factions of the Democratic party.
A breaking point came in 1854 with the national controversy over the KansasNebraska act. Overriding the objections of Broderick and other antislavery moderates,
the Chivs in the statehouse passed a joint resolution approving the Stephen Douglas’s bill
in May of that year. California thus became the only free state aside from Douglas’s
Illinois to endorse the legislation that overturned the Missouri Compromise and permitted
the introduction of slavery into a northern territory.72 Perhaps California’s Chivs saw in
Kansas the first domino in a chain that would push slavery to the Far West. This is
certainly what the slaveholding senator David Rice Atchison had in mind when he wrote,
“If Kansas is abolitionized, Missouri ceases to be a slave State, and New Mexico
becomes a free State; California remains a free State.” But, he continued, “If we secure
Kansas as a slave State, Missouri is secure; New Mexico and Southern California, if not
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all of it, become a slave State.”

73

As Atchison and many across the South and West

recognized, California’s free soil constitution was anything but permanent. Indeed, the
same California legislature that endorsed the Kansas-Nebraska act would continue to give
protection to slaveholders within the state, by passing an extension of the fugitive slave
act with three-to-one support in the senate.74
The issue of slavery became, at times, a fighting matter in California. Before
Bleeding Sumner, there was Bleeding Colby. In April 1854, a proslavery state senator
attacked one of his free soil colleagues with a cane, thereby anticipating by two years
Preston Brooks’s infamous assault on Charles Sumner on the U.S. Senate floor. The
affray took place shortly after the extension of the fugitive slave act within the California
legislature. When one lawmaker pointed out that the state Supreme Court had, in fact,
ruled in favor of the fugitive slave law – a reference to the Perkins decision, no doubt –
Senator Colby of Sacramento responded that such judicial opinions could not prevent him
from entertaining contrary views. The staunchly proslavery Senator Leake of Calaveras
County took issue with the remark, and shortly thereafter “obtained possession of a heavy
cane,” according to a report in the Sacramento Daily Union. Once the senate had
adjourned for the day, Leake advanced upon Colby with the cane and, according to the
same report, “struck him several blows…over the head.” Colby managed to wrestle his
assailant to the ground before several colleagues intervened and ended the melee.
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Apparently Leake’s aim was not as true as Preston Brooks’s would be two years later,
and Colby escaped with several scratches on his head.75
California was again a political bellwether during the elections of September
1854. In the wake of Kansas-Nebraska, rifts among California’s Democrats reflected the
divisions that had been exposed within the party’s national leadership as well. The
Chivalry and Shovelry broke off into rival conventions during the summer of 1854, and
ran on separate tickets and separate platforms in the fall elections. Among other
measures, Gwin’s platform reaffirmed support for the Kansas-Nebraska Act, endorsed
Robert Walker’s Atlantic and Pacific Railroad (what Thomas Jefferson Green called “the
great slavery road”), and nominated for Congress Philemon Herbert of Alabama and
James W. Denver of Virginia.
In spite of rising discomfort over slavery’s expansion and the organization of a
Know-Nothing Party within the state, the proslavery wing of the party overwhelmed their
free-soil opposition in the elections – a result that even surprised some party insiders.
“The returns as they came in astonished every one, but none more than the Whigs &
Broderickites,” one Democratic operative wrote. “It [the Chivalry] has made a clean
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sweep.”

76

Especially promising was the election of two Chivs to U.S. Congress, Herbert

and Denver, who would continue to promote southern interests at the national level.77
The divisions between the two wings of the Democracy would provide an opening
for the newly formed Know Nothing Party the next year, whose candidates upended the
old balance of power by winning the governorship, as well as majorities in the assembly
and state senate.78 Yet this was not a death blow to southern interests in California, since
most Know Nothing leaders, like David Terry of Texas and Henry Foote of Mississippi,
professed strong proslavery views. In fact, Terry even supported the reopening of the
African slave trade. In any case, the Know Nothing insurgency was short-lived.
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Democrats succeeded in blocking Foote’s bid for the open U.S. Senate seat in the 1856
race, and by the winter of that year, political operatives could confidently predict that the
Chivalry would “rout them horse and foal next fall.”79 True to such political forecasts,
the American Party was driven from power in September 1856, and the Chivs regained
their dominant position within the statehouse.80
Although the enduring divisions within the Democratic Party denied Gwin reelection to the U.S. Senate, he continued to exert his political influence during a two-year
lull, before reclaiming his seat by 1857.81 Like Gwin himself, his Chivalry faction
weathered numerous threats to its power, beating back a Know Nothing insurgency and
continuing to check the formidable opposition of Broderick’s Shovelry. Between the
fugitive slave act, the endorsement of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, the election of Chiv
representatives to Congress, and the tireless scheming for a division of the state,
proslavery Californians consistently allied their state with the slave South. Even though
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plans for the full-scale importation of slavery to California had foundered, the enduring
power of Chivalry politics provided a safe haven for southerners in the West and a
safeguard for proslavery interests within Congress.

The Dismal Career of California Republicanism
There was no greater testament to the strength of proslavery politics in California
than the chronic troubles of the state’s early Republican Party. In most other states, the
divisiveness of the Kansas-Nebraska Act opened a wedge for Republican politics and
profoundly weakened Democratic machines after 1854. Not so in California. Aside from
the brief Know Nothing interlude, Democrats swept every election within the state and
dealt the Republican party a string of humiliating defeats, up until 1860. Free soil, free
labor, free men – this rallying cry, by and large, fell on deaf ears in antebellum
California.
By the time California’s Republican party formed in the spring of 1856,
antislavery politicians had already founded chapters in most every other free state of the
union. Slow to organize, the state’s Republican machine was also small in numbers. “No
record, I venture to say, can be found of a political organization starting out with fewer
adherents,” recalled Cornelius Cole, the founding member. Aside from a few personal
friends, including the merchants Collis Huntington, Mark Hopkins, Leland Stanford, and
the Crocker brothers, the entire early membership “could be counted on one’s fingers,”
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Cole added.
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The first state convention in April 1856 in Sacramento attracted delegates

from only thirteen of California’s forty-two counties, with over half the delegates coming
from either San Francisco or Sacramento itself. Unlike their Democratic adversaries,
most of these early adherents to Republicanism were political novices.83
The 1856 presidential campaign of John C. Fremont threw hard light on these
organizational weaknesses. Fremont carried eleven of sixteen free states, with majorities
as large as 78, 64, and 61 percent in parts of the Northeast. Yet in California he captured
barely 19 percent of the vote, his weakest showing in any free state. The Pathfinder, one
might suspect, could have counted on greater support from the state that had made him its
first U.S. senator, and where he had earned early celebrity as the leader of the Bear Flag
rebellion. But controversy over a floating land grant that Fremont held in Mariposa
antagonized voters in California’s mining districts, and Chiv opponents made the most of
his disputed claims. The Mariposa issue, however, only partly explains his electoral rout.
In the state elections of September 1856, after all, the Republican Party fared even worse
than Fremont himself, polling just 18 percent across California.84
As state senator Colby had learned in 1854 and as Republican candidates found
two years later, to speak openly against slavery in antebellum California was to court
danger. Among the southern-born majority of Sonoma County, for instance, “The name
of ‘black Republicans’ stunk in their nostrils worse than that of a horse-thief,” according
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to memorialist John Carr.

While Democrats and Know Nothings ran their party rallies

without incident, the threat of violence loomed over every Republican gathering during
these early years. A mob interrupted the state’s first Republican meeting in April 1856,
hounding the speaker and overturning his platform. Matters hardly improved from there.
Throughout the 1856 campaign, proslavery zealots regularly disrupted meetings, pelted
speakers with rotten food, and even pulled a Republican candidate from his speaking
stand. If a man “was known to have any free-soil sentiments,” Carr recalled, “he was
spotted at the ballot-box, and likewise socially.”86 Such threats took on a particularly dire
aspect with the appearance, in May 1856, of a handbill entitled “TO ARMS!” It called
for the lynching of all Republican leaders, “and as many of the Attaches of said traitors as
may be deemed necessary to restore the public quiet and put a stop to such treasonable
practices.” 87
In their tactics of violent intimidation, these anti-Republican obstructionists bore
some resemblance to the proslavery squatters then operating in Kansas, and likewise
earned the epithet “border ruffians” from California’s beleaguered free soilers. As a
prominent California jurist recalled, these border ruffians ensured that, “to be an
abolitionist or a freesoiler was certain destruction to the aspirations of any person for
political preferment.”88 Antebellum California’s political landscape was a battlefield, and
proslavery forces mustered in superior numbers to sustain their electoral edge.
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While mobs assailed Republican rallies, California’s politicians bolstered their
own credentials through rhetorical assaults on free soilers, abolitionists, and African
Americans, generally. Democrats repeatedly denied the petitions of California’s black
community to lift the ban on their testimony in court.89 In an effort to overturn this ban,
the state’s African American leaders organized the Colored Conventions of 1855, 1856,
and 1857 – giving California more meetings of this sort than any state other than Ohio –
yet they could make little headway against the prevailing anti-black sentiment within the
legislature.90 These were the same lawmakers, after all, who regularly derided
Republicans as “nigger worshippers,” “Black Republicans,” “fanatics,” “abolitionists,”
“wooly heads,” “negrophilists,” and “white niggers.” Benjamin Franklin Washington of
Virginia – the chairman of the Democratic Central Committee, who would run the
leading Democratic paper during the Reconstruction era (Chapter 6) – accused
Republicans of attempting to transform black into white.91 Meanwhile, southern
California’s preeminent orator, E.J.C. Kewen, blasted Republicans for forming “a party
‘conceived in sin, and brought forth in iniquity’,” who had unfurled “their black, piratical
ensign” in defense of “traitorous principles.”92 California’s Democrats were particularly
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outraged at the election of N.P. Banks as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives –
an indication how popular free soil politics had become outside of the South and Far
West – and they made opposition to his appointment a central point in their antiRepublican crusade.93
Against this avalanche of derision, violence, and electoral defeat, California’s
Republicans quickly moderated their official positions. To counter the frequent claims –
albeit almost entirely false – that they harbored racially egalitarian views, California
Republicans did all in their power to distance themselves from the stigma of abolitionism.
While the state party platform in 1856 had opposed the expansion of slavery into the
territories, Republicans thereafter abandoned this plank in favor of popular sovereignty.
Meanwhile, the few Republicans within the statehouse proved to be far from progressive
on racial issues. For instance, they voted for a Chinese exclusion bill, for a homestead
law which denied homesteading rights to blacks and Chinese, and for a bill to declare null
and void all marriages between whites and “negroes, mullatoes or Mongolians.” This
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was not the racially enlightened Republican Party of Eric Foner’s Free Soil, Free Labor,
Free Men.94
In the 1857 state election, the machine’s leaders took a step that was probably
unique in the history of the Republican party: they nominated a slaveholder for governor.
Although he had voted for the admission of California as a free state while representing
North Carolina in Congress in 1850, Edward Stanly still owned one bondsperson in his
native state at the time of his gubernatorial nomination seven years later. During the
campaign, Stanly endeavored to show “that the Republican party was not an Abolition
party,” in his own words. To that end, he cited his past congressional record,
highlighting his opposition to both the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia
and the Wilmot Proviso. “A declaration by Congress that the South should never have
any more slave States, I could not support,” Stanley reassured a Sacramento audience
during his campaign. When it came to slavery, there was “only… one evil,” and that was
the “degradation of labor.”95 At the polls, Stanly and the recalibrated platform on which
he ran performed slightly better than had Republican candidates the previous year,
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capturing 22.5 percent of the vote.

Yet their prospects remained bleak. Republicans

were still, by and large, political outcasts in California.
That same year, however, Republicans scored a victory by proxy in the election of
the antislavery Democrat David Broderick to the U.S. Senate. Since 1852, Broderick had
been vying for the seat, but his ambitions were consistently checked by Gwin’s
proslavery faction, until finally the New Yorker mustered the necessary support in the
1857 contest.97 More promising still, Broderick’s politicking had seemingly secured
California’s share of the federal patronage for the Shovelry. In what some called “the
corrupt bargain,” Broderick threw his support behind his nemesis, sealing Gwin’s
election for the second senate seat, and in return, Gwin agreed to hand over the federal
patronage to Broderick’s discretion. Although the two future senators tried to conceal
their arrangement, it soon became known that Gwin had signed and sealed a document to
this end – what became known as the “scarlet letter.” Soon, both Chivarly and Shovelry
leaders were embroiled in scandal.98 But no amount of scandal could fully sour
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Broderick’s hard-won victory. At long last, it looked as if there might be a chance for
California’s moderate antislavery forces to exert control at the national level.

The Chivalry at High Tide
Broderick would not have long to savor his victory. If he had expected support
from President Buchanan – whose campaign he backed in 1856 – he was to be sorely
disappointed. The president’s administration was staffed with southerners as well as
northerners with proslavery sympathies, like Buchanan himself. Thus Broderick won
himself few friends with his opposition to the recent Dred Scott decision, which
Buchanan’s official organ, the Washington Union had endorsed. And while Gwin
initially remained aloof from the internecine struggles of Washington, the two
Representatives from California, Charles L. Scott and Joseph McKibbin quickly joined
forces against Broderick.99 The deck was thus stacked against him, as Broderick quickly
realized. When he finally secured a meeting with Buchanan, the president was notably
cold. And when he pushed to have his friend John Bigler installed as collector of ports of
San Francisco – one of the richest plums in the state – Buchanan instead handed the
position to the Chiv favorite and proslavery ultra, Benjamin Franklin Washington.
“Broderick is defeated, & is now in open hostility” to the Buchanan administration,
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gloated Charles Scott in April 1857.

Gwin exulted as the humiliated Broderick rushed

back to California “in a great rage” after less than a month in Washington, in a desperate
attempt to secure the gubernatorial election of an antislavery ally.101 But he was again
checkmated by the Chivalry, who succeeded in electing the doughface Weller.102 By
outmaneuvering Broderick, California’s leading politicians would continue to enrich
office-seeking southerners in the West and to endorse proslavery legislation at the
national level.
Observers from the slave states were especially relieved by the humbling of
Broderick. The sectional struggles of California’s Democrats had become well known to
those outside the state, and slaveholding leaders like Jefferson Davis took a particularly
lively interest in western politics. As one of the keenest continental expansionists, Davis
recognized that the political fortunes of the Far West were closely linked with those of
the slave South – one of the reasons he battled so diligently for a far southern
transcontinental railroad. By 1853, if not earlier, Davis had been warned of the
“miserable New York tacticians” in California and the Broderick faction who “are at
heart against the South, against state rights, and favor all schemes of speculation, by
legislation or otherwise,” in the words of Mississippi emigrant, Lewis Sanders. Yet he
could take heart from the fact that Democrats would be denied office in California if they
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did not demonstrate sufficient opposition to “free soil and abolition tendencies.”

103

Watching these political developments in the West, Davis concluded that, “the country on
the Pacific is in many respects adapted to slave labor, and many of the citizens desire its
introduction.” If only the South could secure a favorable railroad route, he continued,
slavery could expand westward and “future acquisitions to the South would insure to our
benefit.” The result, he concluded, would be greater Congressional power for
slaveholding interests.104
The relationship between proslavery forces in the South and West, as Davis’s
correspondence illustrates, was symbiotic. While Davis coveted California’s support in
order to bolster southern influence within Congress, Californians in turn looked to leaders
like Davis to ensure that the state’s antislavery forces would not gain the upper hand in
Washington. Davis’s efforts on behalf of proslavery Californians became indispensable
upon the election of Broderick to the U.S. Senate. As one western correspondent wrote,
“Southern men here begin to look to you as their champion in the future Congresses to
stave off the stealing land and other bills that will be introduced by Broderick, an
uneducated low brute as he is.” Citing the bargain between Gwin and Broderick, he
predicted the state’s offices “will be filled with shoulder strikers & black republicans,
Spare us this.” He continued, “You have many personal friends as well as admirers in
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this state, and every man friendly to the South & her institutions here, do not wish traitor
politicians to ride over this community.”105 As such correspondents recognized,
California was not an island unto itself. Southerners belonged to a transcontinental
community with shared political agendas. And they advanced those objectives by
checking Broderick’s ambitions in Washington.
Over the coming years, slavery’s allies in the West kept up the fight. In
September 1857 Kansas’s territorial legislature, dominated by slaveholders, met in
Lecompton to draft a constitution in order to formally legalize bondage and to override
the proposed free soil Topeka Constitution of 1855. The territory’s free-state majority
boycotted the ensuing vote for ratification, and even Robert J. Walker, the solidly
proslavery territorial governor (and spearhead for the “great slavery road”), resigned his
office rather than implement a constitution that clearly lacked popular support.
Nevertheless, Buchanan gave Lecompton his executive endorsement, thereby igniting an
intra-party struggle along sectional lines – pitting the president and southern Democrats
against Stephen Douglas and many of fellow northern Democrats. That rift was
replicated within California’s congressional leadership, with Gwin and Scott supporting
Lecompton and Broderick and McKibbin opposing it.106 As Buchanan’s support waned
and the Democratic Party unraveled, one might have expected California’s proslavery
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partisans to moderate their position. Instead, they redoubled their efforts and brought the
Far West even deeper into the slave South’s political fold.
Indeed, while the Lecompton controversy invigorated antislavery politics
throughout much of the country, it seemed to have the opposite effect in California. The
state legislature lost little time in endorsing the proslavery constitution for Kansas, while
the Chivalry press gained fresh fodder in its campaign against free soilers, blasting
opponents of the Buchanan administration as “freedom shriekers,” “abolitionists,” and
“Black Republicans.”107 Meanwhile, Gwin, as chair of the Senate Caucus Committee,
punished the Democratic mutiny by booting Broderick from the Committee on Public
Lands and removing Douglas from his chair on the Committee on Territories. Gwin
would later justify his action by citing Douglas’s position on popular sovereignty.
Douglas was not fit for the office because he believed, in Gwin’s words, that “a
Territorial Legislature could lawfully by non-action or hostile legislation exclude slavery
from such Territory.” Gwin, on the other hand, argued that slaveholding rights in the
territories were inviolable, regardless of what local voters may decide.108 California’s
preeminent politician made his position clear: slavery was truly national, and western
leaders would work to keep it that way.
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They did so in a particularly brazen fashion within California’s Supreme Court in
February 1858. Several months earlier, a Mississippi slaveholder, Charles Stovall had
moved to Sacramento with his bondsman, Archy Lee. Once on California’s free soil, Lee
escaped, only to be recaptured by Stovall and dragged before two separate courts in order
to defend his right of ownership. When both courts ruled against Stovall, he took his case
to the state Supreme Court, which – to the shock and outrage of California’s antislavery
population – overturned the previous rulings and remanded Lee to slavery. That the
state’s fugitive slave code had lapsed roughly three years earlier mattered little to justices
Peter Burnett and David S. Terry, both southern by birth and advocates for slaveholding
rights in the West. In what historian Rudolph Lapp calls a “judicial absurdity,” the
justices ruled that Stovall’s poor health and unfamiliarity with California law merited an
exception to the state’s free soil constitution and granted him permission to return to
Mississippi with his slave property.
Galvanized by the clear miscarriage of justice, a group of abolitionists intercepted
Stovall before he could return to Mississippi and secured a final hearing for Lee before a
federal court, the U.S. District in San Francisco. There, Lee finally won his freedom.
But the efforts of California’s African Americans exacted a heavy toll. The legal fees
took so much money from the black community that their newspaper, the Mirror of the
Times, folded.109 And shortly after the final verdict, California’s pro-Lecompton faction
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proposed a new fugitive slave law and a bill to ban black immigration into the state,
which passed the assembly before failing in the senate.110 Whether or not Senator James
Henry Hammond of South Carolina had been apprised of these developments is
uncertain. But when he looked to the western states and territories in March 1858, he
could assure his southern brethren that “there is no antagonism between the South and
[California and Oregon], and never will be.”111
Unable to express their grievances at the polls, California’s African Americans
instead voted with their feet. In April 1858 over 200 blacks, including Archy Lee
himself, left California for Victoria, British Columbia. “Many of the collored [sic]
people of California will select their future houses in the British possessions,” Billington
Crum Whiting, a lawyer and former state senator wrote. “They are pleased with the idea
of being allowed to vote, to testify in courts & to sit on juries.”112 An estimated 400 to
800 African Americans from California settled in Victoria before the war, amounting to
one of the largest movements of free blacks prior to the Great Migration of the early
twentieth century. The discovery of gold in British Columbia proved especially enticing
to prospective migrants, as did the possibility of escape from the discriminatory political
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and legal culture of California.

“Other parts of the world are unpolluted by the

pestilential presence of the negro-hater,” reported Frederick Douglass’ Paper, in an
article that urged California’s blacks to seek the mineral riches and enlightened policies
of British Canada. “Here can the black American go as a man.”114
Stacey Smith refers to the Supreme Court decision in the Archy Lee case as “the
dying gasp of slaveholder rights in California.”115 But there was still plenty of life left in
the Chivalry. Philip Roach, a leader in the proslavery faction of California’s Democratic
Party, made this much clear in his 1859 correspondence with Jefferson Davis.116 In a
June letter, Roach enclosed the Chiv party platform as well as a list of candidates for
twelve of the top offices, noting that “we have many fire-eating men as you will note by
their places of nativity.” Indeed, the entire slate of candidates – with the exception of a
single Pennsylvania doughface – was either southern-born or had come to California after
prolonged residence in the South.117 Much like some of Davis’s other western
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correspondents, Roach wrote as if California constituted part of the Mississippi senator’s
constituency. He praised Davis for past efforts and urged him to continue his advocacy
for both a Pacific railroad and the Butterfield overland mail road. “When this question
arises in Congress [of increased funding for the overland road],” Roach wrote, “I hope
that you will merit our gratitude by its earnest advocacy.”118 In turn, he assured Davis
that he would do his utmost to prevent a particular rival from securing a congressional
nomination.119 Thus, as the sectional controversy intensified, the West’s Chivs and the
South’s political leaders continued to operate in tandem.
Per Roach’s predictions, proslavery loyalists carried the state in the 1859
elections. In the three-way gubernatorial race, the Chiv candidate, Milton S. Latham,
won in a landslide, capturing nearly 62 percent of the vote. Leland Stanford, the
Republican candidate, captured less than 10 percent – the most dismal showing from his
party in a decade punctuated by electoral disappointment. Republicans even lost their
former stronghold of San Francisco to Lecompton Democrats. Furthermore, in the race
for the state’s two U.S. House seats, California voters elected a pair of fire-eating
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Democrats, Charles L. Scott of Virginia and John C. Burch of Missouri. It would seem
that Californians’ anxieties over abolitionism trumped their anxieties over slaveholding
expansion, in an election that can be seen as a referendum on the Lecompton Constitution
and the status of slavery in the territories. Aside from these electoral victories, proslavery
Democrats also succeeded in filling California’s federal positions with southern-born
men. Virginians now served as the collector of the port of San Francisco and as navy
agent; Missourians held the San Francisco surveyorship as well as the superintendency of
the mint; two Georgians ran the state’s Indian agency; and a Texan headed the office of
appraiser general. The only non-southerner in a major federal post was James W.
Mandeville, a longtime Gwin ally from New York.120
California’s antislavery forces suffered their gravest loss that fall, not at the polls,
but on a remote field near Lake Merced. Aside from the Hamilton-Burr affair, no duel in
American history had such far-reaching political consequences as the one between David
Broderick and David Terry in September 1859. Broderick had a legion of political
adversaries, but few as hot-blooded or as deadly as Terry. The son of a Mississippi
planter, Terry spent his formative years in Texas, before migrating to California with a
company of fellow southerners and five slaves. As Stephen J. Field recalled, “Mr. Terry
had the virtues and prejudices of men of the extreme South in those days,” and he aired
those prejudices freely, whether on the bench of California’s supreme court or in public
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diatribes.
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It was one such diatribe that ignited the feud with Broderick, who was

almost equally quick to anger.122 Their first attempt at a duel on September 12, 1859,
ended in their arrest, though they were soon released and reconvened, along with their
seconds and a crowd of 73 spectators, the following day.123 There, Broderick’s hairtrigger pistol prematurely discharged, leaving the skilled marksman Terry with a clean
shot. He sighted along the barrel, took aim, and delivered the mortal blow.124 Broderick
expired three days later, the last U.S. senator to be killed until Bobby Kennedy in 1968.125
Broderick’s body was still warm when antislavery Californians began to cry foul.
Chiv opponents claimed that Broderick’s gun was designed to misfire, while Terry had
practiced extensively with hair-trigger pistols. Quite simply, “the duel was unfair,”
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according to California jurist Annis Merrill.

126

But the conspiracy ran deeper than that,

according to others. Indeed, they claimed that Broderick’s death was part of a
premeditated plan to remove from office the most powerful threat to a Chivalry political
monopoly. “It became apparent before the election that a settled & fixed determination
had been agreed upon by the southern chivalry to kill of [sic] Broderick & thereby create
a vacancy in the senate to be filled by one of their own kind,” Billington Whiting wrote to
his wife. Broderick had thus become merely “another victim to gratify the sectional
malice of southern politicians.” 127 Southerners had, after all, been conspiring to advance
their proslavery interests in the West since before statehood, and there was little reason to
believe they had significantly modified their strategies. True to form, the Chivalry lost
little time in filling Broderick’s seat with Henry P. Haun, a moderately proslavery
Democrat from Kentucky.128
California’s antislavery leaders now wielded a cudgel with which to bludgeon the
dominant Chivalry faction. Although Broderick had remained a Democrat to his dying
day, beleaguered Republicans were particularly eager to claim the mantle of the West’s
antislavery martyr. Edward Baker, the Republican leader and Archy Lee’s defense
attorney, delivered the eulogy at Broderick’s funeral – “the largest and most imposing
that had been seen up to that time in San Francisco,” according to one observer.129 Baker
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reinforced rumors of a Chiv conspiracy by quoting Broderick’s supposed last words:
‘They have killed me because I was opposed to the extension of slavery and a corrupt
Administration.’” In eulogizing Broderick, Baker clearly hoped to bury Gwin. He thus
harped on proslavery malfeasance. “Never in the history of political warfare has any man
been so pursued,” Baker claimed. “It has been a system tending to one end, and the end
is here.” The result, he lamented, was a state without direction, caught in the grasp of a
merciless slave power. His eulogy ended on a note of despair: “Who now can speak for
California?”130

Conclusion
The answer was not at all heartening. True, charges of conspiracy had struck a
chord with California’s voters and badly damaged the reputation of the Chivalry
machine. But with a congressional delegation monopolized by slaveholding interests and
a statehouse controlled by Lecompton Democrats, California had probably never seemed
further from its free soil origins than it did during the fall of 1859.131 From the
perspective of California’s ailing antislavery faction, there was no clear end in sight to
the long reign of southerners in state politics. Lecompton Democrats shrugged off the
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moral outrage that followed in the wake of Broderick’s death. “It is astonishing how
virtuous men become after they are dead,” the southern-born bookseller Jefferson
Martenet wrote from San Francisco. “Obituary addresses are lies, barefaced lies.”132
Meanwhile the abolitionist press looked to political developments in the Far West with
increasing disquiet. Reporting on the fallout from Broderick’s death – which had created
“a sensation in the Federal metropolis” – the Washington correspondent to the National
Anti-Slavery Standard painted a particularly gloomy picture. “California is perhaps the
most hopeless State in the Union,” he wrote. “She is overrun by Southern lawyers and
bankrupt slaveholders. It will take twenty years to give California an anti-slavery
sentiment.”133
Furthermore, the state’s proslavery partisans were a particularly resilient lot.
Southerners did not fold their tents after the passage of a free-soil constitution in 1849,
nor did they surrender their political claims when slaveholders like Thomas Jefferson
Green had been driven from the gold fields. Instead, they consolidated their power in a
well-oiled political machine that exercised a virtual monopoly on federal patronage in
order to preserve the plums of the state for southern-born loyalists. Meanwhile, through
the statehouse and the courtrooms, they crafted laws that gave enormous protection to
slaveholders and imperiled the liberties of the state’s black population. And finally, they
tapped deep-rooted currents of anti-black racism in the West to marginalize a Republican
Party that had otherwise been surging across the free states of the Union. With such a
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deeply entrenched proslavery elite, the state’s free soil constitution was never secure,
whether from conspirators like James Gadsden or advocates of state division like Henry
Crabb. California never became a slave state, but it certainly voted like one through
much of the antebellum period.
Westering slaveholders did not confine themselves to the Pacific Coast, however.
While California’s antebellum political history has attracted close scholarly inquiry for
decades, if not longer, students of the subject have largely overlooked a corollary
narrative: the emergence of a small but committed proslavery community directly to the
east. During the 1850s, New Mexico, Arizona, and even Utah welcomed southern
emigrants, who, in turn, brought the Desert West into the political orbit of the slave
South. In many ways, this history serves as something of a postscript to the great slavery
road. Although slaveholders failed to construct a Pacific railway, their ancillary
achievements – the Gadsden Purchase the overland mail road, most significantly – helped
ease the way for southern emigration across the region and thereby created a foothold for
proslavery interests in these territories. California constituted merely the far western rim
of a proslavery corridor that stretched across the continent.
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Chapter 4

SLAVERY’S SUNBELT AND THE SECTIONAL CRISIS
IN THE FAR SOUTHWEST, 1850-1861

Snatching odd moments during sentinel duty at Fort Fauntleroy in New Mexico,
William Need penned an urgent message to Secretary of War Simon Cameron in
September 1861. Thousands of miles from the killing fields of Manassas, Virginia,
where the Union army had gone down in defeat several months earlier, an equally
ominous development was unfolding along the borderlands of the American Southwest.
“The Texas rebels and Arizona cut-throats, like the ancient Goths and Vandals, are at the
very gates,” threatening the entire western half of the continent, Need warned. That
threat was especially dire, he added, as the territory lacked both the means and the will to
beat back the rebel invaders. Indeed, New Mexico had been in the hands of proslavery
military and political forces for years, and now, with Confederate secession, a
longstanding southern plot to capture the Southwest seemed nearly inevitable. To
ascertain the nature of rebel ambitions in the Southwest, Need wrote, Cameron should
look no further than the Confederate chief himself. For more than a decade, Jefferson
Davis had coveted the region, especially Arizona, “his beau ideal of a railroad route to
the Pacific.” The region, Need continued, “was to him the terra incognita of a grand
scheme of intercommunication and territorial expansion more vast and complicated than
was ever dreamed of by Napoleon Bonaparte in his palmiest days of pride and power.”1
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Need’s fears were justifiable. And his assessment of Jefferson Davis’s western
ambitions was hardly exaggerated. Southern leaders had indeed expended considerable
political capital in an attempt to spread their influence over the Southwest, and many of
their efforts had been crowned with success. Southerners leveraged their power to help
pass a slave code in Utah in 1852 and an even more far-reaching proslavery statute in
New Mexico in 1859; they bested northern Congressional opposition to construct an
overland mail route through slave country and into California; and they backed two
nearly successful territorial movements in southern California and southern New Mexico.
In reconstructing these proslavery operations, this chapter argues that the sectional
conflict reached into a region traditionally ignored by political historians of the
antebellum period. Proslavery leaders transformed the Southwest into a sectional
battleground and, by the outbreak of the Civil War, achieved a subtle political conquest
of the region.
As previously noted, scholarship on slaveholding imperialism has focused
inordinate attention on a small group of dramatic actors and episodes – border ruffians in
Bleeding Kansas, filibusters and diplomats in Cuba, and William Walker’s armies in
Nicaragua. But these ventures distract from a more prolonged and ultimately more
successful campaign to extend a proslavery political order across the Far West. Although
a handful of historians have studied the slave controversy in isolated western territories,
by stepping back and examining the cumulative effect of proslavery politics across the
entire region, a slave power comes into focus that was both more nimble and more
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expansive than scholars have recognized. Indeed, by the late 1850s, southerners created
what we could call a proslavery Sunbelt, a transcontinental sphere of influence stretching
from the coastal Carolinas in one direction to southern California in the other. It was a
region, as Need recognized, beholden to a numerically weak but politically powerful
faction of southerners. And a region that would pose serious problems for Unionists on
the eve of the Civil War.
What has become known as the Sunbelt – a region sweeping from the
southeastern United States to California – is the subject of a sophisticated and growing
body of scholarship. Although historians have backdated the beginnings of this Sunbelt,
it remains, by virtually all accounts, a twentieth-century development.3 This chapter
adopts the spatial framework of the Sunbelt to present a new way of thinking about
nineteenth-century American regionalism. To be sure, many of the factors that
distinguish today’s Sunbelt – military spending, conservative politics, Christian faith, and
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metropolitan development – were not yet in evidence during the mid-nineteenth century.4
But thinking anachronistically about the Sunbelt does indeed have its conceptual payoffs.
Most crucially, by moving a twentieth-century framework into an antebellum setting, we
combat the inclination to view the Far West as a land apart.5 Great distances may have
separated, say, miners in Arizona from planters in Mississippi, but they often saw
themselves in common cause, committed to the political ideology of slavery and a shared
legislative agenda. Slaveholders looked to New Mexico, Arizona and California as a
natural extension of the South, and they built a broad political coalition across this
southern corridor of the continent. If, as the Sunbelt paradigm premises, there is a strong
political affinity that links the present-day South and Southwest, scholars would be wise
to trace the origins of that association to the antebellum period. That regional identity
long predated air conditioning, the presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater, or the
spread of Christian evangelicalism. It took root in the 1850s, when the slave South
moved into the Far West.

Slavery Among the Saints
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Against a rising tide of abolitionism, slaveholders began articulating a new
conception of their peculiar institution by the mid-1830s, emphasizing the harmonious
bond between master and slave and the divine nature of that relationship. No longer was
slavery a necessary evil, as Thomas Jefferson and others argued; it was now, in the words
of John C. Calhoun, a “positive good.”6 Southern religious leaders took a particularly
active role in this proslavery campaign, countering the religiously inspired attacks of
northern abolitionists by pointing to the scriptural justifications for human bondage. By
the early 1840s, the Virginian Baptist minister Thornton Stringfellow had emerged as
perhaps the most persuasive polemicist of this new creed. As God had blessed the
patriarchs of the Old Testament with slaves and his divine favor, Stringfellow wrote in
1841, “it would seem that the institution was one furnishing great opportunities to
exercise grace and glorify God, as it still does, where its duties are faithfully
discharged.”7 The African race was divinely destined for slavery by the curse of Canaan,
Stringfellow argued, which condemned Canaan and his supposedly dark-skinned
offspring to perpetual servitude as punishment for the sins of his father, Ham.8 Slavery
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was, above all, a merciful institution, Stringfellow continued, a boon to both master and
slave alike, and a source of protection and security for a race unprepared for
independence.9 Such arguments were central to the southern evangelical revival of this
period, a revival, as Stephanie McCurry has argued, that strengthened domestic
dependencies, endowing masters with a theological justification for their absolute
authority over wives, children and slaves.10
This religious defense of slavery found adherents in what may seem an unlikely
place: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, founded in 1830 by Joseph Smith
in western New York. Indeed, Smith and other Mormon writers articulated these
proslavery religious arguments several years before Strinfgellow’s major essay on the
subject. Like southern writers during this period, Mormons stressed the scriptural
justification for slavery. “The fact is uncontrovertable [sic],” Smith wrote in 1836, “that
the first mention we have of slavery is found in the holy bible, pronounced by a man who
was perfect in his generation and walked with God.” Similarly, Smith cited the curse of
Canaan, arguing that what God had fixed, abolitionists had no right to undo.11 Other
Mormons followed their prophet’s lead. They stressed the protection that slavery
provided to bondspeople and again referenced Biblical justifications, particularly the
curse of Canaan. According to one such writer, abolition would unleash “a reckless mass
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of human beings, uncultivated, untaught and unaccustomed to provide for themselves the
necessaries of life – endangering the chastity of every female who might by chance be
found in our streets.”12 Stringfellow could not have said it better himself.
This early Mormon commitment to proslavery polemics was no doubt conditioned
by the need for fresh recruits to the faith. At the time of these writings, Smith and the
majority of the Saints lived in Missouri, and thus had to tow the proslavery line in order
to avoid alienating the local population. After being expelled from that state, however,
Smith’s views shifted radically. During his 1844 presidential bid, he publically attacked
the institution of slavery and called for the compensated emancipation of all slaves by the
year 1850.13 This was as close as any prominent Saint would come to preaching abolition
for the next twenty years, however. After Smith’s assassination and the Mormon exodus
to Utah, church leaders would return to the earlier arguments in defense of slavery.
Although slaveholding would never become economically central to Mormon Utah, the
Saints ensured that it would at least be politically and theologically viable.
When, in 1847, roughly 150 of the faithful followed Brigham Young across the
continent into what would become Utah, they brought with them a handful of slaves.
Still standing in central Salt Lake City, the Brigham Young monument, which records the
names of Utah’s first white inhabitants, also bears testimony to the presence of three of
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these enslaved pioneers, Green Flake, Hark Lay and Oscar Crosby.

Due to shaky

census data in such a far-flung territory, the exact number of slaves in early Utah is
difficult to ascertain. The census of 1850 lists twenty-six slaves and twenty-four black
freedpeople, although the actual numbers may well be higher, according to some
historians.15 By one early pioneer’s count, thirty-four black slaves accompanied the
Mississippi Company as it traveled west to Utah during this period.16 The antislavery
press back east took note of these forced migrations of enslaved people, with the New
York Evening Post predicting in 1851 that Utah is “just as likely to be a slave as a free
State.”17 In Utah itself, the official Latter-Day Church establishment did little to refute its
associations with slavery. “The laws of the land recognize slavery,” church leader Orson
Hyde wrote in 1851. “If there is a sin in selling a slave, let the individual who sells him
bear that sin, and not the church.” Anyway, he added, “All the slaves that are there appear
to be perfectly contented and satisfied.”18
Testimony from former slaves themselves tells a different story, however. Along
with a party of several other enslaved people, Alex Bankhead was forcibly transported to
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Utah from Alabama in 1847. In the late 1890s, Bankhead provided his reminiscences of
slavery among the Saints for Salt Lake City’s black newspaper, the Broad Ax. He
recalled a small community of fellow slaves who would congregate in a large room on
State Street to “discuss their condition.” Together they would “gaze in wonderment at
the lofty mountains, which reared their snowy peaks heavenward, and completely forbade
them from ascertaining how they could make their escape back to the South, or to more
congenial climes.” Their condition in Utah “was far from being happy,” according to
Bankhead, and “many of them were subjected to the same treatment that was accorded
the plantation negroes of the South.”19 Although slaves could and did join the Mormon
church, they were admitted in subordinate positions.20 And church membership did not
necessarily guarantee better treatment. Utah may have represented the promised land for
certain Mormon leaders, but it was nothing of the sort for their enslaved laborers.
Brigham Young himself held an ambiguous position on slavery, but one largely
consistent with earlier Mormon defenses of the institution. In his governor’s message of
January 1852, he addressed both Indian and African slavery at length. “[W]hile servitude
may and should exist, and that too upon those who are naturally designed to occupy the
position of ‘servant of servants,’ [i.e. Africans, the descendants of Ham],” Young
proclaimed, “yet we should not fall into the other extreme, and make them as beasts of
the field.” He called for the humane treatment of those relegated to “servitude,” which,
he believed, may eventually ameliorate the condition of “the poor, forlorn, destitute,
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ignorant savage, or African, as the case may be.”

21

Here, Young took a position not

inconsistent with the proslavery paternalism of the South, which held that bondage would
prove a blessing to the bondspeople themselves. When Horace Greeley questioned Young
on these views several years later, the Mormon leader was even more explicit. Slavery,
according to Young, was a “divine institution, and not to be abolished until the curse
pronounced on Ham shall have been removed from his descendants.” Nevertheless,
Young did not believe that chattel slavery could flourish in Utah, and that ultimately it
would come into the Union as a free state.22
At Governor Young’s request, the Mormon legislature legalized slavery in
February 1852. The act passed the same year that the church establishment took its
official stand on plural marriage, thereby linking slavery and polygamy, what
Republicans would later call the “twin relics of barbarism.” Compared to southern slave
codes, Utah’s “Act in Relation to Service” provided more protections for the enslaved
themselves. For instance, if a slaveholder was proven guilty of “cruelty or abuse, or
neglect to feed, clothe, or shelter his servants in a proper manner” the so-called “contract”
between master and slave could be rendered null and void. Masters were also obligated
to send their slaves to school for “not less than eighteen months, between the ages of six,
and twenty years.” And slaveholders were also subject to fines or imprisonment if they
transported slaves out of the territory against their will.23 What constituted the will of the
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enslaved, however, was far from clear. Despite these various protections, much of Utah’s
proslavery statute would have been familiar to southern migrants. As was the case in
most southern states, those guilty of intercourse with either free or enslaved blacks were
subject to heavy fines – between $500 and $1000 in Utah.24 Furthermore, the act gave
Utah’s white inhabitants full license to both buy and sell slaves. Budgets and bills of sale
bear testimony to a limited slave trade within the territory and indicate that slaves
continued to fetch high prices – as much as $800 to $1000 – throughout the decade.25
Although “An Act in Relation to Service” applied certain brakes on the inherent cruelty
of the institution, Utah’s slaveholders, because of their social position and the lack of
surveillance in a frontier community, still possessed immense power over the lives of the
enslaved.
“An Act in Relation to Service” – the first legislative enactment to formally
protect slavery in a far western territory – cannot be explained by economic factors. At
that time, the territory harbored only twelve slaveholders and perhaps as few as sixty to
seventy slaves. Simply put, human bondage was not a driving force in Utah’s economic
development. However, those twelve slaveholders hailed from Utah’s elite circles – a
member of the Council of Twelve Apostles, the first mayor of Salt Lake City, and Utah’s
territorial representative in Congress.26 Thus, this proslavery statute can be seen as both a
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concession to an elite minority of slaveholders within the territory and as an incentive to
aspiring migrants from southern states. With the act, the Mormon legislature broadcast
its receptiveness to the South’s peculiar institution and its commitment to protecting
property in other humans. Utah, as Young himself recognized, was not destined to
become a plantation society, but its political allegiances nevertheless betrayed a strong
southern bias.
In defending slavery, the issue foremost in the minds of Mormon leaders was not
southern immigration, however. Rather, the most pressing concern was the maintenance
of another peculiar institution: polygamy.27 Utah’s leaders looked to the South as a
natural ally when polygamy came under attack in the early 1850s, and southern
slaveholders and Mormon Saints alike spoke out against federal incursions into their
social systems. The Millennial Star explicitly linked the proslavery and pro-polygamy
defense as early as 1853. “The State laws of the North have nothing to do with the
domestic relations of the South,” the Star argued. “So it is in regard to Utah; she asks not
the interference of any state of this Union to dictate to her what kind of policy she must
adopt in her legislative enactments.”28
The Deseret News, a Mormon mouthpiece, took an especially hard line against the
North regarding the slavery controversy, cheering both the Kansas Nebraska Act and the
Dred Scott decision.29 “African slavery in South Carolina is a legalized domestic
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institution, and was and is at least permitted so to be by the federal compact to which
Massachusetts was a party,” the Deseret News argued in 1857, “while white slavery,
adultery, whoredom and other gross abominations… are nevertheless extensively
practiced and securely domesticated [in Massachusetts].”30 In response to the Republican
attack on the “twin relics of barbarism,” the Latter-Day Church establishment urged
support for the Democratic Party with a strident proclamation: “The Democratic party is
the instrument, in God’s hand, by which is to be effected our recognition as a sovereign
State, with the domestic institutions of Slavery and Polygamy, as established by the
patriarchs, and prophets of old.”31 As the Latter Day elite and the Mormon press made
clear, Utah’s affinity for the slave South ran deep – indeed much deeper than scholars
have recognized.32
Ultimately, slaveholding leaders never mustered the support for Utah and plural
marriage that the Saints had hoped they would, although some southerners certainly felt
drawn to the anti-government position of polygamists. “As a Southern man, my
sympathies are with the Mormons,” one slavery apologist wrote to the Richmond South
in 1857. “The same measure that is dealt out to them for their polygamy, would be dealt
out to us for our slaveholding.”33 Other proslavery partisans, however, proved less
sympathetic. To the chagrin of Mormon leaders, Democrats in Congress opposed Utah’s
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bids for statehood, while the proslavery President James Buchanan launched a federal
invasion force in the short-lived Utah War of 1857-1858.34
Nevertheless, Mormon leaders would never fully relinquish their proslavery
leanings. The Deseret News went so far as to defend the international slave trade in a
June 1859 editorial. The paper made its case by first reiterating the standard theological
defense of the institution: “Slavery is not ‘forbidden by Divine Law’ – on the contrary,
most liberal provisions have been made, by that law, regulating, sustaining, perpetuating
the ‘institution’ even from the day it was said: ‘Cursed by Canaan; a servant of servants
shall he be unto his brethren.’”35 That individual slaves were occasionally subject to
inhumane treatment “furnishes no just grounds for reprobating the system,” the News
continued. Rather, by de-criminalizing the international slave trade, Congress would
present an olive branch to the South and thereby mitigate the dangers of sectional strife.
Not only could political disaster be averted, but the enslaved themselves might, in fact,
benefit from such a trade, the News continued. “[I]s it not evident that, when brought to
this country and placed under the careful supervision of the humane southern planter, the
condition of the native African will be at least in some degree improved?”36 From the
political mouthpiece of a frontier territory, populated mostly by northern white families,
came many of the hallmarks of the classic proslavery defense: biblical justifications for
human bondage, insistence that antislavery forces would have to give ground to appease
the South, and paternalistic assurance that enslavement would ameliorate the condition of
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Africans. Even in the absence of a plantation economy, Mormon Utah had nevertheless
embraced much of the proslavery creed. Slavery would remain legal in Utah until
Congress abolished the institution in the territories in June 1862.

The Politics of Slavery in New Mexico
When New Mexico became a U.S. territory in 1850, it was neither slave nor free.
While Congress had admitted California to the Union as a free state at that time, the
newly formed territories of New Mexico and Utah were left to decide for themselves
whether to permit slavery within their borders. Those hoping New Mexico would act as
speedily as Utah in drafting a proslavery statute could expect little aid from the large
majority of Mexican-born residents, who evinced only a marginal interest in sectional
politics.37 And while southern military and political officials had carried a small handful
of black slaves into the territory, New Mexico showed little promise as a plantation
society.38 Yet from the outset, New Mexico harbored a prominent proslavery element,
determined to bring the new territory into the slave South’s political orbit. Over the
coming decade, this southern contingent would grow ever more powerful, charting an
increasingly proslavery course for New Mexican politics.
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Commerce was a powerful adhesive agent in bringing together the Desert West
and the slave states of the South. The main commercial artery through the territory, the
Santa Fe Trail, connected New Mexico’s capital with Independence, Missouri. According
to Thomas Butler King, trade between Missouri and New Mexico was worth $5 million, a
compelling reason, he argued, to accelerate this commerce with a transcontinental
railroad through the region.39 Commercial prospects brightened further with the arrival of
the Butterfield overland mail road, which ran through slave country and across the Far
West. The road “was working wonders in this region,” one visitor observed, “opening
the country, and inducing the enterprising to venture from home and to try their fortunes
in a new land.”40 Meanwhile, the territory’s delegate to Congress, Miguel Otero, lent his
support to William Gwin’s campaign for a far southern transcontinental railroad. From
the perspective of New Mexico’s commercial elite, most roads ran to the South.
The territory’s first Congressional delegate, Hugh N. Smith, warned of proslavery
schemes within New Mexico as early as 1850. To Smith, an antislavery partisan, the real
threat lay less in the expansion of chattel slavery, per se, than in the more insidious
spread of southern political influence across the Far West. “The cement of this strength in
the South is not so much the interest in slave property, but the political power dependent
on it,” he wrote. “The great struggle is to secure for the decaying popular force of that
section an equal weight in the Senate of the United States with the rapidly progressive
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population and multiplying free states of the Union.”

A proslavery New Mexico, he

suggested, could ultimately bolster the South’s waning influence in Congress. Eastern
antislavery forces took seriously this threat to the Southwest and established several
abolitionist leagues in the early 1850s. Organized in 1851, the Free Territory League
sought to establish and support antislavery newspapers while also financing legal counsel
in Santa Fe.42 Meanwhile, the agent of another abolitionist league was sent to the
territory to assume the editorship of the Santa Fe Weekly Gazette. New Mexico was
quickly becoming a sectional battleground.
These early antislavery activities produced more in the way of political backlash
than abolitionist zeal, however. The Santa Fe Gazette, for instance, remained in the
hands of its antislavery editors only briefly before taking on distinctly Democratic
leanings by 1853.43 As the sectional controversy intensified, the Gazette – by then New
Mexico’s most prominent publication – moved further and further into the proslavery
fold. The paper trumpeted its allegiances – “a friend of the south” and a fierce opponent
of the “the fanatics and disunionists of the North.”44 During the Kansas controversy, the
Gazette’s Virginia-born editor, Samuel Yost, heaped scorn on “Black Republicans” and
endorsed the proslavery Lecompton Constitution.45 Like the Deseret News, the Gazette
also criticized American attempts to police the international slave trade. When a
Georgian planter offered to purchase some 200 to 300 slaves from a captured slave ship
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rather than return the human cargo to Africa, the Gazette offered only praise. “These
savage negroes…under the discipline and tuition of kind and humane masters, would in a
few years have become civilized and Christianized,” the paper argued. With a heavy
dose of planter paternalism, the Gazette continued, “As slaves, their condition morally,
physically, and intellectually, would be improved.”46 Those in the South took note of
such proslavery partisanship in New Mexico. A correspondent to the Richmond
Enquirer, for instance, envisioned a bright future for proslavery interests in the Far
Southwest, predicting, “New Mexico is bound to be a slave State.”47
That prediction proved prescient. Although not yet a state, New Mexico joined
Utah by formally legalizing black slavery within its borders, passing a particularly robust
slave code in early 1859. Like Utah, New Mexico had an economically and numerically
marginal population of black slaves – somewhere between ten and fifty, by one recent
estimate.48 But like Utah, New Mexico coveted southern support and thus the territory’s
politicians proved eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the slave states. That New
Mexico’s population was overwhelmingly Mexican and therefore far removed from the
sectional controversy had little impact on the politics of the territory, which were
controlled by a handful of elites, largely sympathetic to the proslavery cause.
The backdoor politicking that led to the passage of An Act to Provide for the
Protection of Property in Slaves in this Territory showcased the long reach of the slave
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South in western territorial affairs. That process began with Miguel Otero, New
Mexico’s congressional delegate, whose Spanish surname belied his deep southern
connections. Otero’s marriage into a prominent Charlestonian family entrenched him in
elite southern society and entangled his territorial mission in sectional politics. He
recognized that New Mexico required federal favors to promote economic development,
finance its territorial government, and to provide protection from Indian attacks. And he
also recognized that his connections, along with his territory’s southern leanings, made
New Mexico a natural ally of proslavery politicians. A slave code, as his southern allies
had assured him, would help “attract greater… political attentions from the States,” and
also “elevate our own class of free laborers.”49
At the insistence of Reuben Davis of Mississippi, Otero tapped his network of
southern-born allies within New Mexico’s territorial system to request the drafting and
passage of a slave code.50 The deck was stacked heavily in Otero’s favor by the regional
origins of this leadership: the territorial secretary, Alexander M. Jackson, hailed from
Mississippi; the publisher of the Santa Fe Gazette was a native of Missouri; a justice on
the territorial supreme court (and Otero’s brother-in-law), William J. Blackwood, came
from South Carolina; and the governor, Abraham Rencher, had migrated from North
Carolina. All strongly favored their native section and the passage of a slave code. Thus,
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slavery’s Sunbelt was stitched together through a web of familial connections and wideranging political networks.51
A small handful of southern-born politicians helped rush the slave bill through
New Mexico’s legislative process, bypassing a roll call in the house and thereby
preventing members from registering a negative vote. By February Governor Rencher
had signed An Act for the Protection of Property in Slaves in this Territory, giving New
Mexico a far more draconian slave statute than the one passed in Utah some seven years
earlier. Compared to Utah’s proslavery statute, the New Mexico act provided fewer
protections for the enslaved and stipulated harsher punishments for those interfering with
slave property. There were stiff fines and prison terms for enabling slaves to escape, for
stealing slaves, for furnishing slaves with free papers, for enticing slaves to absent
themselves from service, for inciting slave rebellion, and for arming slaves. Slaves could
be whipped for public disorderly conduct or for “insolent language, or signs, to any free
white person.” They were also prohibited from testifying in court against whites. Like
the Utah code, New Mexico’s closely policed the color line, outlawing intermarriage
between white and black, and sentencing to death any black person, free or enslaved,
guilty of raping a white woman. In line with many southern states, New Mexico’s bill
made slavery a perpetual institution, in that it “totally prohibited” the emancipation of
slaves within its borders.52
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One could dismiss this slave code as needlessly detailed for a territory that
harbored so few owners of black slaves. With thirty-one sections, An Act to Provide for
the Protection of Property in Slaves in this Territory was far and away the longest bill
passed by the New Mexico legislature during the 1858-59 session. But as Alexander M.
Jackson, New Mexico’s territorial secretary and the likely author of the code, recognized,
it represented a crucial, if largely symbolic, victory for the slave South. Slaveholders had
recently failed to pass the Lecompton Constitution in Kansas, meaning free labor would
likely prevail there. The slave code in New Mexico, then, enabled southerners to save
face and flex their muscle elsewhere in the West. Although the passage of the law did
not prompt a mass migration of slaveholders to the territory, it did signal that the peculiar
systems of law in the South would now hold sway in far-flung territories.53 In many
ways, it represented the institutionalization and elaboration of the Dred Scott decision,
handed down in March 1857, legally affirming slaveholding rights in the territories. As
Jackson would later write to Jefferson Davis, “[T]his legislation perfected the title of the
South to New Mexico.”54
Others within New Mexico and across the South were no less jubilant. Shortly
after the act’s passage, a New Mexican correspondent wrote to the Memphis Daily
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Appeal to spread the good word. The correspondent confirmed what many southerners
had already come to believe, writing, “This action of the legislative power of New
Mexico should be the more gratifying to the South for the reason that it is but the truthful
reflex of the sentiments and disposition of the people of the Territory.” He insisted that
New Mexico would provide a lucrative market for human chattel, evidenced by the recent
sale of a “third rate negro girl” for the large sum of $1000 in gold. But perhaps most
gratifying of all to southern expansionists were the implications that New Mexico’s slave
code had for a transcontinental railroad. With bondage formally protected in New
Mexico, such a railroad could utilize slave labor, “the most efficient and the most
reliable,” and thereby follow a southern route to the Pacific.55 The proslavery
Washington States wrote in equally grand terms about the imperialist prospects of New
Mexico’s legislation. “[N]ot only does slavery thus secure a firm foothold in the
Territory of New Mexico – almost an empire in itself – but the position affords the South
every facility of expansion in the very direction most inviting to its institutions,” the
States reported. The paper predicted that soon Arizona and Nevada – which had yet to be
organized as territories – along with parts of Mexico, would fall under slavery’s sway.
Slaveholders may have lost Kansas, the paper continued, but “they have secured ample
indemnity in a quarter where, instead of being a sickly exotic, slavery will take root in a
congenial soil, and flourish of its own inherent vigor.”56
Antislavery politicians and writers, not surprisingly, proved unwilling to cede this
western victory to the South. From his office at the New York Daily Tribune, Horace
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Greeley raged against New Mexico’s proslavery legislation for well over a year. If the
code represented a “mere scheme on the part of some scurvy politicians to curry favor at
Washington,” then why make it so elaborate and so far-reaching, Greeley asked. This
“most inhuman and piratical Slave-Code” was more than just a symbolic act, he
concluded, but rather, a serious attempt on the part of southern schemers to transform the
Southwest into a bona fide slave society.57 Greeley envisioned a region overrun by
slaveholders – “zealous proslavery Propagandists” filling federal offices, slaveholding
army officers monopolizing western military posts, “platoons” of “Border Ruffians”
moving west from Kansas, and “the scum of Southern rascaldom” moving east from
California. In New Mexico, Greeley noted gravely, “Slavery rules all.”58 These fears
were exaggerated, to be sure, but Greeley was certainly correct in assuming that the
Southwest had become a very hospitable place for proslavery partisans.
While Greeley editorialized, antislavery politicians both in Santa Fe and
Washington organized campaigns to repeal New Mexico’s slave code. In early 1859,
New Mexico’s speaker of the house made the first attempt at a repeal. But, after
branding him an abolitionist and a black Republican, opponents quickly stripped him of
his speakership and then overwhelmingly rejected his effort.59 In May 1860, Ohio
Representative John Bingham took the fight to Washington with a federal bill to
“disapprove and declare null and void” New Mexico’s slave code, as well as its
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legislation regarding the punishment of bound peon laborers.

Although those in Santa

Fe had held firm against any repeal efforts, Bingham and his Republican allies reasoned
that, under the 1850 law establishing New Mexico as a territory, Congress retained the
power to override any obnoxious act of the territorial legislature. Bingham’s repeal bill
passed narrowly in the House, 97 to 90, but then failed in the Senate.61 Yet up until the
eve of the Civil War, Bingham continued his agitation against the slave code – legislation
that, in his words, “would bring blushes to the check [sic] of Caligula.”62 He never
mustered the necessary support, however, and New Mexico’s law remained on the books
until 1862.63
The law was important in catapulting New Mexico into the national debate over
slavery, not necessarily in opening the floodgates to African bondage in the Far West.
Westerners in search of unfree workers could find cheaper alternatives in the centuriesold Indian slave trade, as did Cave Couts in California (Chapter 3).64 More affordable
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still, they could acquire debt peons. Along with enslaved Indian labor, peonage of mostly
Mexican-born peasants constituted part of a vast complex of unfree labor in the West.
According to W.W.H. Davis, a longtime resident of the region, African slavery simply
would not pay in a territory so thoroughly suffused with cheap peon labor. “The present
labor of the country is so much cheaper than any that could be introduced, that a person
would hardly be justifiable in risking his capital in slaves with so little prospect of
profitable return,” Davis remarked in his 1857 account.65 For roughly $5 in monthly
wages, landholding New Mexicans could secure indebted workers. Once under contract
they could then trap these peones in an endless cycle of debt by maintaining prohibitively
high prices on all goods at local stores, which masters generally controlled themselves.
Peones could only break from this arrangement by paying off their debt, a virtually
impossible feat, according to Davis.66
Treatment of peones was regularly cruel. A statute passed the same year as New
Mexico’s slave code gave masters carte blanche in the correction of their peones, so long
as they did not resort to clubs or whips. “No court of this Territory shall have jurisdiction,
nor shall take cognizance of any cause for the correction that masters may give their
servants for neglect of their duties as servants,” the statute read, “for they are considered
as domestic servants to their masters, and they should correct their neglect and faults.”67
Furthermore masters were not obligated to provide for peones in sickness or in old age.
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“When he becomes too old to work any longer, like an old horse who is turned out to die,
he can be cast adrift to provide for himself,” Davis wrote.68 Although peones could not
be bought or sold at market, like black chattel slaves, their condition was hardly any
better, according to Davis. “Peonism is but a more charming name for a species of
slavery as abject and oppressive as any found upon the American continent,” he wrote.69
Black chattel slavery may have never taken root in New Mexico, but the territory clearly
possessed its own peculiar institution. Like the slave South, the economy of New Mexico
ran on unfree labor, and its legislators were dedicated to its preservation. Indeed, it took
until 1867 and an act of Congress to abolish peonage in New Mexico.70

Bleeding Arizona?
No region in New Mexico was more ardently proslavery than the southernmost
part. Known generally as “Arizona” or “Arizonia,” this region comprised much of the
land carved out by the Gadsden Purchase, the treaty authored by James Gadsden to
facilitate the construction of a Pacific railroad along the 32nd parallel. Although railroad
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bills would continue to languish in Congress, the purchase paid dividends for proslavery
expansionists in other ways, namely by attracting a sizeable number of southerners,
mostly Texans, to the valley along the Mesilla River. These southern émigrés
congregated primarily in the town of Mesilla, numbering roughly 2,500 residents and
strategically situated in a rich agricultural region along the route linking Texas to
California. It was also proximate to gold, silver, and copper mines – exactly the sort of
repositories that Jefferson Davis hoped, and Horace Mann feared, would one day be
operated by slave labor (Chapter 1).71 In these early years, however, few southern
migrants carried their slaves into Arizona. But they did bring their ardent proslavery
sympathies, illustrating once again that the political reach of the South could continue
stretching westward in the absence of chattel slavery itself. By the mid-1850s, Arizona
was essentially a satellite of the plantation South, a vital link in slavery’s Sunbelt.72
Arizona presented a particularly tempting field for proslavery expansionists
because of its well-documented richness in agricultural and mineral resources. Make no
mistake, several travelers in the region argued, Arizona’s arid landscape belied its natural
abundance. The riches of southern New Mexico’s mines had been known to American
expansionists since the 1840s, if not earlier (Chapter 1). But more recent investigations
had revealed the presence of a potentially even more valuable resource: cotton. The
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Virginian surveyor, Andrew B. Gray, drew attention to the opportunities for staple crop
cultivation in the Southwest in an 1856 report, following his extensive exploration of the
region for Robert Walker’s Pacific railroad project.73 His encounters with the Pimo and
Maricopa Indians convinced Gray of the agricultural fertility of the region, especially
along the Gila River. In their Indian villages he found wheat, corn, tobacco, and most
promisingly, cotton. Upon examining a sample, Gray determined that their product was
“not unlike the celebrated Sea Island cotton,” with its “exceedingly soft and silky” fiber.
“Large tracts of land on the Gila and in other portions of this district, appear to possess
the same properties of soil,” he concluded, “and where, I have no doubt the finest cotton
will soon be extensively raised and brought to its highest state of perfection by proper
cultivation.”74
While Gray speculated, James Gadsden experimented and collaborated. Upon
receiving a handful of Arizona cotton seeds from a friend at Fort Yuma, Gadsden
proceeded to grow a small crop in his native South Carolina. The conclusions were
highly promising, he reported to his fellow expansionist, Matthew Fontaine Maury.
Shortly thereafter, the Washington States obtained a sample of Gadsden’s crop and
concluded, “If Arizona is to furnish us with cotton-fields capable of producing such a

73

Walker himself had invested in the Sonora Exploring and Mining Company, a group formed in 1856
under the leadership of Charles Debrille Poston of Kentucky, bound for the silver mines of Arizona. For
more on Poston’s venture, see Samuel Truett, Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.Mexico Borderlands (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 38-40.
74
A[ndrew] B[elcher]Gray, Southern Pacific Railroad. Survey of a Route for the Southern Pacific R.R., on
the 32nd Parallel (Cincinnati: Wrightson & Co., 1856), 60. Like many native southerners, Gray settled in
Tucson, Arizona before the war, and then joined the Confederate army upon the outbreak of hostilities. He
died in 1862 in a steamboat explosion. For more on the cotton growing potential of the region, see Samuel
Woodworth Cozzens, The Marvellous [sic] Country; Or, Three Years in Arizona and New Mexico
(London: Sampson Low, Marston, Low, and Searle, 1875, second edition), 99.

214

material as this, it will be an additional inducement to Southern people to occupy it.”

75

The Gadsden Purchase lands, as Gadsden himself now recognized, were even more
valuable than previously imagined. Indeed, the Gila River valley seemed a natural
extension of the southern plantation ecosystem. After all, Arizona – and southern
California for that matter – rested at the same latitude as Gadsden’s South Carolina.
As promising as the Mesilla Valley may have been in its agricultural and mineral
potential, the region remained so far distant from the major northern New Mexican
settlements, especially Santa Fe, that white migrants in the south began to nurture a sense
of separate identity.76 In January 1855, James A. Lucas, a member of New Mexico’s
territorial legislature and an ardent proslavery partisan, first introduced a bill for separate
territorial status for Doña Ana County, which included Mesilla. It was quickly tabled by
the territorial legislature, but Lucas organized another campaign in the summer of 1856,
and in August that year a convention from Tucson petitioned Congress with a memorial
signed by 260 residents. Mesilla held its own territorial convention in September 1858
and another in June 1859. By then, Arizona’s territorial agenda was generating serious
national consideration.77
The expansion of slavery was not an explicit mission of this territorial movement,
but observers on both sides of the Mason Dixon line recognized that the creation of a new
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territory in such a proslavery region would amount to a major coup for the South. Not
surprisingly, northern politicians came out in force against Arizona’s territorial bid, while
southern leaders rallied in support. With J.D.B. De Bow as its president, the 1857
commercial convention at Knoxville warmly endorsed Arizona’s territorial campaign.78
That same year, President Buchanan, gave his executive blessing to Arizona. He would
continue to recommend separate territorial status for Arizona, even after losing out in his
other western proslavery initiative over Kansas’s Lecompton Constitution.79 A number
of slaveholding congressmen, including Thomas Jefferson Rusk of Texas, William Gwin,
and Jefferson Davis also formally supported Arizona’s organization as a territory.80
Albert Gallatin Brown of Mississippi was more explicit, when, in December 1860, he
called for the transfer of New Mexico’s slave code into Arizona, which “shall not be
repealed during the territorial existence of said Territory.”81
Not all slaveholders, however, proved so eager for the prompt organization of
Arizona, despite its potential. James Gadsden himself took a surprisingly reluctant and
nuanced position. In a November 1857 letter to the Charleston Courier, Gadsden urged
caution in endorsing Arizona’s territorial bid, as premature action on the part of
southerners might give “a pretext at Washington for reviving the agitations of Kansas on
the soil of Arizona, and by which another Walker Squatter Sovereignty would inevitably
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rob the South of its inheritance before it was prepared to take possession.”

Like many

proslavery imperialists, Gadsden saw Arizona as the South’s rightful “inheritance,” but
he also worried that territorial organization might spur abolitionist crusaders into action,
who would invade the region and set up another western antislavery government, as they
were currently doing in Kansas.83 In essence, Gadsden envisioned Arizona as another
Bleeding Kansas, as sectional adversaries migrated west to the next available theater.
And past experience, he reasoned, indicated long odds for the South.
News from Kansas confirmed what Gadsden most feared: an abolitionist invasion
of the South’s rightful “inheritance.” A January 1858 letter from the antislavery bastion
of Lawrence, Kansas to the Boston Journal reported, “A great deal of interest is
manifested here relative to the proposed Territory of Arizona.” According to the Kansas
agent, “A great many Free State men have stated their determination to go in the spring,
or when the difficulties are settled here… the principal reason for going being the desire
to help the cause of free institutions there.”84 Southern papers seized on rumors of
abolitionist migration to galvanize a proslavery reaction. “The last mail brought the
startling news that societies were forming in the New England States and that men had
been organized into companies and regularly drilled in Kansas, for the purpose of
abolitionizing Arizona by force of arms,” warned the Texas State Gazette. “Their
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success in Kansas has summoned from the haunts of crime in their great cities, hordes of
paupers and vagabonds to enlist in the new foray against slavery.” According to the
paper, “[N]o severer blow could be inflicted upon the South and her hopes than the
occupation of this territory by armed antislavery propagandists.” By planting antislavery
forces in a “Southern clime” (i.e. Arizona), abolitionists would effectively cut off
slavery’s escape valve by blocking “acquisition of new slave States at the Southwest,
where alone we can look for expansion.”85 Like Gadsden, the Gazette saw great potential
in the American Southwest, including northern Mexico, and struck a decidedly protective
posture whenever threats emerged along this long southern corridor.
But when other proslavery expansionist looked westward to Arizona, they saw
potential rather than calamity. To be sure, “an angry struggle” lay ahead, in the words of
J.D.B. De Bow, as Arizona was both well suited to slavery and situated at a critical
crossroads for transcontinental communication.86 The Baltimore Sun agreed: “There are
strong indications of an intention to transfer the Kansas struggle to Arizona.” But given
Arizona’s fertility – especially with regard to cotton cultivation – and mineral wealth,
“There is a better chance for the establishment of slavery in the latter than there ever was
in the former Territory,” the paper projected.87
Reports of southern migration to the Southwest were particularly heartening to
advocates of proslavery expansion. The Columbus (Georgia) Times confirmed that one
General Henningsen had begun recruitment efforts across several southern cities to
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“collect emigrants for Arizona.” According to the paper, Henningsen intended “to
succeed in colonizing that territory with southern men, with the ultimate purpose of
impressing the institutions of the South upon the political fortunes of that country.”88
With a scheduled departure for July 1859, this mobile and politically motivated
population of young men was prepared to defend a region they viewed as a natural
appendage of the slave South. The New Orleans Daily Picayune likewise predicted a
steady expansion of southerners through the Southwest. As emigration to the Northwest
waned, future settlers would instead head for the more salubrious climate along the
southern corridor. The cumulative effect of this movement would be a decisive victory
for the slave South. “In Utah, New Mexico and Arizona it [slavery] exists by local law,”
the Picayune stated triumphantly, “and as additional accessions to this field of wealth
shall be acquired from Northern Mexico, as will assuredly by the case in a very short
period, the demands of slave labor will then be clearly a necessity.”89 By these accounts,
the future hopes of the slave South lay in the Southwest.
Ultimately Bleeding Arizona never materialized, largely because antislavery
forces failed to migrate in sufficient numbers to spark any armed conflict. Perhaps
bloodshed could have been expected had Arizona been organized into a territory before
the Civil War. But any conflict would have been one-sided. Despite the Mexican-born
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majority, Arizona’s proslavery white population would continue to dictate the political
path of the proposed territory.90
As Arizona continued to attract ambitious young southerners, one of the region’s
preeminent citizens, Sylvester Mowry, redoubled his efforts for territorial recognition.
Although born in Providence, Rhode Island, Mowry wed his political fortunes to the
southern element in the region, and was in turn named Arizona’s unofficial delegate to
Congress three times over. He brought greater visibility to Arizona’s territorial bid
through a series of lectures and publications, not in the least by promoting the region’s
natural fertility. In his Memoir of the Proposed Territory of Arizona (1857), he
extensively cited Virginian Andrew B. Gray’s report on the prospects for cotton
cultivation in the Southwest.91 By invoking Gray’s survey and his speculations about
cotton, Mowry expanded on the familiar notion that Arizona represented a natural
extension of the plantation South. Here was a region, he argued, which would support
“all the fruits known to a Southern clime—grapes, wheat, corn, and cotton in great
abundance.”92
Mowry elaborated on some of these themes in an 1859 address to the American
Geographical & Statistical Society. That Mowry gave this address in New York did little
to temper his proslavery commitment; in fact, he likely understood that New York
financiers had provided much of the capital for the South’s plantation regime.93 Again he
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stressed the suitability of Arizona’s soil for plantation agriculture. “Rice, sugar and
cotton are best adapted to the soil of the Colorado bottom,” Mowry claimed, suggestively
noting that, “the extreme heat of the climate in the summer months will prevent white
labor from agricultural pursuits to any great extent.”94 He thus avoided an outright
endorsement of slave labor, while strongly suggesting that free labor would be untenable.
Mowry enhanced his proslavery bona fides with a plug for the extreme southern Pacific
railroad, “not only the most practicable, but probably the only practicable route.”95 He
appended to this address a lengthy excerpt from Jefferson Davis’s January 1859 speech
on the Pacific railroad. There was thus little mistaking where the loyalties of Mowry, and
Arizona more generally, lay.
With no decisive action coming from Congress on the territorial issue, Arizona’s
white residents took matters into their own hands. In April 1860, a convention of 31
delegates, with James A. Lucas presiding as president, met in Tucson to draft a territorial
constitution. Although the delegates sidestepped the direct mention of slavery during the
proceedings (not unlike the delegates at the American Constitutional Convention of
1787), their actions and endorsements betrayed their proslavery leanings. Not only did
Arizona’s delegates formally approve the “the pure, wise, and patriotic administration of
our venerable President James Buchanan,” they also created a new county in honor of
future Confederate General Richard S. Ewell and a member of the convention, who had
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been stationed at nearby Fort Buchanan.

The convention elected as provisional

governor Lewis S. Owings, a Texan, who in turn selected his fellow Texan, James A.
Lucas as territorial secretary. The territorial constitution, drafted by the convention,
again made no direct mention of slavery, as the authors likely realized that any outright
endorsement of the institution would only enflame sectional discord and potentially
scuttle their hopes for territorial recognition. But, crucially, it did recognize the laws of
New Mexico “to be in full force and effect in this, the Territory of Arizona.”97 New
Mexico’s slave code thus became Arizona’s slave code.
The constitution and published proceedings were largely symbolic. Congress, to
no one’s surprise, refused to recognize the rogue document and Arizona thus remained
part of New Mexico territory. But it would also remain a region apart, even more
committed to a proslavery agenda than the rest of New Mexico. As the nation spiraled
toward disunion, Arizona’s residents would let their sectional allegiance shine.

A State Still Divided Against Itself
While southern New Mexicans battled for separate territorial status, a similar
movement was intensifying directly to the west. For years, a prominent assortment of
Californians – many of them of the proslavery variety – had advocated for state
division.98 California, they pointed out, was substantially larger than any state east of the
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Mississippi, too cumbersome an expanse of territory to be administered by a small
legislative body in Sacramento. Furthermore, the southern part of the state was poorly
represented in this legislature and unfairly taxed as a result. Thus, the only equitable
solution to such an unbalanced administration was to split the state just south of San Luis
Obispo, and convert this lower section into an independent territory. Although several
historians have studied this state division movement, none place developments within
California alongside the concurrent campaign unfolding in Arizona.99 Taken together,
these territorial movements constitute an integral, if ultimately unsuccessful, component
of the proslavery campaign in the Southwest. By literally redrawing the American map,
southern partisans hoped to bolster their waning representation in Congress and to
strengthen their political grip across the lower corridor of the continent.
If southern partisans wanted to disguise their proslavery agenda, they could not
have found a better figurehead for the movement by the late 1850s. Andres Pico hardly
fit the criteria for a slave power conspirator. A landowner of mixed African, Native
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American, and European ancestry, Pico belonged to the wealthy class of Californios who
had ruled the region during the Mexican era and were yet to be entirely dispossessed
under American control. Some of his own property, however, had fallen victim to the
burdensome system of American taxation, which placed disproportionately heavy levies
on land – largely as a measure to reduce the size of Mexican-owned ranchos and thereby
make more land available for white settlers.100
During the 1850s, the aggrieved Pico and many of his fellow Californios joined
forces with southern California’s dominant political faction, the proslavery wing of the
Democratic party known as the Chivalry.101 It was an unlikely alliance, to be sure, one
that fused the proponents of racial slavery with California’s large Mexican-born
population. But it was also a highly effective pairing in the mixed-race political climate
of southern California, and one that produced the most successful initiative for state
division to date. Pico, as a member of the state assembly and one of the leading figures
of this alliance, put forward this measure in early 1859.102 His bill called for the division
of California just below San Luis Obispo and the creation of the territory of Colorado
from the state’s southern counties. The land mass reserved for this southern territory
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mapped almost perfectly onto Foote’s explicitly proslavery proposal nine years before
(Chapter 1) – Pico didn’t even bother to change the name.
The Pico bill may have carried a Spanish, rather than a southerner’s surname, but
the proslavery undercurrents to the state division movement had become unmistakable in
the sectionally charged atmosphere of 1859. This was, after all, a year that would witness
John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, Senator David Broderick’s death at the hands of a
Chiv rival, and open talk of southern secession. Even before Broderick’s death, however,
California’s moderate antislavery press regularly aired charges of a Chivalry conspiracy.
The Sacramento Daily Union established itself as the state’s firmest editorial
opponent of state division, a movement that the paper insisted smacked of proslavery
scheming. The proposed territory of Colorado, according to the Union, “was only the
ground-work for a new Southern State on the Pacific.”103 As the measure worked its way
through the state legislature, the paper grew increasingly anxious, not just for the fate of
California, but for the state of the Union itself. “Southern empire on the shores of the
Pacific is what the leaders of the ultra slavery party in Congress have long coveted above
all things, and it is not likely they will neglect the opportunity which a division of this
State will present,” warned the Union in late March 1859. In this bid for a western
empire, slaveholders would not stop at the division of California and its “inevitable”
conversion to slave territory, however. “To connect the South with her domain on the
Pacific, and bind the intermediate Territories of Arizona and New Mexico, a Pacific
Railroad terminating at San Diego will be of the first necessity.”104 The proposed
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territory of Colorado was therefore merely a part – albeit an important one – in a much
larger enterprise to link the entire Southwest to the slave economy. New Mexico,
Arizona, southern California, and a transcontinental railroad to bind them all – this was
slavery’s Sunbelt at its core.
Historians have long recognized the proslavery cast to California’s state division
movement.105 As contemporaries noted, the Pico party line on state division – as a
measure to provide tax relief for southern California’s landowners – was simplistic at
best and duplicitous at worst. Such grievances could have been addressed through an
amendment to the tax code, rather than splitting the state in two.106 In his careful analysis
of the assembly and senate votes on the bill, historian Ward McAfee identified a distinct
Chiv preference for state division, though the vote did not perfectly follow sectional
lines. In the senate, for instance, the Virginian and future Confederate officer Cameron
E. Thom abstained, while the fire-eating John C. Burch voted against the bill. Perhaps
they worried about the ability of southern emigrants to transform the territory of
Colorado into a slave state – a fear echoed by southern expansionists like James Gadsden
in his writings on the Arizona territorial movement.107 Ultimately, however, their
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reasoning remains obscure, as does the precise logic of the legislators who ensured
passage of the Pico bill by votes of 33 to 25 in the assembly and 15 to 12 in the senate.108
A smoking gun that would link state division to a bald proslavery gambit is yet to
surface. Southern-born politicians in California did not openly campaign for state
division as a slaveholder’s issue, after all. In the heated political atmosphere of 1859,
Chiv Democrats exercised rhetorical restraint around sectionalized issues like Pico’s bill,
lest their proslavery bias jeopardize the passage of southern-friendly legislation. But no
amount of circumspection could disguise the fact that the Pico bill represented another
victory for the expansionists of the slave South.
Onlookers in the slave states made that much clear. Southern expansionists
cheered the state division movement on Pacific Coast, and – as the Sacramento Daily
Union feared – mapped these developments onto their larger imperial imaginary.109
Speaking at a Vicksburg convention in the summer of 1859, Henry Foote chided the
growing body of southern secessionists by arguing that slavery could be best preserved,
and even extended, within the Union. Just look westward, he urged his audience. “Give
[slavery] fair scope and verge, and it will expand itself in all congenial territories.” He
assured the crowd that “in less than two years from this time, if we are wise, we will have
a slave State in Southern California. The State has been divided within the last six months
for that purpose.” Arizona was also fertile ground for slavery, he continued, and even the
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Pacific Northwest beckoned as a field for further expansion.

110

Foote’s faith in the

popular will of westerners was well founded. After all, California’s legislators had
effectively carried out what Foote himself had attempted to do through congressional
mandate nine years earlier.
Like Foote, the Baltimore Sun mused on the broader implications for state
division, explicitly linking the territorial movements in Arizona and California. The
Washington correspondent to the Sun reported that while southerners were making
“preparations for the colonization of Arizona… on a large scale,” Californians were
endeavoring to establish a territory in the southern part of their state, “in order to add to
Arizona, and thus constitute a new State, and probably a slave State.” According to the
correspondent, “This would seem to be the best prospect that is now offered in any
quarter for the early admission of any new slaveholding States.”111 Although southern
California was not likely to fuse with Arizona, as the Sun projected, the instinct to group
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these two would-be territories in a discussion of slaveholding expansion was certainly apt
– though not a pairing that historians have repeated.
The press in the Deep South also tracked the vote on Pico’s measure. Reprinting
an article from the New York Tribune, the Georgia Weekly Telegraph (Macon) noted that
“The prospect of dividing California, no doubt with the idea of the erection of the
southern part of it into a new Slave State,” was again under consideration.112 In a
November 1859 article, the Columbus (Georgia) Daily Enquirer was even more explicit
about slavery’s prospects in the West. By that point, the state division measure had
passed both houses of the state legislature, and moved to a popular referendum by
southern California’s voters, who endorsed the territory of Colorado by a three-to-one
margin. The Enquirer provided a breakdown, by county, of the popular vote in southern
California, before musing on the possibilities for slave agriculture in the would-be
territory. “[T]he prevalent opinion is that cotton, tobacco, and perhaps sugar, can be
profitably cultivated,” the paper noted; “in fact, the main object of its own residents in
demanding the division is understood to be the raising of these Southern products and the
introduction of slavery.”113
Southerners had been eyeing California as a probable site of plantation agriculture
for well over a decade by this point, but their dreams had never been so close to
actualization. Indeed, in this state division movement we might detect something of a
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coda to James Gadsden’s earlier attempts to carve out a slaveholding colony on the
Pacific coast.114 Gadsden had died several months before the state legislature passed the
Pico bill, but his spirit lingered in this initiative that would make way, most likely, for the
re-introduction of slavery to California. That reports of California state division reached
the South via the Butterfield overland mail road, across Gadsden Purchase lands, seems
additionally fitting.
But in all the optimism surrounding southern reports of California’s division ran a
chord of doubt. By September 1859 the measure had passed both houses of the state
legislature, received the governor’s signature, and won the approval of a vast majority of
southern California’s voters. Yet it still required Congressional approval in order to be
made law. And there was reason to expect a hard fight ahead, especially with a new
Republican plurality in the House of Representatives. “If the Black Republicans think
there is reason to fear the making of a slave State by this movement, they will of course
resist it to the bitter end in Congress,” the Columbus Daily Enquirer fretted, “and if they
permit it to pass with a view of making a struggle for the possession of the Territory, we
shall probably have the Kansas troubles re-enacted on the Pacific shore.”115 Again,
Bleeding Kansas cast a long westward shadow that extended into the territorial struggles
of Arizona and southern California.
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Southerners could at least find some solace in the fact that the man responsible for
communicating the Pico bill to Washington was Governor Milton Slocum Latham.
Although born in Ohio, Latham had spent several years in Alabama before coming to
California, and had thoroughly established his bona fides as a Lecompton Democrat. A
proponent of “proper subjugation” for African Americans and the right of slaveholders to
carry their human property into the territories, Latham enjoyed the backing of
California’s Chivalry faction.116 But if slaveholding expansionists expected the governor
to stand firmly on their side, his official Communication was a disappointment. Although
he recognized that southern Californians nurtured justifiable grievances, their attempt to
split the state was “for the present, at least, impolitic.”117 Latham may have been a
southern sympathizer, but he was first and foremost a politician, and he saw the way the
wind was blowing in Congress by early 1860. An outright endorsement of the bill would
have likely smacked of proslavery intrigue – a risky play at a time when sectional
feelings ran at fever pitch in the wake of John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry.
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Ultimately the bill died in the Senate judiciary committee, although California’s
legislature would continue to agitate for state division. In spring of 1860, a majority
report endorsed the continued attempts to divide the state of California. The minority, on
the other hand, urged caution in the present political climate. “The civil discord which
now so trammels Congress and threatens our Federal Union had its origin in questions
growing out of our territorial organization,” it read, “and California, occupying a position
so eminently conservative, should be the last to offer another opportunity for the
enactment of new Kansas difficulties.”118
Before falling victim to rising sectional tensions, the would-be territory of
Colorado represented a high-water mark in a decade of proslavery separatism on the
Pacific coast. From Foote’s attempts to divide the state during the congressional debates
of 1850, to Gadsden’s 1852 petition for a slaveholding colony along the coast, to the
momentarily successful initiative of 1859, slaveholders had seen in California a golden
opportunity for expansion. Their failure to formally organize a slave territory on the
Pacific should not obscure the substantial political inroads they made into an ostensibly
free state. In fact, the popularity of Pico’s measure speaks to the resilience of proslavery
politics in California, in the teeth of the sectional crisis then gripping the nation. If the
antebellum campaign for state division had died in the Senate judiciary committee, the
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dream of a southern empire along the Pacific would live on. Slaveholders who coveted a
piece of the Far West would not have long to wait. War was brewing.

Southern Secession, Western Separatism
On December 20, 1860, South Carolina adopted secession ordinances and broke
from the Union. From there, the rebellion rippled west – much further west, in fact, than
most historians recognize. Indeed, from the perspective of anxious Unionists in the Far
Southwest, the entire region – from New Mexico and Arizona into California – appeared
poised to follow South Carolina’s lead. The territory of New Mexico, for instance,
remained firmly within the South’s political orbit after Lincoln’s election: northern New
Mexico was economically tied to Missouri while the southern part of the territory was
strongly linked to Texas; the major newspapers, the Santa Fe Gazette and the Mesilla
Times, continued to disseminate proslavery views; and the territory’s governor, secretary,
and the majority of the local military commanders hailed from below the Mason Dixon
Line.119 Meanwhile, in California, secessionists met secretly in an attempt to mobilize the

119

The outbreak of the war triggered an exodus of military commanders from New Mexico to the
Confederate South, including Colonel William Wing Loring, the departmental commander, Colonel George
B. Crittenden, the chief of staff, Major Henry Hopkins Sibley, Major James Longstreet, Captains Richard
S. Ewell, Cadmus M. Wilcox, and Carter L. Stevenson, and Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler; see Alvin M.
Josephy, Jr., The Civil War in the American West (New York: Vintage, 1991), 34. Ewell, originally from
Virginia, had previously commanded the garrison at nearby Fort Buchanan and supported Arizona’s bid for
territorial status. As the Union unraveled he downplayed the depth of sectionalism among New Mexico’s
military officers. “Every one here is on the tenter [sic[ hooks of impatience to know what the Southern
States will do,” he wrote from Albuquerque. “The truth is in the army there are no sectional feelings and
many from extreme ends of the Union are the most intimate friends;” Richard S. Ewell to Bettie Ewell,
January 22, 1861, in Donald C. Pfanz, ed., The Letters of General Richard S. Ewell: Stonewall’s Successor
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2012), 161-162. Like so many others from New Mexico, Ewell
resigned his commission in the U.S. army upon Virginia’s secession. He eventually rose to the rank of
lieutenant general in the Confederate army, the third-highest ranking commander in the Army of Northern
Virginia, behind Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet, who had also served in the territory.

233

state’s military forces on behalf of the rebellion.
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True, Abraham Lincoln had carried

California, but he did so with just 32 percent of the ballots – the lowest proportion of
votes he received in any free state.121 Some of the state’s preeminent citizens even
contemplated a separatist movement of their own, in order to form an independent Pacific
Republic.122
Over a decade of robust proslavery activity within California gave hope to
secessionists that the Pacific Coast might peel off from the Union if it came to civil
war.123 And indeed, leading figures within the state had been surprisingly explicit on this
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point. Shortly after he delivered California’s state division petition to Congress, Milton
S. Latham, now a U.S. Senator, outlined the possibility for a grander sort of western
separatism in a spring 1860 speech. He projected that, in the event of civil war,
California would declare its independence and form part of a vast western republic,
extending as far as the Rocky Mountains. Alternating between grim projections of
eastern devastation and boastful remarks on western superiority, Latham argued that an
independent California would shield itself from “fratricidal strife and mutual ruin.” With
the state’s abundant resources and natural advantages, Latham queried, “Why should we
trust to the management of others what we are abundantly able to do ourselves?”124The
senate speech kicked up a minor firestorm in the West, and Latham, ever the opportunist,
soon retracted his remarks on Pacific secessionism.125
But others picked up where the senator left off, and often made explicit
connections between western separatism and southern secession.126 In a December 1860
letter, Charles L. Scott, one of the two U.S. Representatives from California, gave a fullthroated endorsement to independence movements in both the South and West. “In my

for a Pacific Republic, 1843-62,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 31:4 (December 1930), pp. 319-342. My
thanks to Knute Berger for introducing me to the Pacific Northwestern component of this story.
124
Before moving to his comments on Californian independence, Latham devoted much of the speech to
an attack on abolitionism. He argued that “the South claims nothing but her constitutional rights,” and
defended slaveholders’ prerogative to the “protection and enjoyment” of their human property within the
federal territories. Cong. Globe, 36th Congress, 1st session, 1727-1729.
125
With convenient historical amnesia, Latham insisted “there is not a word of truth” in the assertion that
California “would form a Pacific Republic” in the event of southern secession; Cong. Globe, 36th Congress,
2nd session, p. 27. For the national critique of western separatism, see Alta California, December 11, 1860
(which called it a “burlesque upon disunion”); San Francisco Bulletin, November 27, 1860 (branding it a
“suicidal step”) and December 24, 1860; New York Herald, Dec. 14, 1860 and January 5, 1861.
126
Ashbury Harpending, one of the major pro-Confederate conspirators in California, claimed that the
“Republic of the Pacific” was to be “a preliminary” for a Confederate takeover of the state; Harpending,
The Great Diamond Hoax and other Stirring Incidents in the Life of Ashbury Harpending, 30-31. For more
on the direct links between Confederate support and western independence, see Los Angeles Southern
News, March 1, 1861.

235

heart of hearts I warmly sympathize with the South,” he wrote, “and cordially endorse
and fully justify them in not remaining in the Union under the President elect.” Although
California boasted a large southern-born population, Scott noted, it would pursue its own
path to independence. “If this Union is divided and two separate confederacies are
formed,” he vowed, “I will strenuously advocate the secession of California and the
establishment of a separate republic on the Pacific slope.” He believed California’s
mineral resources, agricultural wealth, and access to the Pacific trade would assure its
independence and its success. But an independent California would retain close ties with
the South, he predicted, namely through the construction of a long-awaited railroad
between the two regions.127 California’s governor John C. Weller and U.S.
Representative John C. Burch made a similar projections, while Senator William Gwin,
although more circumspect, privately hoped that California would break from federal
control.128 Thus, at one point or another, the state’s entire congressional delegation
supported a western separation.129
We should not be entirely surprised. A minority position, to be sure, Pacific
separatism nevertheless tapped a deep-seated western bitterness toward the federal

127

Charles L. Scott to Charles Lindley, Chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee of California,
Dec. 21, 1860, printed in the San Francisco Bulletin, January 16, 1861. Similarly, the Los Angeles Star
predicted that an independent California would pave to way to a southern Pacific railroad. “A transcontinental railroad would be built between New Orleans and San Diego in less than two years,” Los
Angeles Star, December 8, 1860; see an article on the same subject in the December 22, 1860 issue. See
also William Carey Jones to the San Francisco Herald, December 15, 1860, in Benjamin Hayes
Scrapbooks, Vol. 19, no. 10, BANC.
128
For Burch’s position, see Red Bluff Independent, January 8, 1861; Sacramento Daily Union, February
13, 1861; also Winfield J. Davis, History of Political Conventions in California, 1849-1892 (Sacramento:
California State Library, 1893), 128-129. For Gwin’s more ambiguous but nonetheless staunchly prosouthern views, see William Gwin to Calhoun Benham, February 8, 1861, OR, Series II, Vol. II, 1015;
Gwin to Joseph Lancaster Brent, March 27, 1863, Brent papers, HEHL.
129
Support for a Pacific republic emanated from a minority of Californians, but given the political power of
some of its keenest champions, it can hardly be considered a fringe position.

236

government and a very American tendency to imagine bold geopolitical
reconfigurations.130 National loyalties and the American map itself – as secessionists
from South Carolina to Arizona had made clear – were in a state of dramatic transition.
And California had never rested comfortably with the free soil status quo. From James
Gadsden’s would-be slave colony, to the proposed territory of Colorado, southern
schemers were constantly on the lookout for ways to redraw western boundaries and open
loopholes in the state’s antislavery constitution. The Pacific republic debates can thus be
seen as a postscript to a decade of proslavery operations within the West, as well as a
prelude to the pro-Confederate activity that would menace large parts of the state during
the war years.131
Ultimately, California remained true to the United States. Within the legislature,
unionists prevailed over separatists and pledged California’s loyalty to the northern war
effort. By 1861 William Gwin was out of office while his Chivalry faction had lost face
due to its deep associations with the secessionist South. Furthermore, the federal
patronage was now in the hands of a Republican administration, driving Chiv loyalists
from the plum posts that they had occupied for so long. 132 Yet while western separatism
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had been discredited, it could not be eradicated. As it had since the gold rush, the slave
South continued to cast a long shadow over the Pacific Coast (Chapter 5).
Meanwhile, New Mexico’s leading political figures did little to disguise their antiadministration sentiments. Miguel Otero, for instance, blamed disunionism, not on the
rash actions of slaveholders, but upon Republicans and the “accursed negro.”133
Although Otero remained neutral during the conflict, his wife was an avowed secessionist
and he never surrendered his fierce anti-abolitionist views.134 Similarly, The Santa Fe
Gazette looked gloomily upon a future of Republican rule. “Abolitionism has become a
fixed principle among the Northern citizens as is plainly enough manifested by the vote at
the recent presidential election,” the paper lamented.135 Several months later, Alexander
Jackson, one of the region’s most eager secessionists, wrote to his friend Jefferson Davis
to encourage “the assignment of New Mexico to the Southern Confederacy,” an action
that he believed “will certainly be in consonance with the wishes of a majority of her
people.”136 Yet he added a caveat: no matter how pro-Confederate New Mexico’s
residents may have been, the territory’s political allegiance would be dictated by
Missouri, the economic lifeline of Santa Fe. “These people are fully prepared to go
South, provided Missouri so goes,” Jackson assured Davis, “but in advance of Missouri,
no expression could be obtained from any respectable body of them.”137
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Missouri never seceded, nor did the northern half of New Mexico. Rather than
foment rebellion within the territory, leading secessionists, like Jackson himself, left for
the Confederate states. He would later return to New Mexico as a staff officer for an
invading rebel army. As they had in California, Republicans shored up the limited
Unionist sentiment within the territory through shrewd political placements. For most of
the decade, federal appointments to the Far West had been made with an eye toward
appeasing southern-born Democrats. Lincoln reversed that trend and ousted the old
proslavery guard. Crucially, he replaced the territorial governor Abraham Rencher with
Henry Connelly, a Virginia Unionist. In his first annual message in December 1861,
Connelly celebrated his territory’s political loyalties: “[W]hen the secession began and
for some time after it had been in progress, it was presumed by the prime movers of the
scheme, that our Territory would join them in their attempts to pull down the pillars of
free government.” Instead, Connelly proudly reported, New Mexico responded with a
“patriotic outpouring of men” for the war machine. 138 The territorial governor no doubt
inflated the territory’s Unionism. New Mexico was no patriotic stronghold, after all. It
clung to an uneasy Unionism, constantly threatened by neighboring Texas. The political
indifference of the Mexican-born majority probably best explains the territory’s wartime
loyalty – or, more accurately, failure to secede – rather than any deep-seated commitment
to the northern war effort. It should be remembered that four slave states – Delaware,
Kentucky, Maryland and most crucially Missouri – also resisted secession.
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Furthermore, Connelly could only speak for the northern part of the territory. In
the southern portion, the separatist region of Arizona, matters took a decidedly different
turn. During the election of 1860, a group of Mesilla residents staged an unofficial
election in which they proceeded to “elect” John C. Breckenridge by forty votes, over
Lincoln’s five, Douglas’s three, and Bell’s seven.139 As the secession crisis deepened, so
too did the proslavery loyalties of Arizona’s white residents. In Tucson, Sylvester
Mowry advocated for secession, claiming that the region would be safer from Indian
attacks under Confederate protection.140 While South Carolina dispatched commissioners
throughout the slave states to encourage secession, Texas sent an agent of its own to
Arizona, Philemon T. Herbert, a former U.S. representative from California and more
recently a lawyer in El Paso.141 Writing to Secretary of State William Seward that month,
William Need lamented, “The slave power in this Territory [Arizona] and New Mexico
has been as proscriptive of Republicans as in South Carolina.”142
As the slave states of the South debated disunion, Arizona’s white residents
hosted two secession conventions of their own. They gathered first in Mesilla on March
16, 1861, where, once again, James A. Lucas presided over the convention. Several,
including Herbert and General W. Claude Jones gave impassioned speeches in defense of

139

Kiser, Turmoil on the Rio Grande, 143.
Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 109-110. Mowry was arrested in Tucson by
General Carlton and marched through the town’s streets in chains in June 1862. He was convicted of
treason before a military tribunal, stripped of his property, and imprisoned at Fort Yuma, until November
1862.
141
For an excellent account of South Carolina’s secessionist commissioners, see Charles B. Dew, Apostles
of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2002). For more on Herbert see James J. Ayres, Gold and Sunshine:
Reminiscences of Early California (Boston: Gorham Press, 1922), 120; and Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
142
Quoted in Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 108.
140

240

southern independence. Jones made the decision a stark one – between subjugation and
empire. “Northward, insult, wrong, and oppression are frowning upon us,” he thundered.
“Southward a brilliant and glorious pathway of hope, leads to the star of empire smiling
over a constellation of free and sovereign States.” In this choice between Union or
secession, the Butterfield overland mail road stood out to Jones as a decisive factor. A
“Southern Post Master General” had initially established the road through Arizona to the
Pacific, Jones reminded the delegation, but “as soon as the North came into power, it was
taken away from you and placed ten degrees farther toward the north pole.”143
Transcontinental communication had been one of the major precipitating factors in the
rift between the free soil North and the slave South, and it remained a central issue for the
separatists of the Desert West. And thus, the convention unanimously resolved “that we
will not recognize the present Black Republican Administration and that we will resist
any officers appointed to this Territory by said Administration with whatever means in
our power.”144
A week later, white residents met at Tucson and, under the chairmanship of
Granville H. Oury, also adopted secessionist resolutions.145 With these two conventions,
Arizona broke from the Union – well before the slave states of Virginia, Arkansas,
Tennessee and North Carolina, which did not secede until after the firing on Fort Sumter
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in April. That the federal bastion of Fort Fillmore stood a mere six miles from Mesilla,
the capital of the new Confederate territory of Arizona, did not deter the region’s
secessionists. In August, they elected Oury as delegate to the Confederate Congress.146
With that series of nearly uncontested conventions and elections, Arizona reaffirmed one
of the principles of southern imperialism: a plantation economy was not a precondition
for proslavery loyalty; the South could achieve its expansionist aims even without the
extension of a chattel slave system.
In the coming months, white Arizona would not waver in its commitment to the
Confederacy. When Lorenzo Labadie, a federal Indian agent, arrived in Mesilla in early
summer 1861, he was met by a belligerent committee of local secessionists. “They have
desired to compel me to depart from within the limits of the Territory of Arizona, and
have given me to understand that if I do not comply voluntarily they will drive me out by
brute force,” Labadie wrote to his superior. “They have at hand a fine barrel of tar, into
which they will put the first officer appointed by President Lincoln, feather him, and start
him out to fly.”147 New Mexico’s Unionist congressional delegate, W.W. Mills, found
the situation in Mesilla equally distressing. “A disunion flag is now flying from the house
in which I write, and this country is now as much in the possession of the enemy as
Charleston is,” Mills reported. “The Mesilla Times is bitterly disunion,” he continued,
“and threatens with death any one who refuses to acknowledge this usurpation.” With
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two exceptions, all the officers at nearby Fort Fillmore were “avowedly with the South.”
Compounding these local problems, Mills warned, was an invasion force from rebel
Texas, expected to cross into New Mexico in a mere two weeks.148

Conclusion
In the spring of 1861, a curious tune could be heard in the streets and saloons of
Los Angeles. “We’ll Hang Abe Lincoln from a Tree” was not the song of some
embittered minority; it was an anthem of Civil War southern California, a manifestation
of the proslavery and anti-Republican sentiments that had for so long characterized the
politics of the region.149 That Los Angeles and many parts of the Far West developed in
such a manner was no accident. Since the American seizure of northwestern Mexico in
1848, slaveholders had looked to this part of the continent as a political appendage of the
South. And they ensured as much through a combination of factors: infrastructural
development, migration, and political pressure. To be sure, relatively few of them carried
black slaves into the Southwestern territories. As W.W.H. Davis noted, the expenses and
risks of moving valuable human property into frontier settings proved too great for most
southerners, who could otherwise expect greater returns on slave labor in the heavily
policed plantation districts of the Deep South.150 But even in the absence of a plantation
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economy, southerners succeeded in transporting their political culture across the western
territories – to the extent that certain parts of the Far West proved more eager for a
slaveholders’ rebellion than did many areas of the slave South.
By extending their influence across the territory taken from Mexico, southerners
created what we might call a proslavery Sunbelt. Again, this is not the Sunbelt of the
twentieth century that historians have so richly described – this was not yet a region
stitched together by military spending, Christian evangelicalism, and metropolitan
development. However, the sense of shared political identity that currently unites the
southern half of the country did not spring up suddenly in the post-World War II era. The
fortunes of the South and the Southwest had been inextricably and deliberately bound
roughly a century earlier. Western leaders affirmed their southern affinities through
legislation, like the slave codes of Utah and New Mexico, and through territorial
movements, as in southern California and Arizona. And with the Butterfield overland
mail road, southern leaders built a physical monument to these regional interconnections.
Although much of the Southwest did not ultimately follow the Deep South out of the
Union, it remained, in the eyes of Confederate officials, ripe for the taking. Thus, when
rebels invaded the Southwest during the early phases of the war, they did so as self-styled
liberators of a region they had long identified as their own.
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Chapter 5

THE CONFEDERATE DREAM OF A CONTINENTAL EMPIRE,
1861-1865
On July 21, 1861, the newly self-proclaimed Confederate States of America
launched its first invasion of the war. In terms of manpower and destructive force, it was
nothing spectacular, especially compared to the bloodletting of the conflict’s later
campaigns. But it was geopolitically significant nonetheless. With a deployment of just
over 250 men, John R. Baylor’s invasion of New Mexico made manifest what many had
long known: slaveholders laid claim to the Southwest, and they were prepared to assert
their title to that region through force of arms. Slipping across the border of west Texas
into the Mesilla Valley, Baylor’s invaders quickly exploited the territory’s patchwork
defenses and tenuous Unionism, capturing the region’s command, Fort Fillmore and its
700 men, by late July. On August 1, 1861, from the proslavery hotbed of Mesilla, Baylor
issued a proclamation declaring the Confederate Territory of Arizona, with a northern
border stretching to the 34th parallel.1 Although Union forces soon began to mobilize
against this far western wing of the rebellion, the Confederate presence in the region only
strengthened in the months ahead. The rebel president Jefferson Davis – who had done
more than anyone else to bolster proslavery interests in the Southwest during the
antebellum period – reinforced the invasion with a much larger force of roughly 2500
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under Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley, arriving in the fall of 1861. Slavery’s
Sunbelt now had an army behind it.2
In many ways, the rebel invasion of the Southwest represents the military
continuation of a political process begun years before. As with the proslavery campaign
for the Far West during the antebellum period, California was the ultimate objective of
this Confederate invasion. Baylor certainly appreciated the “vast mineral resources” of
Arizona, but the true strategic payoff of his invasion depended on opening a thoroughfare
to the Pacific – precisely what southern expansionists attempted through the Gadsden
Purchase, the “great slavery road”, and the Butterfield mail route during the preceding
decade.3 Indeed, we cannot truly understand Confederate grand strategy in the Far West
independent of these antebellum political campaigns. Whereas a number of historians
have explored the military history of Baylor’s and Sibley’s invasions, few connect these
operations to their antecedent political movements.4 We should view southern political
machinations and rebel invasions alike as a continuous process that stretched from 1850
to the collapse of the Confederacy fifteen years later.
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As in the antebellum period, proslavery expansion was aided and abetted by a
transcontinental network of allies. This chapter will therefore follow not only rebel
invasions coming from the East, but also homegrown Confederate operations originating
from within the West. In California, in particular, the strong proslavery coalition of the
pre-war period gave way to a menacing pro-Confederate movement during the war years,
concentrated in the southern part of the state. In many ways, the state was divided
against itself on a north-south axis, mirroring the political fault lines that had fractured
the nation as a whole. Indeed, southern California had to be garrisoned to prevent the
numerous Confederate sympathizers in the region from fomenting rebellion in the West.
We might, therefore, view the state – and to a certain extent the entire Southwest – as a
vast border region, not entirely unlike Missouri or Kentucky, where rebellion constantly
simmered and Union control could only be maintained through overwhelming military
force.5

California’s Civil War
California may have averted secession or the formation of a breakaway Pacific
republic, but the state was hardly free of rebellious activity during the war years. Baylor,
writing from his post in the Confederate territory of Arizona in the fall of 1861,
recognized as much. “California is on the eve of a revolution,” he reported, with “many
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Southern men there who would cheerfully join us if they could get to us.” Hundreds,
perhaps, were poised to join his ranks, if only rebel forces could open a pathway to the
Pacific, Baylor predicted.7 Although the revolution of Baylor’s fantasies never
materialized, a number of prominent California residents did slip across state lines to
offer their services to the Confederacy. Indeed, the list of Confederate officers from
California amounts to something of a who’s who of western politics: David Terry, the
former chief justice of the state Supreme Court and the killer of Broderick; former
Congressmen Charles L. Scott and Philemon T. Herbert; Los Angeles political kingmaker
Joseph Lancaster Brent; General John B. Magruder; ex-U.S. District Attorney Calhoun
Benham; at least three state senators; a handful of assemblymen; and agents in a number
of federal posts, including the state controller, state navy agent, and a former surveyor
general.8
Southern California represented the favored point of departure for western rebels.
From there, future Confederate generals Albert Sidney Johnston, George Pickett, Lewis
Armistead, and Richard Garnett all resigned their commissions and fled east.9 After
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resigning as the commander of the Pacific Department, Johnston was escorted out of the
state by Alonzo Ridley and his Los Angeles Mounted Rifles, a unit of about 80 California
secessionists, who had earlier been outfitted with a full complement of rifles, revolvers
and sabers by the order of Governor John G. Downey. En route to Texas, this company
traveled over the old Butterfield road, thus transforming the antebellum mail route into a
Confederate thoroughfare. The Los Angeles Mounted Rifles would become the only
organized militia from a free state to fight under a Confederate banner. Shortly
thereafter, Joseph Lancaster Brent slipped from the port of San Diego, and after a brief
imprisonment under Union guard, rose to the rank of brigadier general of a Louisiana
cavalry unit.10 Two years later, Cameron Thom left his Los Angeles law practice as well
as his infant son – named in honor of Albert Sidney Johnston – to join the Confederate
cause in his home state of Virginia.11 Such were the sacrifices that certain Californians
were willing to make for the rebellion. In total, Johnston, Ridley, Brent, and Thom
represented just a fraction of the Confederates who fled from southern California.
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According to the estimates of Horace Bell, a rare southern California Unionist, Los
Angeles County furnished the rebellion with “colonels, majors and captains without end,
besides about two hundred and fifty of the rank and file who were… sent over the desert
to the Confederate forces in Texas.”12
California’s rebels waged a two-front war on the Union. While hundreds offered
their services directly to Confederate armies, a vocal and numerous contingent remained
in the West, placing Unionist officials on high alert to the ever-present threat of a
regional rebellion. As Governor Frederick Low would later recall, the Civil War period
in California marked “perhaps one of the most difficult positions ever held by an
executive in the state” given the “large secession element here.”13 General Edwin
Sumner, commander of the Department of the Pacific, would not have disagreed. During
the early years of the war, reports on California’s secessionist activity poured into his
headquarters. According to local intelligence, rebel sympathizers ranged from armsbearing militants to clandestine conspirators to more matronly figures, including one Mrs.
Bettis, an enthusiastic secessionist who had begun rallying Californians in support of
southern independence.14 The cumulative effect of these reports led Sumner to conclude
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that, while “there is a strong Union feeling with the majority of the people of this State…
the secessionists are much the most active and zealous party.”15
Concerned Unionists agreed: While the state’s legislative and military authorities
remained loyal to the government, this strong body of secessionists threatened to
transform the California into another border state. An August 1861 letter from a group of
San Francisco businessmen to Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, argued against
diverting Union troops from California to eastern theaters for precisely this reason.
California was a powder keg of secessionist activity, waiting to go off, they warned. “The
hatred and bitterness toward the Union and Union men,” they wrote, “manifested so
pointedly in the South and so strongly evinced on the field of battle, is no more intense
there than here.” They estimated that 16,000 Knights of the Golden Circle currently
operated in California. Although that figure is probably an exaggeration, the threat of a
regional rebellion was all too real. If secessionists were able to organize in sufficient
numbers, they warned, “The frightful scenes now transpiring in Missouri would be
rivaled by the atrocities enacted upon the Pacific Coast.” To this they added, “We need
only appeal to the examples furnished by Missouri, and even Virginia, to show that the
efforts of a comparatively small number of audacious and unscrupulous men are
sufficient to precipitate an unwilling population into disunion, or at least to inaugurate
civil war.”16
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Anxieties ran particularly high during the September 1861 gubernatorial election,
a three-man race which pitted the Republican Leland Stanford in against John Conness
and the former state attorney general, John R. McConnell, a Kentucky native. For many,
McConnell’s platform – which justified the right of secession, opposed military coercion,
and embraced the Crittenden compromise – raised the specter of rebellion within the
state.17 If California went for McConnell, the future Democratic Senator Eugene
Casserly fretted, the election would “do more to encourage the foe and protract the war…
than another Manassas.” Like San Francisco’s concerned business community, he
especially feared a border war within the state. “Heaven forbid that California should
ever be another Missouri!”18 According to the Sacramento Daily Union, the McConnell
ticket had galvanized the powerful secessionist element within California. The paper was
probably right to assume that California possessed “a larger number of persons who
sympathize with the enemies of the Government, than any other free State in the Union.”
Their votes for McConnell, the Daily Union added, represented something of a
declaration of war against the government.19 The Alta California echoed these dire
projections about the fragility of Unionism within the state, predicting that “if McConnell
had been elected, the Bear flag, in a short time, would have been raised” by secessionists,
and with a sympathetic administration, they would have invaded Northern California to
overwhelm the Unionists there.20
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Although Stanford carried the state as McConnell and Conness split the
Democratic vote, the Republican victory hardly dispelled fears of a western rebellion.
Southern California, in particular, remained a proslavery stronghold. In fact, Los
Angeles County registered a strong two-to-one majority in favor of McConnell over
Stanford.21 And a year later, Los Angeles’s voters once again backed secessionist
candidates, E.J.C. Kewen and J.A. Watson, for positions in the state assembly. Their
victory prompted Henry Dwight Barrows, the San Francisco Bulletin’s correspondent in
Los Angeles, to lament another rebel victory in his precinct. “Well, the Secessionists
have carried this county, body and boots, for Jeff Davis, and for the dis-United States,”
he wrote. “Let it never be forgotten that the county of Los Angeles, in this day of peril to
the Republic, is two to one for Dixie and Disunion; or, for permitting disunion without a
struggle.”22
As Barrows and others were quick to note, the political leanings of Los Angeles
County’s residents confirmed that pro-Confederate impulses remained alive and well
within California, even after initial secession scares flared out. Fears of a statewide
insurrection may have been exaggerated, but secessionists in southern California were
full of more than just the sound and the fury. Indeed, they constituted a powerful fifth
column within California and posed, according to many, an immediate threat to Unionism
in the West. Pro-southern sentiments, of course, were nothing new to Los Angeles.
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During the 1850s, a wave of Anglo-American immigrants, largely from Texas, began
transforming the Mexican pueblo into a proslavery outpost of roughly 4,400 residents by
the time of the 1860 census. As early as 1859, the Butterfield overland mail route linked
Los Angeles directly to the South, and helped expedite southern migration to the
Southwest. Not surprisingly, when Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 troops to suppress the
rebellion in the spring of 1861, many within Los Angeles – most likely a majority of the
town’s residents – sided with the secessionists. Soon, the strains of two popular songs
could be heard in the city’s streets and saloons, “We’ll Hang Abe Lincoln to a Tree” and
“We’ll Drive the Bloody Tyrant from Our Dear Native Soil.” Rebel sympathizers
paraded the Bear Flag, a symbol of California separatism, through the towns of El Monte,
San Bernardino, Merced, and Visalia. Secessionist activity so alarmed future Union
general Winfield Scott Hancock, then stationed in Los Angeles, that he assembled a small
arsenal of Derringers for his own use, while also arming his wife.23
As Hancock fortified his household against a potential Confederate uprising,
Sumner made moves to garrison the entire county. By September 1861, the commander
of the Department of the Pacific was preparing to send a sizeable force into southern
California to stem the tide of secessionism in the region.24 Writing to Colonel George
Wright, commander of the southern district, Sumner made clear his military priorities
within California. “The secession party in this State numbers about 32,000 men…
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congregating in the southern part of the State and it is there they expect to commence
their operations against the Government,” Sumner wrote. This disloyalty, he continued,
“has been tolerated too long already, and I desire that you will put a sudden stop to all
demonstrations in favor of the rebel government, or against our own.”25 He promised a
ready supply of reinforcements.
True to his word, Sumner increased the number of soldiers in southern California
and delayed their shipment east. On guard against secessionist demonstrations, Union
troops were stationed in San Bernardino, Santa Barbara, Visalia, and Los Angeles. By
January 1862, the Union command shifted its operations to Drum Barracks, located in
Wilmington, outside Los Angeles. The camp housed between 2,000 and 7,000 federal
troops at various points during the war, including the famous California Column under
James Henry Carleton, giving Wilmington a larger population than Los Angeles itself. In
an ironic twist of fate, thirty-one camels from the U.S. Camel Corps arrived in Los
Angeles in June 1861, and remained a common sight in the city’s streets until they were
sold at auction in 1863. Thus, for at least a brief period, Jefferson Davis’s pet project for
southwestern development during the antebellum period had been transformed into an
agent of Yankee control. Between these camels and, most notably, thousands of federal
troops, southern California had been garrisoned against its own disloyal residents.26
The federal presence may have dissuaded more organized forms of rebellion, but
it hardly eliminated pro-Confederate agitation in southern California. To celebrate the
Confederate victory at Bull Run in July 1861, for instance, Los Angeles’ rebels staged a
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rally and openly insulted the Union Army.

In the cities of San Bernardino and El

Monte, rebels thwarted attempts to establish Union Clubs.28 Southern supporters also
resorted to outright violence on occasion. In even they pitched a Union supporter from
an upstairs window of the Bella Union hotel, where Confederate sympathizers frequently
gathered during the first year of the war.29 “Is Southern California a part of the rebel
Confederacy that loyalty to the Union is neither respectable nor safe?” bemoaned Henry
Dwight Barrows in April 1862. “Our local State, county, and city officers, with very few
exceptions, are avowed sympathizers with [the Confederacy],” he wrote, “and the Union
cause is very generally despised.”30 Take A.J. King, for instance, the undersheriff of Los
Angeles County and “a notorious secessionist,” according to Barrows. King had rallied a
large gathering of Confederate supporters in the town by displaying a life-size portrait, of
rebel General P.G.T. Beauregard, “elegantly engraved and framed.”31 Given this
atmosphere, Union troops had to proceed with caution beyond the walls of their
garrisons. As Horace Bell recalled, the soldiers stationed at Drum Barracks “scarcely
dared appear in town on account of the wrath of the populace.”32
The rebel spirit was perhaps equally strong 190 miles north of Los Angeles, in the
town of Visalia. “There are more secessionists in this and the adjoining counties than
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there are in proportion to the population in any part of the United States this side of
Dixie,” concluded a Union officer stationed nearby. On a daily basis, he reported, rebel
sympathizers would “ride through the streets of Visalia and hurrah for Jeff. Davis and
Stonewall Jackson.”33 That a federal garrison had been established one mile north of
Visalia in October 1862, seemed only to galvanize Confederate sympathizers. They
regularly mocked Union soldiers as “Lincoln hirelings,” and instigated a number of
violent confrontations. One such fight led to an exchange of gunfire and the death of a
Union soldier as well as the wounding of two Visalia agitators – what we might consider
the westernmost casualties of the war.34
While open confrontations were not uncommon in certain pro-southern
strongholds, much of California’s secessionist activity took place behind closed doors or
under the cover of darkness. Two major secret societies were active in California during
the war – the Knights of the Golden Circle and the Knights of the Columbian Star.
Members in both organizations pledged themselves to the Confederate cause, and sought
ways to aid the rebellion from the far side of the continent. The San Bernardino Knights
of the Golden Circle, for instance, resolved, “That we mutually pledge to each other our
lives, our property, and our sacred honor to sustain our brethren of the Southern States in
the just defense of all their constitutional rights, whether invaded by the present
Executive or by a foreign foe.”35 The Knights of the Columbian Star, who tended to be
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more active in the northern part of the state, made similarly grandiose pronouncements.
According to one report, members of a Sacramento chapter pledged to keep themselves
well-armed and to “resist the enforcement of any and all unconstitutional laws by the
Administration.”36 They also raised money to be transmitted to the Confederacy under
“pretense of giving to the rebel sanitary for rebel prisoners.” Because activities and
membership rolls were kept secret, it is impossible to determine, with any degree of
accuracy, the numerical strength of these two secret societies. One informant estimated
that the Knights of the Columbian Star numbered about 24,000 and an equal number of
Knights of the Golden Circle. Although these numbers are undoubtedly too high, the two
societies did attract their fair share of high-profile Californians. Beriah Brown, editor of
the Copperhead Democratic Press of San Francisco, purportedly headed the organization,
while ex-governor John Bigler was a “prominent member.”37 As in the antebellum
period, California’s proslavery element continued to attract the support of political elites
during the war years.
California’s Confederate sympathizers undermined the Union cause in a number
of ways: they paraded openly on the streets of Los Angeles and Visalia; they organized
secretly in the backrooms of San Bernardino and Sacramento; they fled directly to
Confederate lines to offer their services to rebel armies; and they also waged a war of
words in California’s newspapers. The politics of the old proslavery Chivalry faction
lived on in a number of publications, and raised considerable alarm for beleaguered
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Unionist authorities within the state. According to the estimates of Etta Olive Powell,
over one hundred newspapers were printed in California during the war years, and of
these, roughly thirty opposed the Lincoln administration.38
The Equal Rights Expositor of Visalia was one of the most staunchly anti-Union
papers of this kind. Operated by S.J. Garrison and Lovick P. Hall, a Mississippi native
and longstanding advocate for the extension of slavery into the Pacific West, the Equal
Rights Expositor, cheered the Confederate cause, even as federal authorities began
concentrating troops in Tulare County. Rather than colonize free blacks, the Expositor
argued in a typical editorial, why not colonize abolitionists?39 According to one Union
officer stationed nearby, the Expositor “goes as far if not further than the vilest sheet
published in Richmond.”40
Los Angeles housed an inflammatory, anti-Unionist editor of its own. Henry
Hamilton, though born in Ireland, was a longstanding admirer of the South and the
southern political diaspora within California.41 He supported William Gwin, E.J.C.
Kewen, and the Chivalry faction, and dedicated his weekly paper, the Los Angeles Star,
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to heaping scorn on Abraham Lincoln and the Union war effort. Founded in 1851 as the
city’s first newspaper, the Star came under the editorial direction of Hamilton by 1856,
who lent it a reputation for cosmopolitanism, literary polish, and acerbic political
commentary.42 In many ways, the Star became the political mouthpiece for southern
California’s pro-Confederate population during the war years, lashing out against what
Hamilton viewed as an unholy war. He kept particularly close tabs on Union authorities
within the area, who were busy committing “outrages” against the local citizenry and
arresting innocents on what he dismissed as unfounded charges of treason.43 And he
articulated, perhaps better than any editor in the region, southern California’s natural
affinity for the slave states. “We are on the highway to and from the South, our
population are from the South, and we sympathize with her,” he announced in a January
1861 issue. “Why then should we turn our backs on our friends and join their enemies to
invade, impoverish, and despoil them?”44 Hamilton thus echoed what many others had
suggested for years: the South’s sphere of influence stretched all the way to the Pacific.
No federal action, according to Hamilton, was more outrageous than the
Republican campaign for emancipation. Lincoln’s preliminary emancipation
proclamation, had transformed the Union war effort into a campaign “for a dissolution of
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the Union” as it was, Hamilton wrote.

In another article, he continued to rage: “Was

ever such an outrage perpetrated in the name of law, or such foul perjury committed, as
by this man, sworn to maintain the Constitution and govern by the laws?”46 As for
Lincoln himself, he was a “tyrant” and an “obscure, fourth-rate lawyer” who had
somehow swindled his way into the highest office in the land.47 When Union armies –
what he dubbed the “Abolition force” – went down in defeat, Hamilton seemed almost to
gloat. Of the Confederate triumph at Fredericksburg in December 1862, for instance, he
reported with no small degree of satisfaction, “Their greatest leaders… attempted to
measure swords with the Rebel leaders, and their inferiority is written in gore.”48 Not
only was emancipation bald theft and a tremendous waste of human life, he argued, it
also would bring only misery to the slaves themselves. Quoting a conservative London
paper, the Star made its position clear: “The fact is that the whole negro population, with
here and there an exception, has been happy and contented under slavery; that the free
negro is utterly unable to take care of himself in the midst of a superior number of whites;
that he will do no work at all, and is one of the most miserable beings in creation.”49 In
short, Lincoln and his party were attempting to bring about “the maddest revolution
recorded in the annals of time.”50
Always a minority within the state, California’s pro-Confederate population
nevertheless wielded a political influence well beyond its numbers. To be sure, reports of
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their numerical strength and organizational capacities were exaggerated. And rebel
sympathizers certainly never succeeded in creating a coordinated, widespread revolt
within the state.51 But if California’s anti-Unionists never mustered anything resembling
a full-scale rebellion, they nevertheless provoked enough alarm in high government
authorities – one might even call it a siege mentality – to delay the eastern transfer of
Union soldiers and to justify garrisoning the southern part of the state. Unionist anxieties
may have been overblown, but they were not entirely unjustified. Federal authorities had
good reason to fear the operations of a determined minority. After all, it did not require a
particularly long memory to recall how a relatively small faction of proslavery
southerners had come to dominate the state’s antebellum politics. Many of those
politicians, like E.J.C. Kewen, remained active and powerful within the state, while
others, like William Gwin, menaced the Union from abroad.52 Time and again,
California had cast its lot with the South, and there was reason to suspect – with
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Confederate armies marching from the East and rebels organizing within the West – that
the state was anything but secure.

Slavery’s Sunbelt at High Tide
The greatest threat to Unionism in California came not from the fifth column of
Confederate sympathizers within the state, but from the conquering rebel armies in New
Mexico. Baylor’s invasion had secured the southern half of that territory, what had
become the Confederate territory of Arizona by August 1861. Over the course of the
next year, Baylor attempted to shore up his military control over region, while Arizona
petitioned for political representation within the Confederate Congress. By February
1862, Jefferson Davis signed the territorial bill and Granville Oury was admitted to the
rebel Congress as Arizona’s delegate. With the territory’s organization and admission,
slaveholders thus achieved by force of arms what they had been attempting through
political means for nearly a decade. The newly installed territorial government soon went
to work for the Confederacy, confiscating the property of Unionists in the region,
including some mines owned by northerners around Tucson and Tubac.53 In control of
the upper Rio Grande as well as the old Butterfield overland road, Baylor possessed a
base of operations for further incursions into New Mexico and even California.
From the outset of the war Davis disavowed the imperial ambitions of the
rebellion. “We seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of any kind from the
States with which we were lately confederated;” he wrote, “all we ask is to be let
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alone.”

54

Yet his government’s founding document made no such promises. As Article

IV, Section 3.3 of the Constitution of the Confederate States of America mandated, “The
Confederate States may acquire new territory, and Congress shall have power to legislate
and provide governments for the inhabitants of all territory belonging to the Confederate
States, lying without the limits of the several States.” Furthermore, the Constitution
stipulated that in all new territories, “the institution of negro slavery… shall be
recognized and protected by Congress.”55 No amount of dissimulating from the rebel
chieftain could disguise what was unfolding in the Southwest from the summer of 1861
through the spring of 1862: The Confederacy made a bid for a continental empire,
organizing two invasion forces in order to extend its frontier westward to the Pacific.56
54
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The primary agents in that mission were Colonel Henry Hopkins Sibley and his
army of roughly 2,500 invading Texans. Baylor’s victories in the summer of 1861 had
been swift and decisive, but with Union armies mustering in Colorado, New Mexico and
California, his small Confederate force was in desperate need of reinforcement. Sibley’s
task, according to T.T. Teel, an artillery officer in the invading force, was to bolster
Baylor’s presence in the Southwest and to secure the conquest of New Mexico. But “the
objective aim and design of the campaign” Teel continued, “was the conquest of
California.” Indeed, “as soon as the Confederate army should occupy the Territory of
New Mexico, an army of advance would be organized, and ‘On to San Francisco’ would
be the watchword,” he wrote. Further gains might then be expected in Chihuahua,
Sonora and Baja California, “either by purchase or by conquest.”57 Thus, when Sibley’s
army set out for New Mexico in the fall of 1861, they carried with them the promise of a
transcontinental, slaveholding empire.
Federal authorities were well aware of both rebel objectives and Union
vulnerabilities. As the inspector general of New Mexico wrote to Henry Halleck in
February 1862 – when federal prospects in the Southwest seemed particularly dire –
Confederate grand strategy in the region was to “extend their conquest toward old
Mexico and in the direction of Southern California.”58 This would have come as no great
surprise to Halleck or any other observer of antebellum politics. Slaveholders had, after
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all, actively sought a southwest passage to the Pacific for well over a decade, primarily
by lobbying for a transcontinental railroad. A southern route across the country, they
reasoned, would ensure a proslavery sphere of influence across the Southwest and
provide more direct access to the lucrative China trade for their plantation economy.
Confederate grand strategy deviated little from this antebellum mission, except in that
slaveholders now had an army behind them.59 With the Union blockade of the Atlantic
coastline, a Pacific outlet had become even more essential to slaveholders’ commercial
interests. To this end, Confederate officials looked greedily toward the gold mines of
California and the treasure ships of the Pacific. Furthermore, if the rebellion could
control the entire southern half of the continent, the Confederacy would stand a better
chance of achieving international recognition. With Baylor holding on in Confederate
Arizona and Sibley prepared to join him with a larger force from Texas, the Pacific had
probably never seemed closer to the slave South.
Unfortunately for the Confederacy’s nascent western empire, Sibley was ill suited
to the enormous task at hand. He had begun recruiting his brigade from south central and
east Texas in August of 1861, shortly after Baylor had secured Mesilla. But it took until
October of that year before he finally set off, at which point Baylor’s position in Arizona
had been considerably weakened by disease and Apache raiding parties.60 As they made
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their way across west Texas, his three regiments, along with a handful of slaves and
4,000 animals, were plagued by water shortage, a lack of feed for the beasts, and Indian
raiders. Sibley had expected to supply his army off the fat of the land, but he found the
countryside alarmingly lean in the late fall of 1861. His weary troops did not arrive at
Fort Bliss until mid-December, at which point Sibley took command of Baylor’s forces
and formed the Confederate Army of New Mexico.61
Upon his arrival, Sibley issued a proclamation to the people of New Mexico, a
document that largely echoed the rhetoric of slaveholding expansionists from the
antebellum era. “By geographical position, by similarity of institutions, by commercial
interests, and by future destinies New Mexico pertains to the Confederacy,” he
announced on December 20, 1861.62 Through military means, Sibley was, in essence,
continuing the earlier work of proslavery agents, who had succeeded in linking the
Southwest to the slave South through immigration, infrastructural development, and
proslavery legislation. As this earlier breed of southern politician argued, the Southwest
was a natural appendage of the slave South, and the political outlook of the region largely
confirmed this belief. Now Sibley was simply claiming a region that many believed had
long since belonged to the slaveholding states.
But what Sibley and Baylor found in the Southwest in late 1861 and early 1862
did not entirely reflect the region’s political allegiances of the previous decade. True,
Mesilla had warmly greeted Baylor in the summer of 1861, and the Confederate territory
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of Arizona remained loyal to proslavery interests. But in New Mexico to the north
federal authorities ensured that their territory would not follow the lead of Arizona in
breaking from the Union. Lincoln’s appointment of strong Union men to New Mexico’s
territorial leadership replaced proslavery partisans, who previously served as territorial
governor and secretary. The new territorial legislature finally succeeded in overturning
New Mexico’s infamous slave code, which had withstood a national campaign for repeal
since its passage in 1859. Even the proslavery Santa Fe Gazette tempered its positions
and largely ceased its usual attacks on abolitionists and Lincoln. Meanwhile, the new
governor, Henry Connelly, began mobilizing the population, eventually enrolling
between 5,000 and 6,000 New Mexican volunteers.63 As these enlistments began to
climb, Connelly celebrated the territory’s Unionism in his first annual message, in
December 1861. “This patriotic outpouring of men,” he proclaimed, “has removed all
cause of suspicion which may have been excited in the minds of our countrymen in the
loyal States in reference to the position we occupy in connection with the war.”64 He
added that the local force was now strong enough to beat back any invading army from
Texas.65 Although that projection ultimately proved premature, Connelly and his Unionist
allies could take solace in the support they received from the largely Hispanic population,
whose loyalties had been aroused by an all-too familiar foe – Anglo invaders from
Texas.66
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Despite growing Union strength in New Mexico and waning supplies for Sibley’s
force, the rebel army continued pushing into Yankee territory. In March 1862 the New
Mexican capital of Santa Fe fell to Sibley’s army, thereby unleashing a new wave of fear
in California. With Union forces scattered and close to 3,000 conquering Texans
concentrated in New Mexico, this was perhaps the high tide of slavery’s Sunbelt. The
rebellion now controlled all of Arizona and southern New Mexico, from the Rio Grande
to nearly the Colorado River. Further victories could have carried them to the gold fields
of Colorado, to the shores of the Pacific, and even into the states of northern Mexico. To
that end, Sibley dispatched Colonel James Reily to negotiate with the governor of
Chihuahua, who reportedly granted the Confederacy’s first recognition by a former
power. Reily also attempted to secure a depot for Confederate supplies at Guaymas, in
the Mexican state of Sonoma.67 Meanwhile, Confederate scouts pushed westward to
within 80 miles of California.68
Much like Baylor’s invasion less than a year earlier, Sibley’s thrust into New
Mexico caught Union forces flat-footed. Yet though his initial conquests were notable,
his luck would not hold. At the Battle of Glorieta Pass in late March 1862, a tactical
victory quickly turned into a strategic disaster. Although the rebels initially took the
field, a Union detachment under the command of John M. Chivington – who would later
lead U.S. troops in a massacre of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians at Sand Creek –
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destroyed Sibley’s supply train, an irreversible blow to the Confederate advance. With
inadequate provisions to hold his position in New Mexico, Sibley began a long retreat
back to Confederate Texas, [losing much of his force to the brutal summer heat and
Indian raiders. According to some, the Confederate defeat had less to do with Union
tactical skill, and more to do with Sibley’s own inadequacies. T.T. Teel, for one,
attributed the failure of the campaign to his commander’s ineptitude – namely his
administrative oversights and tendency to “let the morrow take care of itself.”
Compounding this lack of leadership was a “want of supplies, ammunition, discipline,
and confidence.” Had Baylor had full command over the invasion, Teel speculated, “the
result might have been different.”69 Sibley also reportedly suffered from kidney stones
and often abused alcohol to deaden the pain. He was confined to his wagon and
drunkenly incapacitated at several strategic moments during the campaign. In short,
Sibley was ill equipped to carry slavery’s empire across the continent.
That Confederates were the first to recognize and then exploit the strategic
importance of the Southwest should come as no surprise. After all, slaveholders had, for
well over a decade, coveted the region and the transcontinental thoroughfare it opened,
and made moves to shore up their political control there in the years before the war. But
Union officials gradually awakened to the importance of the Southwest and when they
did, they responded with force, mobilizing units from Colorado, California and even
Kansas. They beat back the Confederate advance at Glorieta Pass, and, for the remainder
of the war, deployed the majority of their fighting force against a rebellion of a different
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sort – the numerous Native American peoples of the West who continued to assert their
tribal sovereignty. But for the better part of the year, the rebellion maintained control of
southern New Mexico, what Confederates designated Arizona. In the face of provisional
shortages, environmental difficulties, powerful Indian tribes, and Union forces, this was
no mean feat. Compared to the far larger rebel invasions in the eastern theaters – namely
Robert E. Lee’s push into Maryland and Pennsylvania, which were quickly turned back at
Antietam and Gettysburg, respectively – Baylor and Sibley conducted lengthy
occupations. These Southwestern invasions would not turn the tide of war in the way that
eastern campaigns did, but for the early part of the conflict they proved that the rebellion
could achieve perhaps not only independence, but also territorial aggrandizement.
In an official report of the campaign – what amounted to something of a postmortem – Sibley attempted to shrug off the Confederate defeat. The commander who
once rode off for the West with such high expectations for a continental rebel empire,
now dismissed the region as unworthy of the Confederacy’s efforts. “Except for its
political geographical position,” Sibley wrote to his superior, “the Territory of New
Mexico is not worth a quarter of the blood and treasure expended in its conquest.”70
Others in the Confederate high command, however, would not so quickly write off the
value of that region. The rebellion may have suffered an irreversible defeat, but the war
in the Far West was far from over.
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After Sibley
Neither homegrown secessionists nor Texas invaders mustered enough support to
break California or New Mexico from the Union, but the embers of rebellion in the
Southwest would continue to burn throughout the war, alarming loyalists and
emboldening Confederate hopes for a transcontinental empire. Jefferson Davis himself, a
longtime proponent of western expansion, refused to turn his back on the region that had
handed Sibley such a decisive defeat. Until the last days of the rebellion, the Confederate
high command would authorize several additional invasions, commission a guerilla force
in California’s gold country, and launch a privateering mission in the Pacific Ocean.
Indeed, the slaveholders’ dream of empire in the West would almost outlive slavery
itself.
From the earliest days of the war, rebels threatened – at least rhetorically – Union
control of the Pacific Ocean. As federals tightened their grip on Atlantic trade,
Confederates sought commercial outlets elsewhere – hence Sibley’s preoccupation with
both Mexico and the ports of southern California. The Pacific trade had long held a
prominent place in the imperial imagination of slaveholders, thus it should come as no
surprise that secessionists mused on the possibilities of piracy in the Pacific when war
broke out. In an open and anonymous letter to President Lincoln, the proslavery
polemicist Edward Pollard looked to the Pacific as a potentially lucrative theater of war.
Confederate privateers “will destroy the commercial and navigating interests of the
North,” he boasted in a May 1861 letter. “[T]hey will scour the South Pacific as well as
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other oceans of the world; they will penetrate into every sea, and will find as tempting
prizes in the silk ships of China as in the gold-freighted steamers of California.”71
Union authorities recognized both the value and the vulnerability of their gold
shipments from California. Unsurprisingly, one of Lincoln’s first acts after the firing on
Fort Sumter was to ensure the protection of the nation’s maritime commerce, especially
the Pacific treasure ships.72 “I do not know what we would do in this great national
emergency,” Ulysses S. Grant is rumored to have said, “were it not for the gold sent from
California.”73 To be sure, there was more bombast than actual threat in declarations like
Pollard’s. After all, the Confederacy lacked the naval capacity to launch a full-scale
maritime contest in the Pacific. But the rebellion did possess important contacts in
California who proved all too eager to assist in a privateering campaign. And with only
six sloops-of-war and fewer than 1000 sailors to protect a vast coastline and lucrative
commerce, absolute Union naval control of the Pacific was anything but foreordained. 74
Enter the adventurer and ardent California secessionist, Ashbury Harpending.
The scion of a wealthy Kentucky family, Harpending attached himself to proslavery
schemes at an early age. At fifteen he sailed for Nicaragua in one of William Walker’s
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expeditions, though American officials intercepted his ship and prevented the young
Harpending from taking part in ground operations. Upon southern disunion, he helped
organize a secessionist movement within California, appealing to Albert Sidney Johnston
to turn over the entire Department of the Pacific to the nascent western rebellion. Failing
in this, he shifted his attentions toward the Pacific, where he reasoned a weak Union
naval presence could be turned to the Confederacy’s advantage.75 In 1862 Harpending
traveled overland to Vera Cruz, then via blockade runner to Charleston, and from there to
Richmond, where he laid his plans before Jefferson Davis. He proposed to sail a sloop to
Mexico, transform her into a fighting vessel, and seize the first eastbound Pacific Mail
steamer that crossed their path, confiscating the ship’s gold and silver shipments. Then
Harpending and his associates proposed “to equip the captured liner as a privateer and
figured to intercept two more eastbound Pacific Mail steamers before the world knew
what was happening in those days of slow traveling news.”76 Although Davis was wary
of any operation that could be construed as piracy, he was clearly intrigued by this plan.
According to Harpending, Davis “fully realized the importance of shutting off the great
gold shipments to the East from California,” which in his estimation, “would be more
important the many victories in the field.”77 Thus Harpending received a commission as
a captain in the Confederate navy, even though “I had never been on a man-of-war in my
life.”78
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Harpending returned to California in July 1862 and soon enlisted the help of two
co-conspirators, Ridgley Greathouse and a young English gentleman, Alfred Rubery –
colorful names to match the nature of their operation. Together they purchased the J.M.
Chapman, a 90-ton schooner moored in San Francisco’s bay, and outfitted the ship with
two twelve-pound canons, while also purchasing a small arsenal of side arms – rifles,
revolvers and cutlasses. “[W]ithout much difficulty” Harpending also found “twenty
picked men – all from the South, of proved and desperate courage.” The Chapman never
made it out of port, however. As they were preparing to set sail in March 1863,
Harpending’s plot was betrayed by the ship’s navigator, and soon he was staring down
the trained guns of a US warship and several boatloads of Marines. Harpending and his
associates were taken to Alcatraz and then to San Francisco’s Old Broadway jail. After
six months in prison, Harpending was finally convicted of high treason – though his crew
was acquitted. Fortunately for Harpending, Lincoln’s Amnesty Proclamation of
December 1863 granted full pardon to all political prisoners on the condition they take
and keep a loyalty oath. He thus won his freedom by February 1864, after nearly a year
of confinement, bankrupted and utterly foiled in his plans to bring the Confederacy into
the Pacific.79
Harpending may have failed in his mission to secure Union gold shipments, but
he certainly succeeded in setting the Pacific coast on high alert to a Confederate naval
threat. The War Department was soon receiving appeals for additional protections for
San Francisco harbor, while Washington temporarily suspended gold shipments from
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California.

The California press was among those calling for greater naval vigilance

and bolstered defenses. Had the Chapman made it to the high seas, “it would have been
in her power to annihilate the commerce of the port,” the Alta California reported in the
immediate aftermath of the affair. “Every vessel leaving or entering the port would have
fallen an easy pretty.”81 In another article, the Alta reiterated the call for greater naval
security, arguing, “A bombardment of an hour would set the town, as it is for the most
part built of wood, on fire in fifty places.”82 When the trial began, the San Francisco
press called for the execution of the Chapman traitors. They pointed to Harpending’s
letter of marque from Jefferson Davis as proof positive of his nefarious designs. “These
men of the Chapman… committed a treason as grave as any that ever was, or ever could
be, committed,” the Alta claimed. “That of Arnold was not baser or more malicious.”83
As Harpending languished in prison, Jefferson Davis authorized yet another
audacious rebel plot in the Far West under yet another inexperienced commander. This
time it was Lansford Hastings, an eccentric mapmaker and would-be conquistador, who
won the approval of the Confederate high command. Hastings had achieved notoriety
before the war when his faulty directions sent the Donner Party to a disastrous winter in
the High Sierra in 1846-1847. Although Hastings had been born in Ohio, his politics
took a southern turn by the outbreak of the war, perhaps as a result of his 20-year
residency in proslavery California. In December 1863 he wrote to Davis with a plan that
made Sibley look like a paragon of restraint by comparison. Hastings proposed to raise a
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force of 3,000 to 5,000 partisans from California’s southern sympathizing population,
then march east to reclaim Arizona for the rebellion. The campaign would open “an
unbroken intercourse between California and the Confederacy,” according to Hastings.
Furthermore, it would serve as a “connecting link between the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, the best and most feasible line of communication across the continent, the only
practicable Atlantic and Pacific railroad route, the most valuable agricultural and grazing
lands, and the richest mineral region in the known world.”84
The plan was nothing short of preposterous, coming from a man with lack of
military experience and an abundance of past navigational blunders, but he clearly knew
how to appeal to Davis. By highlighting railroad development, as well as the agricultural
and mineral richness of the Southwest, Hastings spoke the language that southern
imperialists had employed throughout the antebellum period when discussing
slaveholding prospects in the Southwest. Davis thus approved the plan and
commissioned Hastings a major in the Confederate army. Although the campaign never
materialized – probably a result of Hastings’s own shortcomings as a military commander
and ongoing Confederate difficulties in the major eastern theaters – that Davis would
even countenance such an operation speaks to the enduring pull of the Far West on the
southern imperial imagination.85
Western rebels had more success with a smaller, but better organized, operation
around Sacramento in 1864. Under the command of Captain Rufus Ingram, a group of
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southern sympathizing desperados brought a taste of Missouri’s guerilla warfare to
California’s gold country. Ingram himself had fought under the notorious partisan leader,
William Quantrill in Missouri, and had played an active role in the rebel raid on
Lawrence, Kansas in August 1863, in which Quantrill’s rangers murdered over 180
civilians and burned nearly every building in town. Known as the “Red Fox” in
Missouri, Ingram saw an opportunity in California, which boasted a sufficient population
of Confederate sympathizers without an experienced leader. He began recruiting in
March 1864, mainly from the Knights of the Golden Circle around San Jose, eventually
attracting an outfit of some 50 men. Initially he had hoped to lead his unit back to the
major military theaters of the East, but with scanty funding, he opted for a guerilla
campaign within California itself. As Ingram’s lieutenant and Monterrey undersheriff
Tom Poole later recalled, “If we could not raise means enough to go South, we were to
raise and [sic] insurrection in California.”86
The band that the California press would soon dub “Ingram’s Partisan Rangers”
achieved their greatest success in June 1864, when they robbed a Wells, Fargo
stagecoach of its substantial cargo of gold and silver. Ingram established his Confederate
bona fides with a note he handed to the stage driver: “This is to certify that I have
received from Wells, Fargo & Co., the sum of $____ cash, for the purpose of outfitting
recruits enlisted in California for the confederate states’ army. R. Henry Ingram, captain
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commanding company, C.S.A.”

87

The band of six buried the bullion at a nearby spring

and then fled to their hideout, where local authorities, hot in pursuit, tracked them down.
Ingram and his raiders opened fire, killing one officer and grievously wounding another.
In the exchange Pool lost half his cheek to a shotgun blast, and decided to remain at the
hideout while the rest of the gang made their escape. He was later captured when backup
arrived, and subsequently made a full confession, identifying his confederates and
revealing where the bullion had been buried.88
Rebel activity and small-scale carnage continued through most of the summer.
After a failed heist in mid-July, the gang fled to another hideout, where they were again
tracked down by posse of sheriffs, constables and citizens. And once again, Ingram and
his partisans came out firing, wounding two sheriffs, while two of their own died in the
exchange. In late July, California authorities, backed by four companies of infantry – a
testament to just how seriously Union officials viewed this threat – arrested ten of
Ingram’s raiders. Several members of the gang robbed two more stagecoaches in early
August, but by then their partisan campaign was all but played out. By early September,
authorities had killed or arrested nearly every active member of the band – fifteen
captured, two dead – except for Ingram and one other. Local citizens packed the
courtroom that month, as the majority of the Ingram raiders stood trial for murder and
highway robbery – although notably not for treason.89 Ingram himself, however, eluded
justice, melting into the countryside and disappearing from history.90
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The roundup of Ingram’s scattered guerillas coincided with a broader Unionist
campaign against insurrection within the state. The most notable target of these
crackdowns was California’s Copperhead press. As early as February 1862, the U.S.
Postmaster banned the Los Angeles Star from the mails. Several months later the Visalia
Equal Rights Expositor, the Stockton Argus, and the San Jose Tribune, followed by the
Placerville Mountain Democrat and Stockton Democrat, joined the Star on the list of
banned materials. The prohibitions wounded the finances of these Copperhead papers,
although local southern sympathizers rallied in defense of their beleaguered press. In
Visalia, for instance, substantial donations from local anti-Unionists, particularly from
the women of Tulare County, floated the Equal Rights Expositor while its subscriptions
sagged under the ban. Similarly, the Los Angeles Star endured with the support of
Democratic sympathizers in the area. When the mails were reopened to the Star in
January 1863, the editor Henry Hamilton redoubled his defiance of Lincoln’s
administration. “[T]he prohibition was impotent,” Hamilton boasted, “so do we despise
this proffered sop.”91 Where prohibition failed to silence the southern sympathizing
press, mob vengeance often proved more persuasive. After editor Lovick P. Hall
published an abusive article on California’s federalist volunteers, titled “California
Cossacks,” a Unionist mob, led by soldiers, demolished the press and offices of the
Expositor. One of Merced’s Copperhead papers met a similar end at the hands of
enraged Unionists.92
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Along with prohibitions and mob action came a flurry of arrests. Harpending and
his co-conspirators, Ingram’s rangers, and other less violent offenders all came under
lock and key during the course of the war, most of them passing through the federal
prison at Alcatraz. In 1862, two of southern California’s most outspoken anti-Unionists,
Henry Hamilton and E.J.C. Kewen, were arrested, taken to Drum Barracks and then
transported to Alcatraz. Upon their release, the citizens of El Monte treated them to a
celebratory barbeque. The undersheriff of Los Angeles, A.J. King, who had so brazenly
displayed a life-sized portrait of rebel General P.G.T. Beauregard, was also arrested on
charges of conspiracy, though like Hamilton and Kewen, he secured his release upon
taking a loyalty oath. Of all Confederate sympathizers in California, none was more
extraordinary than Peter Biggs, a former slave turned Los Angeles barber and Democratic
partisan, who was escorted to Drum Barracks in 1864 for suspected treason.93 The
Expositor’s editor, Lovick P. Hall was arrested twice during the course of the war,
remaining under guard until September 1865, several months after the conflict had
ended.94
Coupled with Confederate defeats and the departure of southern sympathizers for
the military theaters of the East, these military detainments helped dampen rebel activity
in the Far West. Confederate plots, like Harpending’s would-be privateering expedition
and Ingram’s guerilla raids, deeply unsettled California’s Unionists, but the loyal
majority held firm throughout the war, especially in the northern half of the state.
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Opposition to the Lincoln administration, which had been fueled by the state’s
antebellum Democratic traditions, dwindled as the contest wore on. So too did
Democratic voter turnout at a statewide level. In 1864, perhaps intimidated by militant
Unionism, Kewen and Hamilton opted not to run for reelection to the state legislature.
That year, financial difficulties finally forced Hamilton to sell the Star to a pro-Union
Democrat. Later, the wealthy Unionist Phineas Banning purchased the press and
materials, moved it to Wilmington, and filled its columns with praise for Lincoln.95 The
proslavery spirit that had burned so brightly during the antebellum period and the early
war years had waned to mere embers.

A California Rebel in Napoleon’s Court
But that spirit was hardly dead. It merely migrated. While Unionist crackdowns
had suppressed the most vocal signs of secessionism in the Far West, California’s rebels
had gone international by mid-war. Most threatening, in the eyes of federal authorities,
was former U.S. senator William McKendree Gwin, who, by 1864, had reached the court
of Napoleon III. Gwin had relocated to Paris where he launched a campaign to convince
the French emperor to back a scheme for a colonial settlement in Sonora, Mexico. He
proposed to populate Sonora, then under the jurisdiction of France’s puppet emperor,
with American miners and adventurers, who would help trigger a gold rush in the region
– a la California some twelve years earlier. Although Gwin was not an official
representative of the Confederate government, Union authorities were under no illusions:
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the Mississippi planter-cum-California statesman was a southern partisan through and
through, and his Sonora colony might very well serve as a far western base of operations
for the rebellion. Ulysses S. Grant recognized as much when he contemplated the
invasion of Gwin’s Sonora colony in January 1865.96 In Grant’s mind, the threat Gwin
posed was dire enough to transform a civil war into an international conflagration.97
Union officials watched Gwin’s movements carefully – well before he moved to
Paris. After all, few could forget that Gwin was the leading figure in California’s
proslavery political faction, the owner of a Mississippi plantation, and a close confidant
of Confederate sympathizers across the country. Two of those sympathizers served as his
traveling companions in October 1861 as slipped out of California. Joining future
Confederate general Joseph Lancaster Brent and the prominent Chiv lawyer, Calhoun
Benham, Gwin boarded the USS Orizaba en route to New York via Panama. But the
three never intended to sail for a U.S harbor. Instead, according to Brent, they planned to
“leave the steamer at Panama, make our way to the West Indies, and from there run the
blockade into one of the Southern ports, which could be easily done at that period of the
war.”98 As their misfortune would have it, however, also aboard the Orizaba were four
hundred U.S. soldiers under the command of General Edward Vose Sumner, the former
commander of the Pacific Department, who had been particularly vigilant in his
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surveillance of California rebels during the opening phase of the war. While at sea,
Sumner ordered the arrest of Gwin, Benham and Brent, “all leading, active, and
influential men of the party in rebellion against the government.”99
In protesting their arrest, the three prisoners nearly sparked an international
conflict. When the Orizaba pulled into port at Panama City, several American
southerners there – including the former minister to Panama, who owed his appointment
to Gwin – caught wind of the ex-senator’s arrest. They appealed to the governor, who in
turn dispatched a company of soldiers to the landing wharf to protest the “violation of the
sovereignty of Panama.” Sumner threatened to bombard the city if his orders were
resisted and sent the three prisoners ashore, guarded by a flotilla of small boats and four
hundred soldiers, while a man-of-war pulled into the port and turned its broadside on the
city. According to Brent, their arrest was carried out with “a ‘pomp and circumstance of
war’ such as Pizarro himself never possessed on the Isthmus when at the height of his
power.”100 Thus secured, the prisoners were sent off to New York under parole, and later
imprisoned at Fort Lafayette, before ultimately securing their release on the orders of
Lincoln by the end of 1861.101
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Gwin returned to the Mississippi River Valley to look after his plantation for the
next few years, while his son served a brief stint in the Confederate cavalry. Musing on
his next steps, he wrote to Brent in March 1863. The plan was to run the blockade with
his son – since released from military service – and head to Canada, and from there to
either Cuba or Europe. America was no place for him, he concluded, with Union troops
closing in on every side. “I want to get away from war,” he wrote. Although “my
negroes are as yet safe,” there was no telling how far the Yankees (“the vilest thieves on
Earth”) would go with regard to southern property. Ultimately, however, Gwin hoped to
return to California – and more specifically, to a California free from Union control.
“When the war is over & the South gains her independence we will return to California,”
he wrote. “If we conquer we can put down the Yankees there & what a country it is &
what a climate.”102 Although sketchy in their details, here were plans for a separate
empire on the Pacific: first, southern independence, then the termination of U.S. rule in
California.
But California had to wait until Confederate independence. In the meantime,
France beckoned. After Union forces sacked his Mississippi plantation in July 1863,
Gwin boarded the side-wheeler R.E. Lee, ran the federal blockade, and sailed for Paris.
There he joined a large community of southern expatriates, many of whom were
endeavoring to enlist French aid in the Confederate cause. Although never pledging
official support for the the slaveholders’ rebellion, the French emperor, Napoleon III
proved receptive to these overtures – substantially more so than other European heads of
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state – and he turned a blind eye to the money and munitions that French sources were
sending to the Confederate South.103 Thus Gwin had reason for optimism when he won
an audience with Napoleon to outline his ambitious plan for a new mining colony in
Sonora and Chihuahua, Mexico. France had invaded Mexico in the spring of 1862, on
the pretext of securing repayment of past debts, and installed the Austrian archduke
Maximilian on the throne of the newly created Mexican Empire. Gwin proposed to
unearth the hidden wealth of this empire by attracting American immigrants to the
mineral regions of northern Mexico, and in the process, provide a buffer against the U.S.
government, which was hostile to Napoleon’s puppet government in Mexico. All he
asked in return was a military detachment of some one thousand troops to protect his
colonists from Comanche and Apache raiders.104 Enchanted by Gwin’s assurances of
mineral wealth in the region, Napoleon and his cabinet officially endorsed the plan by the
spring of 1864 and dispatched Gwin to Mexican City to prepare the way for the new
colony.105
The former senator pitched his colony as a golden opportunity for France’s
imperial prospects, but Gwin had a different empire in mind when he set out for Mexico
in the summer of 1864. Here was a chance, not only to enhance his personal wealth, but
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also to mark out an extensive boundary for a new domain on the Pacific, entirely
independent of the U.S. As Gwin recalled in his memoirs, the Sonora colony was to be
the first step in the formation of a vast Pacific republic. Had the Confederacy won its
independence, “it was believed by many that the country would have still been divided by
the separation of California from the Union and the establishment of an independent
government on the Pacific coast,” Gwin noted. “In that event, northern districts of
Mexico would have formed an important addition to the Western Republic.”106 Gwin thus
articulated a more fully realized vision of what he had hinted at in his letter to Brent,
when he mused on the possibility of ending Yankee rule in California. By attracting
emigrants – and most likely southerners – to Sonora, Gwin was preparing for a future free
of U.S. control, and in a strong position to exert his political will over a powerful and
mineral-rich Pacific empire.
Only in hindsight does such a geopolitical reordering appear fanciful or farfetched. As historian Rachel St. John recently argued, Gwin’s visions for Pacific
independence were both “entirely possible” and consistent with decades of American
imperialism. Expansionist like Gwin – with “grand ambitions and flexible loyalties” –
saw “their nation’s boundaries not as a fait accompli but as a work in progress.”107
Gwin’s plans were particularly consistent with the longer history of proslavery
expansionism in the American West. Proponents of a southern transcontinental railroad,
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for instance, hoped to exert control over the West through immigration, infrastructural
development, and commercial penetration. Territorial conquest and the extension of
chattel slavery, while certainly desirable, were not essential to this southern vision of
continental control. Similarly, Gwin operated politically rather than militarily, and he
hoped to harness the gradual force of immigration to remake this western region in a
southern – or certainly an anti-Unionist – image. Henry Crabb, William Walker, Narciso
Lopez, and John A. Quitman had repeatedly shown that independent military operations
were a bloody and inefficient way to carve out geopolitical spheres of influence. Far
better to work within legal, political and diplomatic channels to secure imperial ends –
this was the lesson of over a decade of proslavery scheming in the Far West.
In fleeing one war in the United States, Gwin nearly created another in Mexico.
When Union officials caught wind of his movements in Sonora, they prepared for a
border-crossing conflict. The federal commander Ulysses S. Grant was particularly
concerned about Gwin, “a rebel of the most virulent order.” As his army besieged Robert
E. Lee’s forces at Petersburg, Virginia, Grant considered the possibility of launching
another invasion, thousands of miles to the west. If Gwin organized “the dissatisfied
spirits of California” and threatened an incursion of American territory, Grant was
prepared to respond in full force. “I would not rest satisfied with simply driving the
invaders onto Mexican soil,” he wrote to General Irwin McDowell in January 1865, “but
would pursue him until overtaken, and would retain possession of the territory from
which the invader started until indemnity for the past and security for the future… was
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insured.”
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McDowell, commander of the Pacific Department, also tracked Gwin’s

movements with growing unease. Evidently, two agents were operating in San Francisco
to recruit would-be colonists and thereby “plant upon our frontiers a people hostile to our
institutions, our influence, and our progress.” McDowell thus dispatched a brigadier
general to Arizona to track Gwin’s movements in Mexico, and organized a force of two
to three regiments to “provide for any contingency.”109
Gwin was not officially commissioned by the Confederate government. But
Confederates certainly cheered his progress. While Gwin and his son-in-law played up
his Unionism in post-war reminiscences, the ex-senator’s wartime actions betrayed an
undeniable rebel allegiance. Gwin himself recognized that he was “highly valued
because I am with the South in this contest.”110 Even before he arrived in Sonora,
California disunionists like Cameron Thom believed French intervention in Mexico
would lift rebel prospects in the West.111 By the time the former senator moved into the
region, the promise of a Confederate outlet in the Far West took fuller form. “Doubtless
the Doctor [Gwin] has written you as to his plans in Sonora,” Calhoun Benham wrote to
Joseph Lancaster Brent in late 1864. “He is ‘Director in Chief of Colonization in the
Departments of Sonora and Chihuahua’ which it is proposed to colonize with Southern
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people from California.”

112

John Slidell – the Confederate minister to France, who had

been privy to Gwin’s dealings in Paris – held high hopes for the Sonora mission. “His
object is to colonize Sonora with sons of southern birth… residing in California,” Slidell
wrote to Judah P. Benjamin. “If carried out its consequences will be most beneficial.”113
Geographic factors alone, as Slidell probably recognized, would have lent the Sonora
colony a southern character. In close proximity to rebel Arizona and Confederatesympathizing southern California, the Sonora colony stood out as a potential magnet for
nearby disunionists. As the Confederacy’s armies crumbled in the East, therefore,
Gwin’s colony could have opened a rebel escape valve in the West.
Yet for all the Unionist fears and Confederate expectations that he stirred, Gwin’s
Mexican career was short-lived. A medley of factors beyond Gwin’s control –
interpersonal struggles within the court of Maximilian, the tenacious resistance of
Juarez’s Liberal armies, various administrative missteps – conspired to doom his best laid
plans.114 Gwin did indeed begin recruiting in California, but without French military aid
to protect his would-be colonists from Apache and Comanche tribes, mining operations
could not safely commence. Gwin continued pressing his case until the early summer of
1866, several months after the Confederacy’s collapse. By July, however, he finally
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abandoned his plans and rode from Mexico City under an armed escort.

115

Whereas

Maximilian eventually faced a firing squad of Juarez’s victorious soldiers, Gwin was
fortunate to escape with his life – a fact he attributed to the poor marksmanship of the
Mexican Liberals.116 But he had merely leapt from the frying pan and into the fire. Back
in the United States, and with Confederate rebellion quashed, the former senator was
arrested and transported under guard to Fort Jackson, Louisiana in October 1865.117
He languished there for nearly eight months, until April 1866 – a prison term that
reflected the audacity of his plans.118 Aside from Jefferson Davis, no Confederate high
official served such a long prison term after the war. And for good reason. In many
ways this was the apotheosis – or at least the grandest manifestation – of over a decade of
southern scheming in the Far West. James Gadsden and Thomas Jefferson Green had
conspired to plant a slave colony on the ostensibly free soil of antebellum California;
Henry Crabb and William Walker had launched short-lived and ill-fated invasions of
Sonora; Postmaster General A.V. Brown had outmaneuvered northern congressmen to
construct an overland mail road along a far southern route; Chivalry Democrats had
leveraged their political power to pass a state division bill in California. But only Gwin
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had dared to conspire with emperors, to antagonize the Union high command, and to
launch a colony intended as the southern extension of an independent Pacific republic.
As the U.S. attempted to reassert sovereignty over the former Confederacy, Gwin stood
as a reminder of the globetrotting nature of the recent rebellion, when the slave South
reached into the courts of emperors.119

The Death of the Southern Dream
As his armies deteriorated across the eastern theaters and his government
collapsed around him, Jefferson Davis continued to look west. Indeed, the Confederate
dream of a continental empire proved nearly impossible to kill. While Grant, Sherman
and Sheridan’s Union forces penetrated deep into Confederate territory, Davis considered
launching an invasion of his own, once again into the territory of New Mexico. And
again, he turned to the commander of the first Confederate invasion of the region, John R.
Baylor. Between Gwin’s Sonora colony and Baylor’s proposed invasion, the West, some
believed, represented the last best hope for the rebellion.
For his encore performance, Baylor hoped to tap the region’s deep reservoirs of
secessionist sentiment. To Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon in December
1864, Baylor wrote of the enduring spirit of rebellion in the Southwest – “the only
[remaining] section where men of Southern birth can be raised in large numbers, who
sympathize with us and who would join us in this struggle.” From southern California
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and Arizona he expected to raise somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 rebel troops, with
perhaps an additional 5,000 coming from New Mexico.120 For the initial invasion force,
however, he intended to once again recruit in Texas. With Confederate coffers nearly
emptied by this stage of the war, Baylor expected to fund his operation through the sale
of Texas cotton.121
The Confederate War Department, reeling from Confederate defeats in the East,
rejected Baylor’s plan. But Davis, a western expansionist to the last, overrode Seddon’s
decision and endorsed this last, desperate push into New Mexico. In late March 1865,
Baylor was commissioned a colonel and given authority to raise an invasion force of
2500 in Texas.122 That Davis proved willing to dispatch 2500 soldiers to New Mexico at
a time when his armies were disintegrating in Virginia, again illustrates the power of this
dream of continental empire. The end of major military operations, however, was a mere
few weeks away. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia surrendered on April 9,
thus effectively ending the war and sinking Davis’s hopes for another western campaign.
The Confederate surrender at Appomattox, however, did not completely
extinguish the embers of rebellion in the Far West. In late April, Union officers were still
fretting over a potential invasion of Arizona.123 And not without reason. Some Arizona
rebels were still trying to muster an invasion force a full six weeks after Lee’s
surrender.124 Meanwhile, when news of Lincoln’s assassination reached California, the
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state’s anti-Unionists took to the streets in celebration. In Los Angeles “the Southern
‘patriots’ got on a bust,” Horace Bell recalled. “[T]hey howled themselves horse – they
howled and they hurrahed until they fell in the streets, dead drunk.” Dr. John S. Griffin
and Peter Briggs, the so-called black Democrat, were particularly elated by the news. 125
Reports of similar celebrations across the state began pouring into the Department of the
Pacific. According to one such report, the southern sympathizing citizens of Colusa
“fired guns and cheered the assassination of the President.”126 But Unionists quickly
clamped down on these displays. And angry mobs destroyed the presses of five
Democratic papers, including the one belonging to Beriah Brown, the reputed head of the
Knights of the Columbian Star.127
Roughly four months later, in September 1865, the last California rebel faced
execution. Tom Poole, Ingram’s lieutenant as well as one of Harpending’s coconspirators in the Chapman affair, had been convicted on murder charges near
Sacramento. Well over a year earlier, he was arrested as a member of Ingram’s raiders
after a shootout with local authorities that left one officer dead and another seriously
wounded. Although Pool was treated as a common criminal, he identified as a
Confederate prisoner of war to the very end. Ingram’s outfit was a rebel operation, he
insisted, and their heists and subsequent shootouts represented military actions against the
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Union government.

128

Befitting such acts, several members of the gang were convicted

of treason, although they later won their freedom on technicalities. That left only Poole
to face punishment for the gang’s guerilla operations. Despite a spirited campaign
conducted by his many friends within the state, he failed to obtain the governor’s pardon.
On September 29, 1865, five months after Appomattox and roughly 2,500 miles from the
war’s major military theaters, Tom Poole was hanged – making him perhaps the final
casualty in a war that spanned the continent, from the sea islands of the Carolinas to the
mining towns of California.129

128
129

See their declarations in Alta California, September 10, 1864.
For an account of Poole’s trial and execution, see Boessenecker, Badge and Buckshot, 155-157.

295

Chapter 6

THE AFTERLIFE OF THE OLD SOUTH IN THE FAR WEST
Surveying California’s post-war political order in the fall of 1866, writer Bret
Harte concluded that the state’s once dominant Democratic party now faced extinction.
“Rip Van Winkle, awakened from his long nap, hurrahing for his Majesty King George,
did not exhibit a more incongruous and ridiculous spectacle than these men who seem to
have hibernated during the war,” Harte wrote to the Springfield Republican in 1866.
Whereas Democrats – largely southern in origin and proslavery in outlook – had ruled the
state through most of the 1850s, they were now, in Harte’s estimation, little more than
“fossils” of a bygone era.1 But Harte’s projections were entirely premature. Within a
year, the state’s Democratic Party rode to a stunning electoral victory on a white
supremacist, anti-federal platform. And in the coming years, they would tap bitter antiblack and anti-Chinese sentiment to pursue a campaign against Reconstruction, rejecting
both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments – making California the only free state to
do so during the period.2 This all came at a time when Republicans were successfully
pressing their agenda at the national level and when most southern states remained under
the aegis of Military Reconstruction.
Through a study of California’s Democratic politics, this chapter challenges the
geography, chronology and racial composition of the standard narrative of
Reconstruction. It insists that we look beyond the Mississippi and beyond black-white,
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North-South binaries, and instead view Reconstruction as a protracted, nationwide
struggle over the legacies of slavery and the Civil War – a struggle that often took
unexpected turns. Some of the stiffest opposition to Republican policies at the time came
from regions far beyond the former Confederate states. In fact, the so-called “retreat
from Reconstruction” began largely in California, where as early as 1867 voters vented
their frustrations with national policy by driving out of office the party most closely
associated with federal action in the South.3 In tracing this western revolt against
Reconstruction, it becomes clear that the southern influence on California politics did not
die with slavery. Although many of the former proslavery leaders had faded from the
scene, the old southern interests that once dominated the state continued to exert a
disproportionate influence on California’s political culture. Indeed, the state’s
Democratic politicians and writers stressed their affinity for the beleaguered South and
articulated, at an early stage, the emerging tenets of Lost Cause mythology. Along with
their northern-born partners within the Democratic fold, these southerners blunted the
reach of Reconstruction and ensured that the former Confederacy had allies in the Far
West.
This chapter joins a small but growing body of literature that seeks to shift the
perspective of Reconstruction-era historiography, a historiography that has traditionally
limited its purview to the eastern half of the continent. From Hubert Howe Bancroft in
the late nineteenth century to Eric Foner in the late twentieth and beyond, historians have
overlooked the myriad ways in which federal policy shaped politics in the American
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West during this period. Bancroft’s pioneering work focused almost exclusively on local
politics during the post-Civil War era, while Foner’s synthesis, for all that it
accomplished, largely ignored political matters in the trans-Mississippi West.4 There
have been some notable exceptions, however, beginning with Eugene Berwanger’s The
West and Reconstruction in 1981. More recently, the scholarship of Joshua Paddison, D.
Michael Bottoms, and Stacey Smith has drawn needed attention to the racial politics of
post-Civil War California.5 Yet the dominant narrative remains regional rather than
national, and none have yet adequately probed the political affinities that bound South
and West during this period. The limits of Reconstruction and the path to Redemption
must be understood in fully national terms, as a program that stretched from the coast of
California to the heartland of the former Confederacy.

Go West, Old South
By the spring of 1865 the Confederacy had been routed, slavery abolished, and
the wealth of the rebellious states drained. Yet fears persisted of a lingering threat from
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the South. Less than a month after Appomattox, the Sacramento Daily Union predicted
that a flood of rebel refugees would soon inundate the West. The border slave states,
warned the Union, would send westward a “class of shiftless, lawless Union-haters” and
“across the Plains will come the poor, ignorant, brute whites” of the South, along with
their political apostasy. The West’s relative lack of African Americans made it a natural
escape for the thousands of former Confederates fleeing the fallout of emancipation, the
paper added.6 Fears of a southern takeover were only compounded by later reports,
including one from New York, where a secret cabal of former rebels had purportedly
gathered. Because of California’s strong Democratic affiliations, the state was regarded
as a field of opportunity for southern politicians, according to the Union’s New York
correspondent. Among those contemplating a fresh start in the West were former
Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard and California’s estranged former senator,
William McKendree Gwin. “I tell you their eyes are turned thitherward,” the
correspondent warned.7
Ultimately the threat of a mass southern migration to the Far West never
materialized. According to census data, the number of Californians born in the former
Confederate states increased by only 700 between 1860 and 1870. Yet this enduring
distrust of the slave South was not entirely misplaced. Even if the state’s southern-born
population had not greatly increased over the previous decade, California still harbored
five times as many natives of Confederate states than any other part of the West. 8
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Furthermore, few longtime residents could forget that proslavery leaders had steered the
state’s political course through the antebellum period. And although California remained
loyal during the Civil War, pro-Confederate activity had forced Union officials to
garrison the southern part of the state, while a venomous Copperhead press agitated
against the Lincoln administration. California may have entered the postwar order under
relatively progressive Union Party leadership, yet many residents cherished fond
memories of California’s proslavery past.
Lucy Smith Crittenden Thornton was one such Californian. With a peerless
southern pedigree – wife of an Alabama Supreme Court judge, mother of a Confederate
officer, and sister of Kentucky Senator John J. Crittenden – Lucy Thornton clung to as
many of her prewar connections as she could in postwar San Francisco, where she and
her family had lived since 1849. While complaining that “Yankee officers are all the
fashion” in San Francisco, her social world still featured large gatherings of former
Confederates, including the wife of the slain rebel general, Albert Sidney Johnston.9
Meanwhile, Lucy Thornton and her California-based family kept up a close
correspondence with friends in the South, lamenting the “melancholy picture of affairs

this census data in, The West and Reconstruction, 19-20. For the original figures, see Francis A. Walker, A
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social & political in our beloved old home [Alabama],” in the words of her daughter
Sarah.10 Such sympathies led the Thorntons and other southern expatriates in San
Francisco to start a fund for the former Confederate states.11 Although the fund never
measured up to Lucy’s expectations, she hoped to entice some of her friends and family
to move to California from the Reconstruction South. She reminded her son that while
former rebels in the South suffered under federal intervention, prospects appeared much
brighter in the West.12
Several hundred miles to the south of Lucy Thornton, in the town of Los Angeles,
prospects for former rebels appeared more promising still. There, former rebels and rebel
sympathizers ruled, making life perilous for the town’s Unionists. In the summer of 1866
“the Civil War continued to rage” in Los Angeles, according to Horace Bell, a Union
veteran who had just returned to southern California. Bell found that old friends “turned
their backs on me” and spoke spitefully of his wartime service. He met with a common
refrain on the city’s streets: “The idea… of a Los Angeles man of your stamp fighting on
the side of the blacks! As a “red rag to the Secessionist bulls of the vicinity,” Bell wound
up (according to his own estimates) in as many as 40 brawls for his wartime loyalties,
although the eventual arrival of more Union veterans relieved some of the pressure.13 As
a longtime Los Angeles resident, Bell had grown accustomed to the southern character of
the town. A natural endpoint to the southern overland route, Los Angeles attracted a
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sizeable portion of its population from below the Mason-Dixon Line, and during the
1850s grew into what we might consider the far western outpost of the slave South.14
During the war, these southern natives transformed Los Angeles and its neighboring
counties into a hotbed of secessionist activity, leading Union officials to believe that the
state might devolve into an internal civil war.15 If Bell’s postwar experiences are any
indication, sentiments were slow to change. Indeed, Democrats carried the Los Angeles
Country in every state and national election before 1880.16 And in 1882 the citizens of
Los Angeles went so far as to elect as mayor, Cameron E. Thom, a former captain in the
Confederate Army.17
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The southern influence on California persisted in less violent form along the
Merced River in the Central Valley, where several planters launched an ambitious
experiment in cotton cultivation. John L. and J.M. Strong, brothers and Georgia natives,
served as the pioneers and propagandists of these efforts, gathering around them a small
community of fellow southern migrants. John L. Strong viewed California as something
of an extension of the plantation South, a state that lay almost entirely “within the cotton
zone.”18 By the early 1870s, efforts at cotton cultivation had created a “mania” in
California, according to the Fresno Expositor, and soon glowing reports poured in from
across the state and even the South.19 When the Strong brothers shipped their samples to
experts in New Orleans, Liverpool and Scotland, they received highly gratifying
feedback, attesting to the superior quality of the California crop.20
Aside from the temperate climate, California’s advantage, according to western
planters, rested in its laboring population. The Strong brothers insisted that Chinese
“coolies” presented an elegant solution to the problem of free black labor. Compared to
recently emancipated slaves, argued John L. Strong to a correspondent in Kentucky,
Chinese laborers were “less expensive,” “controlled with less difficulty,” and were
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generally “more efficient.”

These cotton experiments thus constituted both an

endorsement of western agriculture and a small-scale revolt against the postemancipation order in the South. Despite the Strong brothers’ boosterism, however,
fantasies of a new cotton kingdom in the West ultimately came to naught. The
combination of a labor shortage and California’s distance from markets proved fatal for
the crop, which planters had largely abandoned by the late 1870s.22
Aside from J.M. Strong and his brief foray into state politics, these cotton planters
did not pose a serious threat to Union or Republican control in California.23 A far greater
political menace, according to the Unionist press, came from William M. Gwin, the
former Mississippi slaveholder who had been California’s Democratic kingpin through
the 1850s. Senator Gwin’s postwar political comeback was nothing short of spectacular,
a testament to the enduring power of southerners in the state’s affairs. In the spring of
1865, few would have predicted that Gwin could ever return to politics in the West. For
the second time in the course of four years, he had been imprisoned on suspicion of
treason. He remained under guard at Fort Jackson, Louisiana, until early 1866, for a total
of nearly eight months – a longer prison sentence than any Confederate high official other
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than Jefferson Davis.

California’s loyal press had cast him off as a “hoary-headed

traitor,” while Ulysses S. Grant himself branded him a “rebel of the most virulent
order.”25 Yet by late 1866 he was back in California, and a year after that he helped
orchestrate the astonishing electoral victory of his son, Willie, a former Confederate
cavalryman.26 As a state senator, the younger Gwin would become one of the leading
opponents of the Fifteenth Amendment, while his father continued to campaign on behalf
of his various Democratic friends. Although the elder Gwin never again sought office, he
remained a prominent voice in state politics and continued to inspire glowing tributes
from California’s rapidly growing Democratic population.27 For many, Gwin had not
only redeemed himself; he had helped redeem the state for the old guard of the
Democratic Party.28
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The Roots of Revolt
The Far West may have avoided the deluge of former Confederates that some had
feared, but California could not so easily escape its proslavery past. That past lived on in
Los Angeles’ lingering secessionist sentiments, in cotton experiments along the Merced
River, and in the second career of William Gwin. It also persisted in the politics of a
small but growing core of Democratic politicians. When the Thirteenth Amendment
came up for ratification by the states in December 1865, a cadre of California Democrats
took a determined stand against emancipation. Senator J.K. Rush of Colusa suggested
that the amendment to liberate the nation’s slaves simultaneously infringed upon state’s
rights, and that such measures would only open the floodgates to greater federal
encroachments. Furthermore, he argued, why should a mere two-thirds of the states be
able to strip Delaware, which had remained loyal to the Union throughout the course of
the war, of its enslaved laborers?29 The dominant Union Party easily silenced these antiabolitionist voices of dissent. However, in future struggles over the meaning of
emancipation, Democrats would increasingly exploit California’s white supremacist
tendencies to gain the upper hand.
California’s Democrats began their comeback by tapping into a widely-held fear
among the state’s voting public: that whites sat uneasily atop a racial pyramid slowly
crumbling under the weight of federal Reconstruction. White voters recognized that
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measures designed to reconstruct the South would decisively shape the West as well. In
fact, Congress extended the suffrage to African Americans in the territories two months
before those in the former Confederacy.30 In such a diverse state, whites felt particularly
threatened by the prospect of a widening franchise which would inexorably dilute their
voting power. These threats to white supremacy came in many shades of brown –
African Americans, Native Americans, Hispanics, and Chinese immigrants.31 While
California’s Mexican-born citizens had earned at least the grudging respect of many
white Democrats due to their longstanding ties to the Party – especially in southern
California – blacks, Indians, and Chinese residents remained political outcasts and the
targets of both rhetorical and physical assaults.32 California’s anxious white electorate
quickly connected the dots: if Republicans could remake the racial order in the South,
they might similarly empower non-whites in the West. Thus, what began as a mistrust of
federal policy grew into what D. Michael Bottoms calls “a level of racial hysteria
unmatched anywhere else.”33
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In the statewide races of the immediate postwar period, local issues generated far
less interest (and friction) than national policies. For instance, on crucial state labor
issues – namely support for the eight-hour workday – California’s Democrats and
Republicans were in agreement. And unlike eastern Republicans, westerners expended
little political capital on policies related to prohibition, prostitution, or trade unionism.
Instead, California’s electoral battles centered on national Reconstruction and the racial
and economic policies that it entailed. By conjuring the bogeyman of an overweening
federal government, Democratic leaders differentiated themselves from their Republican
opposition and rallied the votes of the white working class. They harped on the cost of
Reconstruction in the South, especially expenditures on the Freedmen’s Bureau, and what
this might mean for taxation in the West. And above all else, they played to deep racial
anxieties by presenting scenarios in which the state’s non-white populations had equal
political power.34 These were the anxieties that united many white voters across the
continent and made the Republican political experiment such a fragile undertaking.
Attuned to these apprehensions, Democrats made an attack on black voting rights
the central plank in their 1865 campaign. Because Republicans also opposed Chinese
suffrage, Sinophobia was not the political wedge that it would later become for
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Democratic candidates. At the Democratic State Convention that year, Eugene Casserly,
fast emerging as the Party’s leading spokesman on this issue, pledged his “opposition to
negro suffrage and its inevitable result, the social equality of the negro.”35 Democrats
like Casserly learned that casting their opponents as champions of black suffrage and
racial equality paid political dividends, while simultaneously distracting from accusations
of wartime disloyalty. In turn, their opponents complained that Democrats had created a
single-issue party. The Stockton Independent reported, with some justification, that “the
negro is about the only staple in Democratic argument… without him the party would be
non est.”36
As the self-anointed defenders of white rule, Democrats enjoyed modest success
in the 1865 elections. Although the Union Party retained control of the statehouse,
Democrats won important seats from Sacramento, San Francisco, and Sonoma. But more
valuable than any legislative gains were the lessons learned: race baiting won votes, and
more generally, vocal opposition to Reconstruction could provide a way forward for the
party. In the legislature of 1865-66, Democrats compensated for their limited numbers
with the ferocity of their attacks on federal policy. They inserted themselves into the
national struggle over Reconstruction by issuing a wave of resolutions on federal issues,
while also introducing more localized bills to prevent the immigration of blacks into
California and to permanently bar them from the franchise. When, in December 1865,
Congress refused to seat the recently elected candidates from former Confederate states –
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including six members of Davis’s cabinet, 58 Confederate Congressmen, and four
Confederate generals – California’s Democrats spoke out in opposition.37
Support for Andrew Johnson and sympathy for the defeated South became
hallmarks of this opposition to Reconstruction. Democrats were jubilant when Johnson
vetoed the Freedmen’s Bureau bill in February 1866. To celebrate, they held a rally in
San Francisco, and issued a series of resolutions, drafted by Benjamin Franklin
Washington, the Virginia-born editor of the state’s leading Democratic newspaper. In
conjunction with opposition to black suffrage, sectional healing was the order of the day:
Resolved: That American progress and civilization alike demand that
friendly feelings should be cultivated between the North and the South;
that their citizens should forgive and forget the wrongs of the past; that
they should seek to soothe the asperities growing out of the war; that they
should ‘let the dead past bury the dead,’ and shaking hands over the graves
of common brothers and countrymen, pledge themselves to a better
understanding in the future.38
This early paean to reconciliation came at a time when the memory of the war was still
fresh in the nation’s collective mind, when retribution seemed as likely as reunion. In
their battle against Reconstruction, California’s Democrats were among the first to
embrace the reconciliationist (if racially exclusive) spirit that would, in time, guide much
of the nation.39
As Democrats united in opposition to Reconstruction, the Union Party began to
fray. A coalition of Republicans and loyalist Democrats that came together during the
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early years of the war, the Union Party clung tenaciously to its old majority in a time of
peace. Johnson’s vetoes of the Freedmen’s Bureau and civil rights bills – triumphs for
California’s Democrats – exposed fissures within the fragile Union coalition. Party
leaders would eventually endorse the civil rights bill – what would become the
Fourteenth Amendment – but at the cost of alienating their more conservative allies.
Union stalwarts who guided the state during the war years were dismayed to find the
party in shambles by 1867. Yet, in many ways, this swift decline was no surprise.
Taking the long view of California history, we can see the Union party as merely the
product of wartime exigencies, an aberration in the state’s deep association with
proslavery politics. Beneath the surface, California remained an intensely racist state,
hostile to the progressive politics of the Republican postwar order. The Union Party
simply lacked the blueprint for a political future. That future belonged to the Democrats
and their politics of white supremacy. Thus, the Democratic victories of the late 1860s
look less like a “political revolution,” as Michael Bottoms has suggested, and more like a
return to the political equilibrium that had long reigned in California.40 This was a
redemption of sorts, not a revolution.41
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A Referendum on Reconstruction
When Congressional Republicans passed three Reconstruction Acts between
March and July 1867, they once again invigorated the Democratic cause in California.
Here was confirmation of white supremacists’ worst fears: not only had the acts placed a
suffering South under military rule, but they had enfranchised black voters in the former
Confederacy while simultaneously barring many whites from the polls. B.F.
Washington, slavery apologist and editor of the San Francisco Examiner, raged against
what he called the “great Mongrel military despotism” and the “Five Monarchy Acts,” a
reference to the five military districts into which the former Confederacy had been
divided. No amount of scorn seemed sufficient for the Republicans behind these policies.
“Never before in this or any other country did a more atrocious band of wicked traitors
and unconscionable knaves meet together,” Washington seethed.42 Military
Reconstruction was naked act of northern aggression, according to Washington, born out
of a vengeful hatred of the South. “Ranting, raving New England Puritans,” Washington
wrote, “hate a Southern gentleman and all his belongings, on the same principle that the
devil does holy water.”43 Other Democrats were no less vehement in their denunciations
of Military Reconstruction. An equally irate California Democrat claimed that the recent
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Congressional measures “crushe[ed] beneath the iron heel of naked power every principle
of right and freedom [for which] the revolution [had been] fought.”44
Democratic politicians carried this outrage into campaign season that summer and
urged California’s voters to join them by casting their ballots in protest against
Reconstruction. A quick look at the Democratic platform would immediately dismiss
any notion that the Far West isolated itself from national issues during this period. In
fact, it was precisely upon national issues that Democrats aimed to rebuild the party.
Roughly half of their platform planks targeted Reconstruction, especially the issues of
black suffrage and military rule in the South. Radical Republicans, the state committee
argued, had “imperil[ed] the union by their mad and seditious course.” Reflecting
growing sympathy for the defeated South, the committee insisted that “the states lately in
rebellion should be dealt with in a spirit of kindness and forbearance” rather than
Congress’ current “harsh, illiberal, and oppressive” policy. The committee also
hammered on the party’s central plank by reminding voters that suffrage for “negroes,
Chinese, and Indians… would end in the degradation of the white race and speedy
destruction of the government.”45 The cumulative effect of these resolutions was to
present a clear and united front of opposition to Republican national policy. And by
linking the Union Party with Congressional legislation, California’s Democrats turned the
September elections into a referendum on Reconstruction.
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Opposition to Military Reconstruction, rejection of black suffrage, and sympathy
for the defeated South proved a winning formula in the election.46 Indeed, this grand
strategy catapulted California’s Democrats to one of the most stunning electoral reversals
in the postwar years. While the Union Party held a decisive 65 percent of the seats in
previous state legislature, when the polls closed in September 1867 the Democrats had
gained a 22-seat majority in the assembly, and won two of the three U.S. House elections.
Out of the state’s 47 counties, 32 went Democrat, while Union-Republicans polled a
dismal 35 percent in San Francisco, once a party stronghold. Democrats were now
poised to elect a U.S. senator in December and to fill most state offices with party
loyalists.47 Although Union-Republican supporters insisted that their defeat resulted from
internal party divisions and low voter-turnout, Democrats recognized that their attacks on
Reconstruction had been the deciding factor in the election.48 By returning the
Democrats to power, California’s white voters effectively denounced Military
Reconstruction in the South and registered their firm opposition to black suffrage.
The Democratic landslide was all the more remarkable coming as it did at the
high tide of national Republicanism. In the election of 1866 – what one scholar has
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called the most important mid-term contest in American history – Republicans extended
their massive majority in Congress to ensure that they controlled well over two-thirds of
the votes required to override a Johnson veto.49 As Howard Beale noted in his influential
account of the election, that decisive victory helped transform the Radicals from a
“determined minority” to a position of “irresistible mastery.”50 Over the next year,
Radical Republicans leveraged these gains to secure the military occupation of the South
and to advance their program of black suffrage, constituting what Eric Foner has called
“a stunning and unprecedented experiment in interracial democracy.”51
The 1867 returns thus came as a sobering rebuke to the Republican establishment,
still flush from its victories only a year earlier. Twenty states across the country held
elections between March and November 1867, and Republicans, according to historian
Michael Les Benedict, “lost ground in nearly all of them.”52 In Connecticut’s
Congressional elections, Democrats won three of four available seats, while the state’s
Democratic candidate eked out a narrow victory in the gubernatorial contest. Meanwhile,
Ohio’s voters struck down a state constitutional amendment that would have enfranchised
black men while barring “disloyal” whites from the polls. In New York and New Jersey
as well Republicans lost a substantial amount of votes. Yet what were setbacks for
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Republicans in most states was an utter rout in California. Only in California did
Republicans lose the governorship, the statehouse, and their Congressional majority. In
no other free state did the Democratic gubernatorial candidate win by a larger margin
than California’s Henry H. Haight, who beat his opponent, George Gorham, by more than
ten percentage points. 53 The message coming from the West was thus especially clear:
The party that had seemingly bested President Johnson and his conservative allies faced a
hard road ahead. Indeed, following California, Oregon’s Democrats also took back the
statehouse in 1868. And in the coming years, other western states and territories
expressed a growing unease over federal encroachment.54 Anyone attuned to the mood in
the West could tell that the struggle against Reconstruction would extend far beyond the
former Confederacy.
The 1867 defeat proved fatal to California’s Union Party, which dissolved shortly
thereafter. During the election Union candidates largely ignored national issues, never
able to parry the damning Democratic critique that they had abandoned the white voter.
When Union gubernatorial candidate George Gorham attempted to set the moral direction
of his party by appealing to the “universal brotherhood of man,” he played directly into
the hands of his race-baiting opposition.55 His party’s campaign lacked both the
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coherence and the force of previous efforts. Union candidates continued waving the
bloody shirt – that is, blaming Democrats for secession and the ravages of the war – but
this strategy was evidently yielding diminishing returns.56 California’s voters had
seemingly traded their indignation over secession for a growing sympathy for the South,
now chafing under military occupation. Amid mounting appeals for reconciliation, the
Union Party – which was, after all, a product of wartime exigencies – had lost its trump
card of anti-Confederate outrage. Those members of the now defunct Union Party who
did not defect to the Democrats soon adopted the Republican banner. The reconstituted
Republicans would enjoy some success in the coming decades, but only after shedding
the racially progressive ideals of the wartime era and crafting a new party image based on
the hard experiences of 1867. There would be no more “brotherhood of man” in
California electoral politics.57

California’s Southern Revival
By 1867 white Californians were eager to bury the past. The Union Party’s
failure to sufficiently tap wartime bitterness coincided with a sea change in how
Californians imagined the former Confederacy. Through a sort of political alchemy,
Democrats had redeemed former rebels and transformed the Party of Lincoln into the
enemy of both Union and Constitution. Few Californians would go so far as to defend
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secession, but Democratic leaders regarded the South as the true victim in a postbellum
order that was perhaps more destructive to the nation than the carnage of the war years.
Sharpening this sympathy for former rebels was a widely shared fear that the statesponsored depredations afflicted on the South might soon migrate west.58
At the center of both the Democratic and the pro-southern revivals was the newly
elected governor, Henry Huntley Haight. Haight’s path to Democratic ascendency was
hardly a straight one. A supporter of the Republican candidate John C. Fremont in 1856,
Haight went on to serve as the Republican state chairman four years later during
Lincoln’s campaign. But less than a month into the war, he renounced his previous
affiliations, denounced Lincoln’s war machine, and began a dramatic swing to the
Democratic right – citing northern coercion as the reason for his political
transformation.59 When his adopted party mounted its comeback in the postwar years,
Haight emerged as one of the Democracy’s most forceful speakers, especially on the
issues of Military Reconstruction and universal suffrage. During the 1867 campaign,
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Haight harped on Radical Reconstruction in a series of rallies held around San Francisco
and Sacramento, transforming himself into the “anti-black, states’ rights spokesman for
the West.”60
Haight may have been born in Rochester, New York, but his sympathies for the
defeated South were unmistakable. Before enthusiastic crowds he conjured the image of
a vindictive and bullying national government, exacting undue vengeance on former
Confederate states long after the war had ended. In one of his most celebrated campaign
speeches, Haight played to the reconcilationist impulses of his Democratic audience.
“The South seceded, was conquered, and now lies helpless and bleeding at every pore,”
he pleaded.61 Instead of vengeance, he called for “a spirit of broad, catholic patriotism
that knows no North, no South, no East, no West.”62 This growing, vengeful government,
Haight argued, struck at the very heart of American democracy, undermining the
constitutional rights of states at every turn. Haight was unshakable in his defense of
states’ rights. Some of his political opponents made note of this, charging that not even
John C. Calhoun went as far as Haight in attempting to limit federal power.63 In his
inaugural address, Haight struck a dire note on this subject. Reconstruction – the policy
of black suffrage, the wasteful spending of the Freedmen’s Bureau, and the military
occupation of the former Confederacy – had brought about a new and highly
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unconstitutional epoch in American history, and if the federal government continued to
act beyond its delegated powers, the nation would fall victim to “the worst form of
despotism,” or what he would later call “a congressional absolutism.”64 Confiding to
President Andrew Johnson in 1868, Haight fretted over the dangerous policies of the
Radicals, which he feared “would light the flames of civil war again from one end of the
country to the other.”65
State rights were sacrosanct, according to Haight, especially when it came to the
right of denying suffrage to non-white citizens. He argued that a Republican Congress
had sacrificed the white South on the altar of black suffrage, and the result was pure
pandemonium. Haight devoted much of his inaugural address to this issue. White
southerners had been stripped of their constitutional rights and subjected to military
despotism, he claimed, which devolved “political control to a mass of negroes just
emancipated and almost as ignorant of political duties as the beasts of the field.” The
federal policy of Reconstruction, he elaborated, was the “subversion of all civil
government under military rule, the abolition of those personal rights guaranteed by the
Constitution” and “the subjection of the white population of the Southern States, men,
women, and children, to the domination of a mass of ignorant negroes just freed from
slavery.” At this point in history, Haight fulminated, the former Confederacy amounted
to nothing more than “negro States,” dangerously close to becoming “another St.
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Domingo on our Southern border.”

Haight attempted to bring home the severity of this

issue to his California electorate by introducing a thought experiment. “What would you
think of the Government, if, to punish you it should disfranchise half your white
population, and by military force give the Chinese population the right of suffrage?”
Haight goaded at a campaign rally. “What would you think of such legislation? Would
you not rather have all the property confiscated and every tenth man hang?”67 With this
nightmare scenario, California’s leading statesman not only provoked outrage amongst
his electorate, but also implicitly approved the South’s violent resistance to
Congressional Reconstruction.
Haight’s heated rhetoric on the federal menace and the evils of Reconstruction
struck a chord, not only among California audiences, but within the former Confederate
states as well. When she read the text of one of Haight’s political addresses, Narcissa
Saunders of Nashville, Tennessee felt compelled to express her appreciation directly to
the California governor. Saunders congratulated the governor on his effective leadership
and thanked him for his enduring support of the South. “Like everything from your pen,”
she wrote in June 1868, the speech conveyed “true patriotism, justice, and integrity, and
gives us down trodden people some hope of a bright future.”68 That same month, Andrew
Roland, a distant relative from New Orleans confided in Haight: “Between the ‘cotton
wound’ and the Radicals, poor Louisiana has suffered a perfect martyrdom.” That
martyrdom included, most egregiously, the political elevation of black men over their
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former masters, a system enforced by strict federal oversight. “So you see how we are
persecuted,” Roland added, “having strangers, and negroes in office, to rule us, and make
laws for us.”69 Here was first-hand confirmation of everything Haight had warned about
Military Reconstruction and the perils of black enfranchisement. Beleaguered rebels like
Roland knew they had a sympathetic audience in the California governor.
While Haight might have been able to out-Calhoun Calhoun in his bitter
denunciations of federal power, no Californian could surpass B.F. Washington in both his
opposition Reconstruction and his fierce support for Southern intransigence. Raised on a
Virginia plantation and a lineal descendent of George Washington’s brother, B.F.
Washington’s Old Southern pedigree ran deep. While he had been airing his outrage for
years, it was the Radical measures of 1867 that brought his invective to a fever pitch. In
Washington’s eyes, every federal measure was a dire slander on a noble, suffering South.
The imprisonment and trial of the former Confederate president Jefferson Davis was a
“shameful, disgraceful and contemptible farce.” “We venture to say,” Washington
added, “that the history of jurisprudence presents no parallel to the infamy of these
proceedings.”70 Thanks to Congress, the once prosperous South had been reduced to a
Yankee thralldom, equal to “a Poland, a worse than Hungary, and a rival for the
despotism of a crushed Ireland.”71 Secession may or may not have been a mistake –
Washington was vague on this – but the southern conscience remained deservedly
spotless. “[N]o men ever embarked in a cause with a more thorough conviction of right
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and justice than did they,” he argued. “No men conscious of wrong could ever have
made the heroic and prolonged resistance against such overwhelming odds.”72 The real
rebels, Washington insisted, were Radical Republicans, who threatened to dismember the
nation through their crazed Reconstruction policies. To call the current Congress “the
hell-spawn of civilization,” he added, is “a slander on the infernal regions.”73
As slavery’s staunchest post-mortem apologist within California, Washington
infused the Examiner with a profound nostalgia for the Old South. The San Francisco
Elevator, one of California’s leading African American papers, hardly exaggerated when
it argued that Washington “would doubtless like to see the old era re-established, and
slavery triumphant over the land.”74 Indeed, just a few days earlier Washington wrote
that slavery – the “negro birthright” – had provided each black person in the South with
“the protecting care and guardianship of his master who provided for all his wants, and
made him a useful member of the community.” Now, “with an insane love for the
negro,” Yankees had uprooted this benevolent and prosperous order and attempted to
“force” freedom on blacks, which would bring them “nothing but wretchedness and
misery.”75 While many southerners in the immediate postwar years sought to distance
themselves from their slaveholding pasts, Washington came as close to embracing the
institution as any leading figure plausibly could. In this respect, he was perhaps less
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reconstructed than Jefferson Davis, himself, who all but erased the issue of slavery from
his wartime memoir.76 By insisting on the benign nature of slavery and the valor of
Confederate soldiers, Washington articulated at an early date two fundamental tenets of
the emerging Confederate mythology. Indeed, we can reasonably trace to the Examiner
the beginnings of the Lost Cause in the American West.
Washington was no mere maverick. He edited the leading Democratic paper in
California and therefore could rightfully claim to represent many of the views of the
state’s most powerful party. To be sure, the overtly proslavery wing of California’s
Democratic Party crumbled shortly after secession. Yet the continuities between the prewar and post-war political orders in California were more pronounced than historians
have yet recognized. Although the old proslavery leader of the party, William Gwin, had
retired to mining, railroading, and lobbying, those who followed in his wake – including
his son, the former Confederate cavalryman – continued to nurture deep connections to
the South. The most detailed study of Democratic politics in post-Civil War California
reveals that native southerners continued to wield a disproportionate influence within the
state. Of the 17 Democrats who Thomas Malone identified as the party’s most influential
leaders, over half hailed from former slave states. Only seven, including Haight, were
born in free states, while one, Eugene Casserly, came from Ireland.77 Clearly, B.F
Washington had good, southern company in the upper echelons of the party.
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Retreat from Reconstruction
With a popular mandate, the ascendant Democratic Party lost little time in
attacking federal policy, leading the West in the struggle against Reconstruction.
Democrats acted on their campaign pledges to resist Radical Reconstruction, introducing
a wave of resolutions in December 1867 in opposition to the military occupation of the
South.78 Several months later they followed these resolutions with one of their fiercest
declarations yet: “Resolved, That it is not only the patriotic duty, but the deliberate
purpose of the democratic party never to submit to be governed by negroes, nor by those
claiming to be elected by negro suffrage.”79 Three years after the Civil War, California’s
lawmakers were, by all appearances, flirting with rebellion, as determined in their
opposition to Reconstruction as any group of legislators reasonably could be. Over the
coming years, Democrats were as good as their word, refusing to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment and then overwhelmingly rejecting the Fifteenth.
California Democrats’ battle against the Fourteenth Amendment was hardly a
battle at all. After winning two-thirds majorities in Congress, the amendment was sent to
the states for ratification, arriving in the summer of 1866 when California’s legislature
was in recess. The Union Party governor could have called a special session to consider
the amendment but – perhaps realizing that his ailing party could not survive such a
contest – he simply left the issue for his successor, Henry Haight.80 Not surprisingly,
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Haight sat on the legislation and it never came up for a full vote, making California the
only free state that did not ratify the Fourteenth Amendment before the turn of the
decade.81 Meanwhile, Senator Eugene Casserly publicly applauded the former
Confederacy’s ongoing resistance to the amendment, a measure he deemed
unconstitutional in that it barred some ex-rebels from voting. This was all part of a
Radical “negro supremacy” master plan, Casserly insisted, which also included attempts
to arm “en masse the negro hordes of the South.” Unless something could be done to
avert the Radical spiral, the former Confederacy was headed in the direction of “Hayti”,
Casserly warned.82
California would never suffer such a cruel fate – this was the Democratic Party
pledge in the campaign against the Fifteenth Amendment. Again, Senator Casserly
played a leading role in California’s ongoing retreat from Reconstruction, railing against
the amendment before a large Democratic audience in San Francisco in July 1869. “This
Fifteenth Amendment is a subversion of the Constitution,” he thundered to applause. “It
is no amendment… it is a revolution [Cheers].” Although Congress had amassed a litany
of abuses in the post-war years, this amendment, according to Casserly, was the most
egregious overreach yet. At the expense of hardworking white voters, it would
enfranchise and empower not only “the most wretched negro between the Potomac and
the Sabine,” but also “the most depraved coolie of China or Hindoostan.” Reconstruction
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had made a colony of the South and now its baleful effects were coming to be felt in the
West as well, Casserly continued. “[A] small, remote State, like California, is governed
at Washington, very much in the spirit in which old Rome, in her decline, might govern a
distant province by a pro-consul.”83 Governor Haight picked up on this theme of western
subordination several months later in his official review of the Fifteenth Amendment.
“If, in our local concerns and interests, we are to be governed by representatives of other
States,” he warned, “we might as well be governed by a foreign king or emperor.”84 Thus
the Fifteenth Amendment, according to Haight and Casserly, would not only inaugurate
an era of black and Chinese rule; it would also signal the colonization of the South and
West by the federal government. As these leading statesmen of California argued, the
South and West were locked in a common struggle against the arbitrary and quasimonarchical rule of a distant Congress.
This opposition to the federal government and universal enfranchisement – which
remained the cornerstones of the Democratic platform – clearly played well with
California’s electorate. In the 1869-1870 legislature, Democrats enjoyed a nearly fourto-one majority. They used this majority to issue a resounding renunciation of the
Fifteenth Amendment, after Congress submitted the measure to the states in late 1869.
Not surprisingly, Willie Gwin, the Confederate soldier-cum-California state senator, was
the first within the statehouse to speak out against the amendment. He followed the state
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rights line of thinking that was so popular with his peers by arguing that the federal
government had no power to impose universal manhood suffrage.85
But no member of the legislature was so strident in his opposition as John S.
Hager, who blended appeals for sectional reconciliation with racist tropes. He anticipated
a withering defeat for the amendment in California, which had taken pride of place as a
Democratic stronghold. “The West is no longer the setting but the rising sun,” he
cheered. This push for black voting rights amounted to “a more mischievous – a more
dangerous rebellion” than the Civil War itself, Hager warned, and would effectively
exchange “white civilization” for “the dominion of the black race.”86 According to
Hager, all of human history affirmed a simple truth: white and black were inherently
unequal. He hammered home his point with a particularly vicious metaphor. “I do not
think the donkey is the equal of the thoroughbred,” he argued, “nor do I think our radical
Congress can legislate him into a horse, or into social equality with the horse.”87 Like
Casserly and most of the party, Hager was particularly concerned that the amendment
might enfranchise California’s Chinese workers – who constituted roughly 10 percent of
the state population – despite assurances from Republicans that the Chinese could never
vote, being legally barred from citizenship. Ultimately, Hager’s jeremiad sealed the
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inevitable. The Democratic majority carried the day, rejecting the amendment by an
overwhelming 81 to 16 vote.88 California would not ratify the measure until 1962, the
only free state to withhold support for so long.
California’s campaign against black suffrage took place not just within the
statehouse, but also in polling places across the state. Clerks in Sacramento, San Joaquin,
Santa Clara, and San Francisco counties refused to register black voters, in defiance of
the Fifteenth Amendment, which had become national law in February 1870.89 Their
defiance received the firm backing of California’s attorney general, Jo Hamilton, a native
of Kentucky. In a letter to the clerk of Nevada County, California, Hamilton advised
“against the registration of negroes.” According to Hamilton, “the so-called Fifteenth
Amendment” was not “self-operative;” that is, it required confirmation in the California
constitution itself in order to become enforceable within the state. Until then, “it is not
only not the duty of County Clerks to place their [blacks’] names upon the Great
Register, but it is their duty not to do it.”90
Judge Sepulveda of the County Court of Los Angeles reinforced this message in
an influential ruling one month later. Citing his 15th Amendment rights, Lewis Green, an
African American, had applied for a writ of mandamus to secure his place on the voting
registry, and took his case before Sepulveda in the spring of 1870. Sepulveda struck
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down the request, ruling, “The wording and spirit of the Amendment is so general in its
meaning that it cannot be operative without regulations to enforce and prescribe the mode
in which it shall be carried into effect.” Like Hamilton, Sepulveda argued that further
“legislative enactments” would be necessary to secure black voting rights. The
Amendment, he continued, “cannot punish its violation, and hence it is not selfexecuting; for really it has no modus operandi, and cannot be enforced.”91 Thus, with the
blessings of the attorney general and county judges, state officials succeeded, for a time,
in establishing proto-Jim Crow strategies of disfranchisement on the Pacific Coast.

Black Politics and Anti-Chinese Violence in the Age of Emancipation
California’s African Americans did not take these attacks on their citizenship
lying down. Emboldened by Confederate defeat and the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment, blacks in the postwar West seized the initiative to inaugurate an era of
increased political consciousness and activity. Just as Congressional policy triggered a
heated reaction among California’s reactionary white voters, it invigorated a black
political struggle that had previously lagged under Democratic rule in the pre-war years.
Thus, from the perspective of San Francisco’s African American community – the largest
such community west of St. Louis – the black political struggle of the Reconstruction era
takes on a truly nationwide dimension.92 African Americans may have waged their most
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intense and important battles in the post-emancipation South, but greater attention on the
cognate struggles in the Far West reveals a broader, more nuanced movement than the
standard narrative allows.93 As western blacks closely monitored the unfolding struggle
within Congress and in the former slave states, they also responded to unique challenges
engendered by California’s demographics. Their path to citizenship would wind between
the rock of white supremacist politics and the hard place of a perceived Chinese labor
threat.
The postwar bid for citizenship and voting rights was part of a longer history of
black political mobilization, dating back to the early 1850s, at a time when some African
Americans in California were still enslaved.94 Black political activists cut their teeth in a
prolonged campaign against a pair of discriminatory testimony statutes, which barred
African Americans from taking the stand in civil and criminal cases involving whites.
Centered in San Francisco, the community launched three separate campaigns to end the
testimony ban, although the Democratic state legislature ignored all of their petitions. To
better identify and pursue black needs within California, the First Colored Convention
assembled in November 1855, and a year later, the state’s first black newspaper, The
Mirror of the Times, appeared.95 The black community also rallied financially and
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politically around several high profile fugitive slave trials within the state, notably the
Archy Lee case. Not until the outbreak of secession and the ascent of the Republican
party, however, would African Americans have allies within the state legislature. By
1863, with pressure from the black community, Union-Republican legislators finally
overturned the statutes banning black testimony in civil and criminal cases.
Black leaders transferred the lessons learned in their campaign against the
testimony laws to a postwar political order that was at once more promising and more
challenging.96 This was the age of emancipation, but also an era of Democratic
resurgence and white backlash. Phillip A. Bell recognized both the pitfalls and the
promise of the times when he founded The Elevator in San Francisco on April 7, 1865,
two days before Robert E. Lee’s surrender at Appomattox and amid a nascent, national
African American movement for civil rights. A former correspondent for William Lloyd
Garrison’s Liberator and one of the most experienced and respected black activists in the
country, Bell quickly turned The Elevator into the most widely read African-American
periodical within the state, surpassing the other black-owned publication, the Pacific
Appeal. Within months, Bell had established himself as the most vocal champion of
black voting rights in the West. Again and again, he called on both the California
legislature and federal congress to break America’s long history of oppression by
enfranchising its “law loving and law abiding, honest, industrious” black citizens.97
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In the absence of voting rights, Bell nevertheless ensured that California’s African
Americans received a comprehensive political education. The Elevator published some
of the most searing critiques of the state’s Democratic leadership, smearing them with the
broad brush of wartime treason. Bell blasted the 1870 Democratic leadership as “the
legislature of a thousand swindles,” little more than a gang of unreconstructed rebels.
“Of what material is this infamous body composed, and who are its leaders?” he asked.
“They are traitors and the sons of traitors. Wm. M. Gwin, son of an ex-Senator, soidisant
Count of the Mexican empire, and … traitor, leads the Senate,” Bell charged.98 Here,
then, was a fierce and capable editor who could lead the black campaign for political
rights and simultaneously challenge the white supremacist, Democratic majority.99
Yet Bell also turned his acidic pen on far less offensive opponents. California’s
substantial Chinese population – “alien to our customs, habits and language, heathen in
their worship, and naturally licentious” – served as Bell’s foil for a thoroughly rooted and
reliable black population, “with their American ideas, Christian religion, and family
connections.”100 Indeed, for Bell and other black leaders within the state, Sinophobia and
black political advancement went hand-in-glove. This rhetorical assault resulted largely
from the perceived labor threat caused by rising Chinese immigration. Whereas San
Francisco’s African American population remained fairly stagnant during the 1860s, the
Chinese population had more than tripled. By 1870 the city’s Chinese outnumbered
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blacks by more than nine to one, while at the statewide level, there was a 50,000 to 5,000
imbalance in favor of the Chinese.101 Sinophobia only deepened with the debate over the
Fifteenth Amendment, as Democrats warned that suffrage would also extend to the
Chinese if the statute passed. Bell was particularly insistent that the Fifteenth
Amendment would leave Chinese disfranchisement in place, dismissing rumors to the
contrary as “the sheerest nonsense and “brazen-faced falsehood.”102
The politically beleaguered black community enjoyed plenty of company in its
Sinophobia. Although white workers had targeted Chinese immigrants since their arrival
during the gold rush, it was not until the postbellum period that racial anxieties
crystalized into official anti-Chinese clubs. The first major club of this kind, the Central
Pacific Anti-Coolie Association, emerged in the aftermath of a particularly violent antiChinese riot in the winter of 1867, in which 400 white laborers drove Chinese contract
workers from their jobs on the Portrero Street railway. The rioters injured twelve
Chinese laborers, one of whom later died of his wounds. When ten of the rioters were
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convicted and sentenced to prison, San Francisco’s white conservatives, and the newly
formed Central Pacific Anti-Coolie Association, in particular, rallied to their defense and
eventually won the release of all ten perpetrators on technicalities. California’s sole
Democratic congressman at the time, Samuel B. Axtell, was central in securing their
release. 103
Also central to this growing anti-Chinese movement was General Albert M.
Winn, a former slaveholder and Mississippi militia officer who served under Jefferson
Davis during the U.S.-Mexico War. Winn, who owned several slaves in California
during the gold rush, emerged as one of the leading voices in anti-Chinese politics during
this period, serving as the co-secretary of the Central Pacific Anti-Coolie Association and
later as president of the Anti-Chinese Convention.104 Although there is no evidence to
suggest that Winn himself took part in anti-Chinese mob violence, he did little to
discourage it. As president of the Anti-Chinese Convention in 1870, Winn addressed a
menacing letter to the six Chinese Companies of California, warning (or threatening)
them of the likely assaults that would result from increased immigration.105 Thus, as
unreconstructed rebels unleashed a reign of racial terror against free blacks across the
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former Confederacy, southern émigrés in California condoned a not dissimilar wave of
violence against the state’s Chinese population.
The parallels between southern and western racial violence were often made
explicit by the perpetrators themselves. In the late 1860s California’s newspapers of the
more Republican variety frequently reported on outrages committed by western iterations
of the Ku Klux Klan and other unaffiliated vigilante groups.106 Rather than target African
Americans, however, these California Klansmen generally assaulted Chinese immigrants
and their white employers, while occasionally threatening Republican politicians and
journalists as well. Although there is no evidence to suggest western Klansmen were in
direct contact with their southern counterparts, they clearly drew on the terrorist
strategies employed by the latter.107
Like southern Klansmen, western vigilantes operated in a cryptic and clandestine
fashion, often achieving their political ends through anonymous threats. In April 1869,
“another open Ku Klux proclamation, without address or envelop, was thrown into the
Post Office receiving box last night after ten o’clock,” reported the Patriot of San Jose,
where the Klan was particularly active. “It threatens a destruction of all the crops of
persons employing even a single Chinaman.”108 A particularly violent message sent to
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one Rice Eli and signed “Ku Klux Klan,” demanded the cessation of “your obscene and
slanderous conversations at once, or the excrements will be ripped out of you.”109
Although not directly identified with the Klan, an anonymous writer sent a similarly
threatening note to a former Union soldier and correspondent to the Alta California,
warning that “parties are watching your course” and that “serious consequences” could
result from further Republican writings. The Alta rightfully took this as proof of “the
affinity of character between the Ku Klux of the South and the Democracy of
California.”110
Anonymous threats may have been effective in certain circumstances, but western
Klansmen and various vigilantes also resorted to outright violence. In an article titled
“Kuklux Klan – California Branch,” the Sacramento Daily Union reported on several
raids on northern California ranches in the spring of 1868. The white raiders captured,
beat, and “nearly murdered” the Chinese workers on these ranches, the paper reported,
and succeeded in carrying away a small amount of money in the process.111 The spring
and summer of 1869 seems to have been a particularly active period for anti-Chinese
vigilantes. In one instance, a group of Klansmen raided a ranch near Santa Cruz, “drove
some Chinamen off after horribly maltreating them, abused and terrified the children,
declared their intention to Democratize the whole county, broke open the wine cellar and
stole, broke and raised Cain generally with things.”112 California’s press also circulated
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several reports of vigilante attacks on Chinese churches. In Nevada City, California, a
newly opened school for Chinese children was scheduled to operate strictly in the
daytime and on Sundays, “so as to avoid the Ku Klux Klan, who are burning churches,
and will next attempt to destroy all school books,” reported the Marysville Daily Appeal
in March 1869.113 Not isolated to a single western state, the Klan and similar vigilante
groups also operated in Oregon and Utah, according to several reports.114
The steady stream of reports of Klan atrocities pouring from the West, and
especially the South, handed Republicans a stick with which to bludgeon their political
opposition.115 Despite the hailstorm of bad press, however, California’s Democrats
refused to concede that former rebels were responsible for this southern bloodbath.
Rather, they turned the blame back on Republicans. By elaborate contortions of logic,
Eugene Casserly charged that the “secret clans and leagues” purportedly organized in the
South were merely proof that Republican Reconstruction policies had failed.116
According to Edward Stanly, the former Republican candidate for governor and North
Carolina slaveholder, the Klan was “merely an organization for mutual protection against
negroes.”117 B.F. Washington, meanwhile, dismissed reports of vigilante violence in the
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South, while repeatedly thundering against “the infamous atrocities perpetrated upon
defenceless [white] people by the infamous tools of Radicalism.”118 After Congress
passed a series of Enforcement Acts in 1870 and 1871, giving needed protections to the
freedpeople of the South, the Democratic state central committee of California issued a
resolution firmly in opposition. While the committee paid lip service to the unfortunate
“riotous and unlawful combinations” in the South, it more forcefully “denounce[d]… the
‘Ku-Klux bill,’ as enacted for no other purpose than to complete the work of
centralization, and by establishing a military despotism to perpetuate the present
administration without regard to the will of the people.” In branding these acts
“revolutionary and dangerous in their tendency” California Democrats could implicitly
dismiss Klan violence as a byproduct of unjust federal intervention, rather than as a
manifestation of a continuing rebellion in the South .119
As California’s Democrats dismissed reports of racial violence in the South and
railed against protections for freedpeople, one of the largest anti-Chinese massacres of
the century erupted in the small town of Los Angeles. On the evening of October 24,
1871 a mixed crowd of some 500 frenzied Angelenos – whites and Hispanics, common
laborers and local elites alike – pressed in around a small cluster of buildings where
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several dozen Chinese residents had taken refuge. The mob had gathered in response to a
brief and disorganized shootout between suspected Chinese gang leaders and local law
enforcement, which left two men dead – one Chinese and one white. Crying for blood,
the crowd charged the main building, stabbing and shooting some of the Chinese, while
dragging others to a makeshift gallows to be hanged and mutilated. In total, the mob left
eighteen mangled bodies in its wake, including those of a respected doctor and a twelveyear old boy, a death-toll representing a full 10 percent of the city’s Chinese population.
None of the victims had participated in the earlier shootout. Of the 500 rioters, only eight
were convicted of manslaughter and none would serve a full sentence. They were
released from San Quentin one year later on technicalities.120 As in San Francisco in
1867 and as in countless cases across the South, the perpetrators of racial violence had
once again walked free.
Rituals of racial violence at both the local and national level provided a template
for the Los Angeles mob. Longtime residents of Los Angeles would likely remember
previous episodes of mob action – the sacking of an Indian rancheria in 1847 or any one
of the thirty-seven lynchings, mostly of Mexican men, that took place between 1854 and
1870.121 Angelenos were accustomed to seeking extra-legal redress, and when the local
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courts appeared unable to extinguish small-scale criminal activity within the city’s
Chinese community, they probably saw an opening for mob action. As historian David
Samuel Torres-Rouff argues, “The anti-Chinese massacre, rather than being an anomaly,
more rightly stands as another episode in an embedded local social practice that found
specific traction at a specific moment as it had many times in the past.”122 The mob
mentality was doubtlessly also fueled by a sensationalist, white supremacist press, headed
by the Los Angeles News editor, Andrew J. King. A Georgia native and ardent
Confederate supporter while undersheriff of Los Angeles during the war, King turned his
pen against the growing Chinese population in the late 1860s.123 He portrayed the
Chinese as “an alien, an inferior and idolatrous race” pouring into California to squeeze
white men out of work and leave “a foul blot upon our civilization.”124 That these
editorials were followed by an uptick in assaults on Los Angeles’s Chinese residents is
hardly surprising.
This massacre should be placed in the context, not only of rising anti-Chinese
sentiment within California, but also of an orgy of extra-legal violence sweeping the
South. While not ignoring local peculiarities, we should recognize the Los Angeles
Chinese massacre for what it was: part of a larger pattern of race riots and mob violence.
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New Orleans, Memphis, Pulaski – all these southern cities witnessed the assault, murder
and often mutilation of African Americans by white crowds in the immediate postwar
years. Although the victims in Los Angeles had a different skin color than their southern
counterparts, the features of mob violence in both the South and the West exhibit striking
parallels – parallels that historians have yet to fully trace.125 Whether in southern
California or western Tennessee, race riots generally erupted over a perceived crime or
offense committed by an ethnic minority, deemed threatening to local hegemonic
prerogatives. What followed was the indiscriminate targeting of these minorities, which
generally included lynching, looting and mutilation, with little or no legal action taken
against the perpetrators. Collective killings generally featured a performative element as
well – public hanging and torturing, for instance – serving as a ritualistic reassertion of
white rule. With low regard for due process, western and southern vigilantes favored
communal retribution as the surest means to preserve the hierarchical order. To be sure,
racial violence in the West involved more than a bipolar struggle between white and
black, as the joint efforts of Hispanic and white rioters in Los Angeles attests. Yet, such
diversity should not obscure an important point: The unreconstructed South hardly had a
monopoly on racial violence.126
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Conclusion: Continental Reconstruction
Reconstruction, as westerners at the time recognized, was a political reordering
that unfolded on a truly continental scale. The former Confederacy may have been the
epicenter of the political struggle of this era, yet the South’s road to Redemption
accompanied corollary conflicts that stretched to every corner of the Union. To
California’s anxious white voters, Reconstruction came largely as a specter, as a series of
politically potent fears – the fear that the federal juggernaut that purportedly invaded the
South would find its way west; the fear that manhood suffrage would give the state’s
unassimilated underclasses a decisive say in local affairs; the fear that federal spending
on programs for freedpeople would shatter an already weakened economy and perhaps
deprive the West of needed resources. What made California unique – its racial diversity
and specifically its large Chinese population – also made it particularly resistant to the
racially-leveling policies of the national Republican Party.
Californians were hardly alone in their opposition to this growing nation-state,
however. In neighboring Utah, polygamists were fighting a losing battle against
Republican lawmakers who had targeted Mormonism’s “peculiar institution” since the
1856 presidential campaign, when polygamy appeared alongside slavery as one of the
“twin relics of barbarism.” After a series of legal and legislative defeats, Mormon elders
finally succumbed to federal pressure and renounced polygamy in 1890, thereby capping
what legal historian Sarah Barringer Gordon has called a “second reconstruction in the
West.”127 Meanwhile on the Central Plains, sovereign Indian tribes clashed with federal
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armies, fresh from their victories against rebels in the South. Many of the commanders
who carried out these campaigns in Indian country, like Philip Sheridan, O.O. Howard,
E.O.C. Ord and John Pope, had previously overseen aspects of the military occupation of
the former Confederacy under Congressional Reconstruction. As historian Steven Hahn
has argued, the federal response to rebellions in the slave South, Mormon Utah, and
Indian country should be seen as an integrated political process, a defining aspect of
state-making in the Civil War era. This reconstruction – or rather, Greater
Reconstruction, as Elliot West suggests – transformed a geographically diffuse nation of
sovereign and semi-sovereign polities into an increasingly centralized nation-state.128
This framing of a continental Reconstruction is not merely a historian’s attempt to
provide narrative coherence to a highly complex period. Even voters at the far western
rim of the empire recognized that these centralizing forces would stretch well beyond the
bounds of the former slave states. In fact, Democrats rebuilt their party on precisely this
assumption. California’s Democratic leaders rhetorically linked their state with the
former Confederacy, in common cause against Congressional policy, and they rode back
to power on a platform familiar to any unreconstructed rebel. Indeed, ex-Confederates
and conservative Californians alike spoke a common language of federal opposition,
white supremacy, and sectional reconciliation. Of course, the retreat from Reconstruction
in the West took on a distinct character, given the racial diversity of the region. But
Californians employed a combination of tactics, including noncompliance with federal
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law, restrictive legislation, racial violence, and eventually outright exclusion, to ensure
the subordination of ethnic minorities and to preserve a system of white rule that southern
rebels would have envied. In the age of emancipation, California’s voters successfully
resurrected the political party that had ruled in an age of slavery.
The Democratic reign could not, of course, last forever. By the early 1870s, as
the nation as a whole pulled back from the racially liberal measures of Congressional
Reconstruction, California Democrats softened their rhetoric. Without a Radical
bogeyman guiding national policy, Democrats on the Pacific coast had lost a key –
perhaps the key – weapon in their political arsenal. Thus, state Republicans were able to
begin a comeback that decade. In many ways, Democratic leaders were victims of their
own success. In order to curry favor with the white electorate, California Republicans
adopted some of the race-based policies that had propelled their rivals to high office. For
instance, they dropped all appeals to what George Gorham called the “brotherhood of
man” and instead endorsed a ban on Chinese immigration. No longer the party of slave
abolition, they were now the party of Chinese exclusion.129 Democrats’ power may have
waned but the ideology of white supremacy that they did so much to promote in the late
1860s would continue to hold sway in California through the next decade, and indeed
beyond.

Epilogue
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THE REBELLION’S WESTERN RESTING PLACE
Dwarfed by the gaudy tombs of southern California’s celebrities and socialites, a
cluster of graves in Hollywood Forever Cemetery bears silent witness to a largely
forgotten chapter in western history. There lie buried some thirty Confederate veterans
from nearly every rebel state, along with a handful of prominent figures from the United
Daughters of the Confederacy. Rising above these headstones stands a seven-foot granite
monument with a bronze plaque commemorating the rebel soldiers who spent their final
days in southern California. Erected in 1925, it was the first Confederate monument in
the Far West.1 Yet elsewhere in the state, and across the Southwest generally, there are
very few physical reminders of the region’s deep affiliations with slavery and
slaveholders. No William Gwin Boulevard, for instance, runs through San Francisco, nor
does a John R. Baylor Avenue grace any part of Tucson.2 The western landscape, by and
large, does not speak to this past. This is hardly surprising, however. It is, after all, a
history many westerners may prefer to forget.
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This proslavery past is at odds with western myths of freedom, rugged
individualism, and forward progress. Since the earliest days of the republic, the West has
occupied a central place in the American imagination as a landscape of opportunity and
social mobility. As Thomas Jefferson argued, the West belonged to white yeoman,
whose economic independence and agrarian virtues would usher forth an “empire of
liberty.” In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis lent scholarly validation to
the stories that Americans tell about the West. Free from the squabbles over slavery that
convulsed the eastern half of the continent, Turner’s frontier was the nursery of
republicanism and virtuous self-sufficiency.3 Various bonanzas and technological
breakthroughs have only added luster to the glittering image of western promise – the
land of gold became the land of the automobile, became the land of film, became the land
of silicon. The busts are quickly forgotten, the next boom just around the corner. In
order to have any validity whatsoever, this narrative must be scrubbed clean of slavery.
Californians, and westerners in general, have whitewashed more than just their adobe.4
3
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The tombs of the Confederate dead in Hollywood Forever Cemetery provide a
rare window into a very different western narrative. The modern metropolis that now
surrounds this cemetery bears little resemblance to the nineteenth-century pueblo of
several thousand denizens, where proslavery politics found such fertile soil. There, a
curious alliance of californio landholders and southern emigres transformed the old
Spanish pueblo into a Chivalry stronghold. During the Civil War, Los Angeles County
hosted a vocal pro-secessionist element, prompting the establishment of several federal
military encampments in the area in order to prevent open rebellion. Although slavery
was dead by 1865, Los Angeles voters still nurtured its ghost, delivering strong
Democratic majorities through the 1870s and electing as mayor a former Confederate
officer in 1882. In subsequent decades, a number of Confederate veterans drifted west,
naturally gravitating to a town that had for so long cherished its southern roots. True, the
influx of emigrants from former free states had, by the turn of the century, supplanted this
old southern bloc. But in the leafy suburb of Pasadena, where a particularly active
Confederate veterans’ chapter operated, these old rebels still could find a home. In 1929
the California Division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy even established a
rest facility for their tired soldiers in nearby San Gabriel, one of only two such residences
outside the former rebel states.5
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In terms of its deep-rooted proslavery sympathies, Los Angeles was no anomaly,
however. Rather, it represented merely the far western outpost of an antebellum political
orbit that stretched to the Pacific. This network was built deliberately by imperialminded southerners who saw in the West their best chance to extend their section’s
political power, if not its economic institutions. Indeed, the slave South and the Far West
came together through the efforts of influential leaders in both regions – senators from
California, cabinet ministers from Mississippi and Tennessee, territorial officers from
New Mexico, foreign ministers from South Carolina, magazine editors from Louisiana,
cartographers from Virginia, and the list goes on. If these expansionists argued over
tactics – and they certainly did at times – they at least agreed on strategy: the westward
extension of a southern commercial and political empire. Not all of their imperial
fantasies materialized, but they exercised enough power to shape the political culture of
the Far West prior to the Civil War. The old men who withered away in San Gabriel’s
Dixie Manor can perhaps be considered the last representatives of this once-mighty and
continent-spanning slave power.
There is a political imperative to remembering. To lay the sin of slavery at the
South’s door is to ignore the western half of the continent and its role in nurturing the
ideology upon which that institution drew strength. Slavery was indeed national. During
the antebellum period, bondspeople – black, brown, and red alike – could be found in the
gold fields of California, the Mormon households of Utah, the mines of Arizona, and the
adobe towns of New Mexico. To be sure, black chattel slavery never flourished as an
economic system in those places. Yet the fact that it was legally protected in most of the
antebellum Southwest, despite the lack of economic incentives, speaks to the remarkably
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broad appeal and durability of race-based systems of unfreedom. In framing the history
of American slavery as regional, rather than national, we indulge a misguided brand of
American exceptionalism and impose a moral quarantine on a system that recognized no
natural limits.
This dissertation rests on a relatively straightforward premise: The road to
disunion ran west, and unless we account for the Pacific ambitions of slaveholders, our
understanding of America’s bloodiest conflict will remain incomplete. Several studies
have pointed to the existence of slavery in particular territories and states of the West.
But no historian has yet to enlarge the geographic optic, and to explore the deep political
affinities that ran from the coastal Carolinas to the shores of the Pacific. With regard to
the vast scholarship on slaveholding imperialism, historians’ geographic purview
generally hits a western boundary at Kansas. These scholars have instead fixed their
focus eastward, their attention drawn to bloody bids for territory in the Atlantic Basin –
the invasions of Nicaragua and Cuba, for instance. But the horizons of proslavery
imperialists also stretched far in the opposite direction, all the way to the ports of China.
Slaveholders fought for the Far West and its commercial outlets, first through legislation
and infrastructural projects, and then with rebel armies. This dissertation has attempted
to reconstruct this grand imperial project – how it came to be, how it was destroyed, and
why it ultimately mattered.

6

Indeed, the passage of Utah and New Mexico’s slave codes and California’s Archy Lee decision
coincided with Britain’s attempts to offset the economic fallout from emancipation by importing coolie
bound labor across its global empire.
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Yet in the end, such a study may raise more questions than it answers. And the
geographic scope could be enlarged further still. Where, for instance, did Oregon fit into
the imperial imagination of slaveholders? Henry Foote was hardly the only Confederate
to expect that the Pacific Northwest would join California in forming an independent
western republic.7 Like California, Oregon had been dominated by Democratic
politicians through much of the antebellum period, and in 1860 it supplied the vice
presidential candidate, Joseph Lane, on John C. Breckinridge’s proslavery ticket. When
discussing the promise of the Far West, slaveholders also eyed northern Mexico.
Filibusters like William Walker and Henry Crabb launched invasions of Sonora with the
blessing of many of California’s proslavery leaders. For southerners like PostmasterGeneral A.V. Brown, western infrastructural development dovetailed nicely with
territorial conquest. His unabashedly sectional report on the overland mail road
celebrated the route’s potential to unite south and west, and to provide a staging ground
for potential invasions of northern Mexico.8 In short, slaveholding visions of empire
encompassed an enormous swath of the American West and Mexican North, and future
research will hopefully explore the dimensions of these grand ambitions and what they
can tell us about the antebellum United States.
The ambitions of slaveholding expansionists only hastened their empire’s
collapse. A western proslavery project that had been cultivated for decades crumbled

7

See his 1862 resolution “recognizing the practical neutrality of the States of California and Oregon, and of
the Territories of Washington and Nevada,” in Frank Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary of
American Events, with Documents, Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, Etc., 11 volumes (New York:
G.P. Putnam, 1863), 5:90. Recall that Foote also looked toward the Pacific Northwest as a field for
slaveholding expansion in an 1859 speech, reprinted in “The Southern Convention at Vicksburg, Part 2,”
De Bow’s Review 27 (August 1859), 216.
8
Report of the Postmaster General, Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st session, appendix, 27-28.
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decisively with the Confederate surrender at Appomattox in 1865. And yet in certain
places, southerners’ transcontinental political communities proved remarkably resilient.
Well into the twentieth century, ancient Confederate veterans in southern California
continued their rebellion in the only way they could: through memory. Clustered in the
retirement home of Dixie Manor and aided by nearby Confederate memorial associations,
these veterans celebrated a heroic past. They honored fallen comrades, wrote paeans to
their lost cause, and accepted new medals for old service. That they now lived thousands
of miles from the Confederate South and decades after the last guns fell silent mattered
little to them. On the contrary, Los Angeles County seemed a perfectly fitting location
for this minor Confederate renaissance. Indeed, what better place to seek their final rest
than the city that had once exemplified the slave South’s hold over the Far West?
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